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Research on inter-organizational relations (IORs) continues to proliferate as the result of 
the increasingly accepted recognition of the importance of IORs in firms’ success. IORs can be 
defined as “the relatively enduring transactions, flows, and linkages that occur among or between 
an organization and one or more organizations in its environment” (Oliver, 1990:241). Within 
this definition, research in this area has mostly focused on alliances, equity joint-ventures (EJVs) 
and supplier-buyer ties. In addition, the focus of research has largely been on the reasons for 
relationship  formation,  and  the  performance  implications  of  different  types  of  collaboration, 
rather than their change over time. Over the last two decades research on the evolution and 
dissolution of IORs has started to pick up gradually. Yet, a lack of empirical research on the 
drivers of IOR evolution, particularly those originating from strategic or environmental change, 
remains. We know even less about the performance implications of changes in IORs. I aim to fill 
some of the gaps in this literature with this dissertation.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
  The  extensive  body  of  literature  on  IORs  is  characterized  by  divergent  theoretical 
perspectives, definitions, levels of analyses and conclusions, preventing the development of a 
clear synthesis of what we know about IORs. One way to overcome some of these issues and to 
push  the  literature  forwards  is  to  strive  towards  more  precision  in  the  definitions  and 
categorizations of IORs (Mayer and Teece, 2008). Despite the vast differences between different 
types of IORs, a lot of research has defined alliances so broadly that they are often impossible to Chapter 1 
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differentiate  from  other  types  of  IORs  (Das  and  Teng,  2000;  Gulati,  1995,  1998).  In  this 
dissertation I will  largely  focus on one type of IOR, i.e., supplier-buyer ties. Supplier-buyer 
relations  constitute  one  type  of  IORs,  which  can  be  construed  as  market-type  procurement 
relationships which typically rely on competitive bidding, and differ from other forms of IORs. 
Supplier-buyer ties are generally aimed at gaining access to inputs or at improving efficiency or 
performance in a specific area, while alliances and equity joint-ventures are often pursued for 
corporate development purposes, i.e., to expand or reshape a firm’s operations. The main goal of 
this dissertation is to indentify drivers of relationship change, specifically what explains whether 
a  supplier-buyer  relationship  continues  or  is  terminated,  and  subsequently  analyze  how 
relationship change affects firm performance – two issues on which the extant literature has only 
provided us limited insights. Hence, my dissertation aims to answer the following overarching 
question:  
What are the determinants and performance implications of change in supplier-buyer 
relations?  
In Chapter 2 I review the literature on the evolution and dissolution of IORs in general, 
and  supplier-buyer relations  in particular. In doing so, I  identify established determinants of 
relationship change and identify gaps in the literature. I focus on the interplay between different 
types of IORs and their implications for relationship change. I argue that not only concurrent 
IORs have the possibility to affect each other, but prior collaborations can also have an impact 
on IOR evolution and dissolution through the occurrence of experience spillovers. In addition, I 
discuss how a firm’s strategic actions stand to impact its IORs. I focus on the effect of corporate 
development activities, i.e., those activities aimed at expanding or reshaping a firm’s business, in 
particular.  I  first  discuss  how  corporate  development  pursued  through  inter-organizational General Introduction 
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collaborations, such as alliances and equity joint-ventures, affect other IORs, further reinforcing 
the notion that IORs do not operate in isolation from each other.
 1 After a brief general discussion 
of the impact of various other types of corporate development activities, I focus on mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As)
2, as a trigger of IOR change in particular. 
In Chapter 3 I examine empirically the interplay between external corporate development 
activities,  i.e.,  alliances,  equity  joint-ventures  and  M&As,  and  supplier-buyer  ties.  More 
precisely, I address the following research question:  
How do firms’ cumulative external corporate development activities (CDA) - i.e., the 
alliances, EJVs, M&As they pursue to expand and reshape their business - affect the 
stability of their supplier ties? 
I  use  the  notion  of  experience  spillovers,  based  on  transfer  theory,  to  elucidate  how 
corporate  development  activity  experience  affects  supplier  tie  stability.  I  argue  that  the 
occurrence  and  magnitude  of  experience  spillovers  depends  on  the  similarity  between  these 
corporate development activities and supplier-buyer ties, and elaborate on two dimensions of this 
similarity:  similarity  among  governance  modes,  and  similarity  in  the  direction  (vertical  vs. 
horizontal)  of  the  relationship  between  firms.  I  test  my  hypotheses  on  a  sample  of  381 
advertising agency-client ties which I track over a period of 12 years, thereby showing that not 
                                                              
1 Corporate development, which is an essential part of firms’ strategies, can be pursued through external activities 
such  as alliances,  equity  joint-ventures,  and  mergers  and acquisitions,  or through  internal  actions  such  as new 
product  development,  restructuring,  or  greenfield  expansions.  Corporate  development  is  often  pursued  through 
IORs, but not all IORs are pursued to achieve corporate development. Some IORs are pursued to gain access to 
inputs  (e.g.,  supplier-buyer  ties),  for  distribution  purposes,  to  lower  costs  or  to  improve  efficiency  in  existing 
operations. In addition, not all external corporate development activities can be classified as IORs.  
2Mergers usually refer to “mergers of equals” where two companies become unified into one unit, while acquisitions 
refer to cases in which one company takes over another company or a subsidiary and integrates it into its own 
company,  although  the  degree  of  integration  may  vary  considerably  across  acquisition  deals.  Despite  these 
differences, in reality very few true mergers occur and the terms M&As, mergers and acquisitions are often used 
interchangeably in empirical research (King et al., 2004). In line with previous research, I will use the terms M&As 
and acquisitions interchangeably.  Chapter 1 
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all  types  of  experience  matter  in  the  same  way.  These  findings  have  implications  for  a 
generalized theory of the evolution of inter-organizational relationships. 
In  Chapter  4  I  focus  on  the  effect  of  strategic  actions,  specifically  M&As,  on  the 
continuation of supplier-buyer ties and address the following research question: 
How do buyer-level M&As affect the willingness of the buyer and the supplier to continue 
their relationship? 
 Drawing on the co-evolutionary perspective on IORs - which postulates that IORs are 
intertwined with the partners’ strategies - I argue that the occurrence of an M&A will affect the 
likelihood of supplier-buyer tie continuation. I examine the implications of buyer firm M&As for 
supplier-buyer ties, both from the buyer and the supplier’s perspective. I focus on the changes 
M&As trigger in the competitive dynamics in the supplier’s customer portfolio, which in turn 
affect  both  the  buyer’s  and  the  supplier’s  willingness  to  continue  their  relationship.  More 
precisely, I focus on post-M&A changes in competitive overlap between the merged company 
and the other buyers in the focal supplier’s customer base. I test my hypotheses on a sample of 
798 advertising agency-client ties, for which the client was involved in an acquisition. By taking 
a  two-sided  view  of  supplier-buyer  tie  continuation  and  by  examining  the  implications  of 
strategic actions and the competitive dynamics they may trigger, I contribute to the supplier-
buyer  literature  and  more  generally  to  the  IOR  literature.  In  addition,  by  examining  what 
essentially constitute important boundary spanning resources, I contribute to the literature on 
post-M&A  resource  reconfiguration  which  has  hitherto  only  focused  on  resources  residing 
within the boundaries of the acquiring or target firms.  
Whereas  Chapters  2-4  focus  on  the  drivers  of  IOR  change,  Chapter  5  addresses  the 
performance implications of change in IORs. To fully understand these implications, I move General Introduction 
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from  the  dyadic  level  of  analysis  to  the  portfolio  level  and  address  the  following  research 
question:  
How does supplier-portfolio reconfiguration affect firms’ performance?  
 I postulate that the effect of portfolio reconfiguration on performance will be contingent 
on the characteristics of the portfolio and the ties it contains. I test my hypotheses on a sample of 
1,118 firms whose portfolios of relationships with advertising agencies (suppliers) I tracked for a 
period  of  5  years.  This  study  illustrates  the  importance  of  inter-firm  resources  for  firm 
performance. Moreover, I contribute to the extant literature on IOR portfolios and on supplier-
buyer ties by showing how dynamics in supplier-buyer tie portfolios impact performance.  
Finally, Chapter 6 offers overarching conclusions derived from the empirical studies in 
Chapters 3-5, relates them with the literature discussed in Chapter 2 and other chapters, and 
discusses the main limitations of this research and suggestions for future research.  
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
This  dissertation  examines  the  research  questions  outlined  above  in  the  context  of 
advertising  agency-client  relationships.  Based  on  a  general  literature  review,  interviews 
conducted in the advertising industry as well as extensive research on the industry through trade 
publications, two main considerations led to the choice of this specific context. Firstly, due to the 
increasing  importance  of  services  in  the  world  economy,  research  has  started  to  focus 
increasingly  on  professional  service  firms  (e.g.,  Greenwood,  Deephouse  and  Li,  2007;  La, 
Patterson and Styles, 2009; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). However, research on supplier-buyer ties 
is somewhat lagging behind with relatively few studies focusing on the relationships between 
professional service providers and their clients (e.g., Baker, Faulkner and Fisher, 1998; Chatain, Chapter 1 
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2011;  Levinthal  and  Fichman,  1988).  Yet,  these  services  account  for  a  large  proportion  of 
corporate expenditure and contribute to the achievement of competitive advantage (Baker and 
Faulkner, 1991). Although there are some differences between service supplier-buyer ties and 
relationships in a manufacturing setting, this does not necessarily preclude the generalizability of 
the  results  as  there  are  also  many  similarities.  I  will  discuss  the  benefits  and  drawbacks  of 
focusing  on  a  service  context  in  each  of  the  empirical  chapters,  thereby  discussing  the 
generalizability of the results of each study.  
Secondly,  the  research  objective  of  this  dissertation  requires  an  empirical  context  in 
which (1) the relationships with suppliers of the focal service are of sufficient importance to 
firms, (2) the sourcing strategies for the focal service vary across firms, both in terms of duration 
and the number of suppliers firms maintain, and (3) firms can exit relationships relatively easily. 
After conducting  numerous  interviews with advertising executives  in Europe and the U.S. it 
became apparent that the advertising agency-client setting met these three criteria and offered a 
suitable context to study my research questions.  
Akin to other types of supplier-buyer ties, agency-client ties are market-like procurement 
relationships which rely on  competitive  bidding,  i.e., several  agencies pitching  for the same 
account. Moreover, advertising agencies constitute suppliers of important services that contribute 
to the success and the value of client firms by improving brand recognition and increasing sales, 
amongst other things (Assmus, Farley and Lehmann, 1984; Dekimpe and Hannsens, 1995; Jones, 
2007; Kim, 1993). In addition, stock markets react to changes in agency relationships (Mathur 
and  Mathur,  1996).  Hence,  the  relationships  with  advertising  agencies  are  of  sufficient 
importance  to  firms  to  assume  that  the  decision  to  switch  agencies  is  not  taken  lightly  or 
randomly.  General Introduction 
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Although it became apparent from the interviews and the trade press that firms do face 
switching costs - i.e., the cost of searching for a new agency and familiarizing it with the firm’s 
products, culture and customers - when changing advertising agencies, these relationships are not 
characterized  by  high  levels  of  physical  asset  specificity  that  could  potentially  make  it 
impossible for firms to exit the relationship. Moreover, advertising agency-client relations are of 
a legally open-ended nature, and usually entail no more than a 90-day notice for cancellation 
(Horsky, 2006). Consequently, studying determinants of change and stability is facilitated in this 
context as it prevents the effect of the variables of interest being overshadowed by the effect of 
high levels of physical asset specificity or other elements, such as contractual complications, that 
may  determine  relationship  duration  in  manufacturing  settings.  Moreover, there  are  no  legal 
restrictions that could affect firms’ sourcing options, as there are in, for example, the case of 
auditing services where firms can only use one auditor (Baker et al., 1998). This improves the 
generalizability  of  the  findings  to  other  contexts.  Moreover,  there  is  a  lot  of  variety  in  the 
sourcing strategies that firms pursue when it comes to advertising, both in terms of the number of 
relationships  they  maintain  and  the  duration  of  these  relationships.  Yet,  agency  executives 
stressed  that  it  remains  unclear  what  really  drives  these  differences,  suggesting  that  future 
research on these issues is well warranted.  
In short, the study of supplier-buyer ties in professional service contexts is well warranted 
and advertising agency-client relationships offer a very interesting and suitable context to study 
the research questions postulated in this dissertation.  







THE EVOLUTION AND DISSOLUTION OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
RELATIONS: A REVIEW AND EXTENSION OF PAST RESEARCH 
 
ABSTRACT 
We provide a comprehensive review of the literature on the determinants of the evolution 
and dissolution of inter-organizational relations (IORs). We identified several gaps in the 
current literature and proposed avenues for future research. We focused predominantly 
on the interplay between different types of IORs and between IORs and firms’ strategic 
actions.  Firstly,  we  suggested  that  future  research  should  examine  the  possibility  of 
experience spillovers between different types of IORs that stand to impact the evolution 
and  dissolution  of  IORs.  Secondly,  we  discussed  the  implications  of  M&As  for  the 
evolution  and  dissolution  of  IORs  in  general,  and  supplier-buyer  ties  in  particular. 
Overall, we offer new propositions and suggestions to advance the IOR literature.   
   
                                                 
1 This chapter is the result of joint work with Xavier Martin. Chapter 2        
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INTRODUCTION 
Research  on  inter-organizational  relations  (IORs)  continues  to  proliferate,  but 
many  questions  remain  unanswered.  A  lot  of  prior  IOR  research  has  focused  on  the 
antecedents of IOR formation, the mode of governance of these relations, the structural 
aspects of firms’ networks of IORs, and the effects on performance from a variety of 
theoretical  perspectives  (e.g.,  Baum,  Calabrese  and  Silverman,  2000;  Gulati,  1998; 
Hennart,  1988;  Oxley  and  Sampson,  2004;  Parkhe,  1993;  Stuart,  1998).  Moreover, 
several scholars have provided a synthesis of the literature in these areas (e.g., Barringer 
and Harrison, 2000; Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Oliver, 1990). Consequently, we know a 
lot about IOR formation and the benefits and performance implications of different types 
of  IORs.  However,  we  know  comparatively  little  about  how  different  types  of  IORs 
evolve and eventually come to an end. Although IOR termination has certainly enjoyed 
some attention, it has often been treated as an undesirable outcome or as failure (e.g., 
Barkema et al., 1997; Park and Russo, 1996). Yet, dissolution can also be conceived of as 
a conscious strategic action, one of which we have only limited understanding (Hennart 
et al., 1998; Jones et al., 1998). This paper is aimed at furthering our understanding of the 
evolution and dissolution of IORs in general and supplier-buyer ties in particular.  
One  of  the  main  obstacles  in  providing  a  synthesis  of  the  literature  on  the 
evolution and dissolution of IORs stems from the differences between IORs. Much of the 
previous literature has either focused on one type of IOR (e.g., alliances or equity joint-
ventures) under the assumption that the findings are generalizable to all other types, or 
focused on one type without considering the broader implications for other types of IORs 




flows,  and  linkages  that  occur  among  or  between  an  organization  and  one  or  more 
organizations in its environment”. The most commonly studied IORs are alliances, equity 
joint-ventures, and supplier-buyer ties. Despite the differences between these IORs, a lot 
of research has used very broad definitions, particularly for alliances, making it almost 
impossible  to  differentiate  one  type  from  another  or  draw  general  conclusions  about 
specific types of IORs (e.g., Das and Teng, 2000; Gulati, 1995, 1998). Moreover, some 
studies have theoretically discussed alliances, while empirically studying equity  joint-
ventures or including both types of IORs without controlling for any differences (e.g., 
Xia, 2010). Recently, the literature has been advanced by a call for more precision in the 
definitions  and  categorizations  of  IORs  in  order  to  avoid  coming  to  seemingly 
contradictory  conclusions  (Mayer  and  Teece,  2008). In  line  with  this,  we  distinguish 
between different types of IORs, and aim to provide more focused definitions of the types 
of IORs we discuss.
2  
Alliances  can  be  defined  as  collaborative  arrangements  governed  by  contracts 
whereby two or more organizations each  contribute resources  in pursuit of  economic 
goals  (Martin  and  Salomon,  2003).  Equity  joint-ventures  (EJVs)  achieve  their 
cooperative purpose by creating a new entity, which requires equity contributions as well 
as commitment of resources and employees to make the new venture work (Martin and 
Salomon, 2003). Alliances and EJVs are often pursued to achieve corporate development, 
i.e.,  to  expand  or  reshape  the  firms’  business  by  for  example  expanding  into  new 
                                                 
2 Although we try to highlight and take into account the differences between different IORs as much as 
possible, providing a review of the literature that has grouped different IORs together will inevitably lead to 
us doing the same when discussing some studies. In fact, in some cases it is even impossible to accurately 
assess which types of IORs the study has focused on based on the definition and the description of the data 
provided. Moreover, we draw on research from different streams which in some instances uses different 
labels for similar concepts, or differ in their definitions of some concepts. We recognize that there is also 
heterogeneity within each category of IORs. In this chapter we restrict our discussion to differences across 
categories, but in Chapter 3 we touch upon some of the differences within categories.  Chapter 2        
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geographic or product markets. EJVs and alliances have a lot of commonalities and are 
often  studied  under  the  general  label  of  “alliances”.  Yet  there  are  some  important 
differences. For example, EJVs usually entail more knowledge sharing, higher set-up and 
dissolution costs, and tend to be of a  longer duration than alliances (Harrigan, 1988; 
Mowery  et  al.,  1997;  Pangarkar,  2003;  Sampson,  2007;  Santoro  and  McGill,  2005). 
Supplier-buyer relations are yet another distinct type of IOR differing from alliances or 
EJVs  as  they  are  market-type  procurement  relationships  which  typically  rely  on 
competitive  bidding.  Supplier-buyer  relations  differ  from  alliances  in  terms  of  their 
underlying contracts and administrative structures, the level of exchange of proprietary 
information  that  takes  place,  the  approach  to  dispute  resolution  and  likelihood  of 
termination following conflict, amongst other things (Mayer and Teece, 2008). Moreover, 
unlike  many  alliances  and  EJVs,  supplier-buyer  ties  are  generally  not  pursued  for 
corporate development purposes, but rather to gain access to key resources or to improve 
operational efficiency.  
The dynamics and the discrepancies in goals between partners - and consequently 
the reactions to certain events occurring within or outside the collaboration - also vary 
considerably  across  different  types  of  IORs.  Although  there  are  some  underlying 
commonalities  -  i.e., the need to select and negotiate with potential partners, organize 
the  form of  collaboration and  negotiate appropriate contracts, manage and  coordinate 
activities  across  organizational  boundaries,  evaluate  and  adjust  the  collaboration  as 
conditions change - the differences between these types of IORs should not be ignored as 




strategy field, and open up interesting avenues for research on the interplay between these 
different types of IORs. 
We first provide an overview of the literature on relationship evolution in general, 
focusing mostly on alliances and EJVs. Subsequently, we focus on supplier-buyer tie 
evolution in particular. Next, we discuss the literature on relationship dissolution. Again, 
we focus on IORs in general and supplier-buyer ties in particular. Appendices 1-4 offer 
an overview of the literature we discuss. Subsequently, we identify several gaps in the 
literature. Firstly, we discuss the interplay between different types of IORs. Secondly, we 
examine  the  implications  of  strategic  actions,  M&As  in  particular,  for  relationship 
evolution and dissolution. In doing so, we push the literature forwards by examining how 
IORs are affected by other actions the firm takes, and how they co-evolve with the firm’s 
strategy. In the process we derive testable propositions for future research.  
 
IOR EVOLUTION AND DISSOLUTION: CURRENT LITERATURE 
IOR Evolution   
The evolution of IORs has often been depicted as a multi-stage process (de Rond and 
Bouchikhi, 2004). Some scholars argued that IORs go through several predictable life-
cycle  stages,  i.e.,  partner  selection  and  courtship,  negotiation,  implementation  and 
operation, or a variant thereof (Achrol, Sheer and Stern, 1990; D’Aunno and Zuckerman, 
1987;  Forrest  and  Martin,  1992).  Others  argued  that  IORs  evolve  as  a  result  of 
unexpected consequences of actions, but they do not follow a predictable trajectory as is 
often assumed in the life-cycle perspective (de Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004). Doz (1996) 
portrayed alliance evolution as a sequence of learning, re-evaluation and re-adjustment Chapter 2        
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stages. As partners learn by interacting and react to shocks triggered by events taking 
place within or external to the relationship, they evaluate the alliances for efficiency and 
each other for equity and adaptability and subsequently revise the initial conditions of the 
alliance  (Ariño  and  de  la  Torre,  1998;  Doz,  1996).  Hence,  changes  in  the  scope, 
governance or purpose of IORs can be conceived of as the result of unexpected events, 
either  within  the  collaboration,  within  one  of  the  partner  organizations  or  in  the 
environment. 
Several other conceptual  studies  focused on the dynamics of IORs.  Koza and 
Lewin  (1998)  argued  that  strategic  alliances  are  embedded  in,  and  consequently  co-
evolve with, firms’ strategies and their institutional and competitive environment. Akin to 
these arguments, Hite and Hesterly (2001) suggested that emerging firms’ networks shift 
together  with  their  evolving  resource  needs  and  challenges  when  they  progress  from 
emergence  to  early  growth.  Kumar  and  Nti’s  (1998)  dynamic  theory  of  knowledge 
intensive  alliances  argued  that  the  partners’  absorptive  capacities,  the  patterns  of 
interaction amongst them, and changes in the environment and in the strategies of the 
partners,  determined  the  evolutionary  path  of  alliances.  More  precisely,  partners’ 
reactions  to  discrepancies  between  expected  and  actual  outcomes  of  collaborative 
processes will determine how the collaboration evolves.  
Reuer, Zollo and Singh (2002) offered one of the few empirical studies on IOR 
evolution  by  focusing  on  the  occurrence  and  determinants  of  alterations  in  alliance 
contracts, boards and monitoring mechanisms. Their focus was largely on characteristics 
of the relationship and the partners - i.e., prior experience, the alliance scope, its division 




that may act as shocks to the IOR. Reuer and Ariño (2002) fill this gap by showing that in 
addition  to  the  initial  conditions  of  the  alliance,  strategic  change  in  the  partner 
organizations  is  also  an  important  determinant  of  the  likelihood  of  contractual 
renegotiations in alliances. Nevertheless, contrary to claims in earlier conceptual work, 
they failed to find statistical evidence of environmental change as a trigger of alliance 
dynamics. However, they did not distinguish between different types of environmental 
change and only focused on one aspect of IOR evolution, i.e., contractual renegotiations. 
Network research provided some additional insights. For instance, Madhavan et 
al. (1998) showed that regulatory and technology shocks change the structure in alliance 
networks. Koka et al. (2006) postulated that changes  in resource  munificence and  in 
environmental  uncertainty  are  key  drivers  of  network  evolution.  In  a  similar  vein, 
Hoffman (2007) argued that the evolution of firms’ alliance portfolios is a function of 
their strategic uncertainty and resource endowments, environmental uncertainty, as well 
as  the  actions  of  other  firms  they  are  directly  or  indirectly  linked  to.  Lorenzoni  and 
Lipparini’s (1999) study of three networks in the Italian packaging industry showed that 
network  change  is  triggered  by  events  at  the  industry  level.  Despite  these  valuable 
insights,  more  empirical  research  is  well  warranted  to  get  a  more  comprehensive 
understanding  of  the  implications  of  different  types  of  strategic  and  environmental 
change for IORs.  
Supplier-Buyer Tie Evolution 
Given the differences between supplier-buyer ties and other types of IORs, such 
as alliances and EJVs on which the bulk of the research outlined above focuses, it is well 
worth examining the literature that discusses supplier-buyer ties in particular. Much of Chapter 2        
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the literature on supplier-buyer relationships has focused on explaining the different types 
of  relationships  and  sourcing  strategies  firms  maintain,  the  importance  of  knowledge 
sharing and the development of relation-specific assets in these relationships, the role of 
trust, and on their performance implications (e.g., Kotabe et al., 2003; Lazzarini, Miller 
and  Zenger,  2008;  Mesquita,  Anand  and  Brusch,  2008;  Mudambi  and  Helper;  1998; 
Srinivasan  and  Brush,  2006).  Yet,  we  have  only  limited  insights  into  the  way  these 
relationships evolve. Dwyer et al. (1987) described the evolution of supplier-buyer ties 
based on five stages: (1) achieving awareness of the need for an exchange partner and 
recognizing  potential  partners,  (2)  the  exploration  phase  in  which  the  relationship  is 
established and collaboration starts, (3) expansion and deepening of the relationship, (4) 
commitment stage and (5) dissolution.  
In  line  with  these  arguments,  Asanuma  (1989)  suggested  that  buyers  in  the 
Japanese  automobile  and  electric  machinery  industry  start  off  supplier  relations  with 
relatively simple tasks, and subsequently move on to more ambitious joint or delegated 
projects involving customized products as the relationship evolves and matures, and as 
relation-specific skills are developed. Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) also observed an 
evolution in supplier-buyer ties towards closer and stronger relationships as a result of 
changes  in the buyer’s environment that required  more specialized products from the 
suppliers. In professional services contexts, similar dynamics were observed. Levinthal 
and Fichman (1988) showed that in the early stages of client-auditor relations, the rate at 
which those ties ended increased with time and after this phase, labeled the “honeymoon” 
period, the rate at which relationships ended decreased with time, which they attributed to 




At  the  network  level  of  analysis,  Li  and  colleagues  (2010)  found  that  the 
evolution of networks of supplier-buyer ties within business groups is driven by changes 
in the interdependencies between network members. Strategic actions, such as the pursuit 
of  unrelated  diversification,  alter  the  resource  requirements  of  buyers  and  the 
interdependencies amongst network members, thereby altering supplier-buyer networks.  
  This brief overview of extant research illustrates the scarcity of work in this area, 
at the dyadic level of analysis but even more so from a supplier network or portfolio 
perspective. Given the differences between supplier-buyer ties and other types of IORs 
(Mayer and Teece, 2008) it is imperative that we push this literature further to gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of these relationships.  
IOR Dissolution 
In  general,  much  less  is  known  about  relationship  dissolution  than  about,  for 
example, relationship formation and the performance effects of IORs (Greve et al., 2010). 
As the literature review in the previous sections already hinted at, dissolution is often the 
result  of  instability.  In  addition  to  this  work,  a  number  of  studies  have  examined 
relationship,  partner  and  environmental  level  determinants  of  relationship  dissolution 
from a variety of theoretical perspectives.  
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argued that IORs can be terminated for reasons 
exogenous (e.g., a shift in political regime) or endogenous to the collaborating parties 
(e.g.,  a  shift  in  organizational  commitments  or  performance,  or  conflict  between 
partners). Based on transaction cost economics a number of scholars have attributed IOR 
dissolution to competition between partners, ownership distributions in the case of EJVs, 
and the threat or manifestation of opportunistic behavior (e.g., Dhanaraj and Beamish, Chapter 2        
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2004; Killing, 1983; Park and Russo, 1996; Park and Ungson, 1997). According to real 
option theory JV instability – which refers to a number of different outcomes including 
dissolution and buy-outs – is determined by the parties’ decision to exercise the option or 
let it expire, which in turn is a function of exogenous uncertainty (Kogut, 1991; Vassolo, 
Anand  and  Folta,  2004).  Cuypers  and  Martin  (2007)  integrated  transaction  cost 
economics, real option theory and learning theory to discuss how factors endogenous and 
exogenous  to  the  joint-ventures  influence  its  instability.  They  postulated  that  the 
likelihood of JV instability, and the form it takes, is determined by environmental change, 
asset specificity and the options firms hold. According to resource dependence theory, 
IORs are formed because firms depend on resources of other organizations and they use 
IORs to control this dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). 
When this dependence or their resource needs change, relationships will be terminated 
(Das  and  Teng,  2000;  Seabright,  Levinthal  and  Fichman,  1992).  Similarly,  when 
partners’  skills  and  capabilities  converge  and  hence  they  have  little  to  gain  from 
continuing the collaboration, relationship dissolution becomes imminent (Nakamura et 
al.,  1996).  Yet,  according  to  social  exchange  theory,  the  development  of  individual 
attachments can attenuate these disruptive effects, while the departure or mobility of key 
individuals increases the risk of tie dissolution (Broschak, 2004; Seabright et al.1992).  
In  addition,  factors  such  as  cultural  differences  between  the  partners,  market 
overlap  and  multimarket  contact,  incompatibility  of  resources  and  skills,  conflict, 
changes in firm ownership, shifts in bargaining power, and tensions between competing 
forces - such as cooperation versus competition, rigidity versus flexibility and short-term 




(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; Das and Teng, 2000; Greve et al., 2010; Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997; Steensma et al., 2008; Yan and Zeng, 1999).  
This overview suggests that a fairly deterministic view of relationship dissolution 
prevails in the literature as a lot of research has focused on factors that make relationship 
dissolution  virtually  inevitable.  The  failure  to  recognize  relationship  dissolution  as  a 
conscious strategic choice in most of the literature, with the real option literature being a 
notable exception, is accompanied by the equation of termination with failure in much of 
the early work (Jones et al., 1998; Yan and Zeng, 1999).  
  Recent  work,  however,  has  suggested  that  IORs  -  and  thereby  the  decisions 
pertaining to their formation, operation, adjustment and termination - are embedded in the 
evolving strategies of the partner firms (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Koza and Lewin, 
1998; Reuer and  Ariño, 2002; Reuer and Zollo, 2005). Nevertheless, research on the 
effect of strategic actions on IOR dissolution remains scarce. To illustrate the importance 
of studying IORs in light of the firm’s broader strategy, we will focus on the interplay 
between different types of IORs and between IORs and M&As later on. 
 Supplier-Buyer Tie Dissolution 
  Baker, Faulkner and Fisher (1998) provide one of the most comprehensive studies 
of the determinants of supplier-buyer tie dissolution, taking  into account competitive, 
power and institutional forces. In line with previous work, they found evidence of the 
development  of  structural  and  individual  attachments  that  act  as  stabilizing  forces 
(Broschak,  2004;  Levinthal  and  Fichman,  1988;  Seabright  et  al.,  1992).  These 
attachments in turn are affected by the departure of individuals or major organizational 
changes like M&As, leading to an increase in the likelihood of tie dissolution.  Moreover, Chapter 2        
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the status of exchange partners and the market structure, as well as the level of rivalry 
also have a significant effect on tie continuation (Baker et al., 1998; Jensen, 2006). Some 
of these determinants of tie dissolution have been shown to impact other types of IORs as 
well.  However,  the  role  of  the  structure  of  the  market  and  the  level  of  rivalry  is 
particularly  relevant  for  supplier-buyer  ties  as  they  are  essentially  market-based 
procurement relationships based on competitive bidding. Suppliers’ failure to keep up 
with technological advancements or their  inability to live up to expectations are also 
reasons for supplier-buyer tie dissolution (Lazzarini et al., 2008).  
Despite  the  valuable  insights  accrued  through  this  work,  a  critical  omission 
remains,  i.e.,  the  failure  to  explicitly  take  into  account  that  both  the  buyer  and  the 
supplier can terminate the relationship. Moreover, previous research has fallen short in 
examining how changes on one side affect the willingness of the other exchange party to 
continue the relationship. At best the literature has taken into account the characteristics 
of both parties (e.g., Baker et al., 1998), but it has largely failed to take into account the 
dynamics and reactive processes that take place in relationships when changes take place 
in one of the firms. This omission stems from the implicit assumption underlying most of 
the literature on supplier-buyer ties that suppliers want to retain as much business as 
possible and are therefore reluctant to terminate relationships, and consequently, buyers 
call  the  shots.
3  However,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case  and  a  two-sided  view  of 
relationship dissolution would improve our understanding of the dissolution of supplier-
buyer ties.  
                                                 
3 Although IOR research in general also tends to takes a one-sided view, this is less problematic as there is 
no underlying assumption that one party would be willing to keep the relationship going no matter what. 
Moreover, the factors that lead to the desire to terminate the relationship on one side are likely to also affect 




EXTENSION OF THE LITERATURE 
  The  previous  sections  highlighted  the  current  state  of  the  literature  on  the 
evolution and dissolution of IORs in general, and supplier-buyer ties in particular. In this 
section, we will discuss several gaps  in the  literature and propose avenues  for future 
research. We  highlight the  importance of  considering IORs as  being a part of  firms’ 
strategies,  thereby  recognizing  the  interplay  between  different  types  of  IORs  and  the 
impact of other strategic actions on IORs.  
We first focus on the interplay between different types of IORs, including IORs 
that are aimed at corporate development and other forms of IORs such as supplier-buyer 
ties. Next, we examine how strategic actions affect IORs in general and supplier-buyer 
ties in particular. A wide variety of strategic actions, such as international expansion, 
corporate restructuring and M&As, stand to impact IORs. After a brief discussion of the 
impact of some of these actions, we focus on the effect of M&As in particular. M&As 
entail very high levels of resource commitment and are difficult to reverse. Moreover, 
they  often  entail  changes  in  strategic  direction,  change  in  organizational  structure, 
individual turnover, and consolidation of resources. As a result, they constitute important 
strategic actions with far-reaching implications for the organizations involved in the deal, 
but also for other stakeholders of the firms, making this a particularly interesting form of 
corporate  development  to  study.  We  focus  on  the  immediate  and  longer-term 
consequences of one of the collaborative partners becoming involved in an M&A with a 
third party. Subsequently, we move away from the dyadic perspective and focus on the 
implications of M&A for networks of IORs.  
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The Interplay between Different Types of IORs 
  A substantial portion of the literature on IORs - particularly the work focusing on 
the  dynamics  and  processes  -  focuses  on  dyadic  relations  in  isolation,  while  these 
relationships are  in  fact part of a  larger  system of IORs (Baker and  Faulkner, 2002; 
Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Shipilov and Li, 2010). For example, firms often maintain a 
portfolio of concurrent alliances to achieve their strategic goals (Wassmer, 2010). The 
network literature has extensively studied the system of IORs a firm is embedded in, but 
only a fraction of this work has focused on the dynamics in networks and the interplay 
between different types of relationships has been all but ignored.  
Firms may use multiple suppliers for the same component or service to reduce 
dependence  on  any  single  supplier  (Baker,  1990;  Martin  et  al.  1995;  Mudambe  and 
Helper, 1998). In those cases, changes in, or the termination of one of those relationships 
may  alter the power  balance and the  level of dependence  in relationships with other 
suppliers of the focal component as well. Similarly, firms may use multiple concurrent 
alliances or joint-ventures to pursue one specific corporate development goal. Or, they 
can maintain a portfolio of relationships with suppliers of a specific product or service, 
while also maintaining several concurrent alliances aimed at corporate development. In 
short, firms often pursue a variety of IORs simultaneously to achieve a strategic goal, or 
several different goals, causing relationships to affect one another and their faith to be 
intertwined. 
  Recently,  scholars  have  started  to  examine  how  concurrent  IORs  affect  each 
other. For example, Xia (2010) examined how a focal equity joint-venture’s survival is 




reduces the focal firm’s dependence on its partner and enhances its relative power in the 
focal  EJV,  thereby  increasing  the  likelihood  of  relationship  dissolution  (Xia,  2010). 
While Xia (2010) focused on the interplay between IORs of the same type – i.e., equity 
joint-ventures aimed  at corporate development, Lazzarini, Claro and  Mesquita (2008) 
examined the interplay between different types of concurrent alliances. They focused on 
how  jointly  occurring  horizontal  (supplier-supplier)  and  vertical  (supplier-buyer) 
alliances reinforce or undermine one another. The results suggested that firms’ desire to 
keep their bargaining power outweighs their desire to achieve learning effects that would 
occur by maintaining both intense vertical and horizontal relationships. As a result, firms 
weaken vertical ties when horizontal ties amongst suppliers become more intense, and 
vice  versa.  In  addition,  recent  work  showed  that  vertical  ties  drive  the  formation  of 
horizontal ties (Shipilov and Li, 2010). This work has taken an important step towards 
understanding  the  interplay  between  different  types  of  IORs,  but  a  lot  of  questions 
remain.  
  In addition to the need to examine the interplay between concurrent IORs in more 
detail, continuing the trend of the research outlined above, the examination of the inter-
temporal interactions between IORs is also well warranted. Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006) 
provided some initial insights into this by showing that the domains in which firms form 
alliances and the partners they choose are a function of their past alliances and their 
desire to balance exploitation and exploration through alliances. Yet, we know very little 
about the way experience with one type of IORs affects other types of IORs, both in 
terms of how they are managed and in terms of their outcomes. Several scholars have 
argued that firms develop an alliance capability through the accumulation of alliance Chapter 2        
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experience (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale and Singh, 2007). Or in more general 
terms,  firms  develop  a  “relational  capability”  or  a  “collaborative  capability”  through 
experience, which improves their ability to identify suitable potential partners, choose an 
optimal  governance  structure,  negotiate  the  form  of  the  collaboration,  manage  and 
monitor the venture, internalize or transfer specialized knowledge, and determine when to 
terminate the collaboration (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Reuer et al., 2002; Simonin, 
1997).  Despite  these  valuable  insights  into  the  outcomes  of  IORs,  several  important 
issues remain unaddressed. Firstly, most of the literature on the effect of experience in the 
context of IORs - alliances and EJVs  in particular - has  focused on the performance 
implications rather than on the dynamic implications. Moreover, this stream of work has 
almost exclusively focused on intra-activity learning, i.e., learning from experience with 
the  same  type  of  IOR,  ignoring  the  possibility  that  firms  can  apply  the  knowledge 
obtained through experience with one type of IOR to other types of relationships.    
The limited work that does address these two issues suggests that this is a fruitful 
avenue for future research. Several studies found a positive relationship between alliance 
and joint-venture experience and the longevity of these collaborations (Barkema et al., 
1997;  Pangarkar,  2003;  2009).  In  addition,  firms’  prior  alliance  experience  affects 
alliance  dynamics,  and  the  occurrence  of  post-formation  governance  changes  in 
particular, as well as the favorability of alliance outcomes (Reuer and Zollo, 2005; Reuer 
et al., 2002). Hence, there is some evidence that prior experience affects the dynamics 
and the likelihood of dissolution of IORs. Furthermore, some scholars implicitly assumed 
that firms learn how to improve performance of one type of IOR by gaining experience 




experience on alliances and on EJVs, yet their experience measure contains both types of 
collaborations. Hence, they implicitly assumed that the experience developed through one 
activity  is  also  of  use  in  the  other  activity,  i.e.,  experience  spillovers  occur  between 
different activities.  
The  idea  that  experience  spillovers  occur  between  different types  of  IORs,  is 
grounded in the fact that firms are confronted with similar challenges in these different 
IORs. For example, despite the differences between them, alliances, EJVs, and supplier-
buyer  ties  all  require  firms  to  select  appropriate  partners,  manage  and  coordinate 
activities across organizational boundaries, design and negotiate appropriate contracts, 
evaluate  performance,  manage  cultural  differences  and  decide  how  to  adjust  the 
collaboration and when to terminate it. Sampson (2005) argued that firms learn how to 
deal  with  such  complexities  by  gaining  experience  with  any  type  of  alliance,  and 
subsequently use the skills they developed in the context of other alliances as well. This 
would suggest that firms can develop a general expertise in relationship management that 
can be useful across collaborations (Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Zollo and Reuer (2009) 
found evidence of experience spillovers from alliances to M&A, but we know very little 
about the determinants and consequences of experience spillovers between different types 
of IORs.  
Hence, additional research is needed in order to fully understand the effect of 
experience spillovers on the outcomes and the evolution of different types of IORs. One 
of the skills firms develop through collaborative experience is that of knowing when and 
how  to  adjust  or terminate  the  collaboration  (Cuypers  and  Martin,  2007;  Martin  and 
Cuypers, 2010; Reuer et al., 2002; Simonin, 1997). Hence, gaining experience with this Chapter 2        
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aspect of collaboration, which can be gained through different types of IORs, will affect 
the evolution and termination decisions of different types of IORs.  
Proposition 1: Experience with one type of IOR will spill over to other types, 
thereby affecting the stability and duration of those relationships.  
 
In  order  for  this  literature  to  advance  and  provide  conclusive  insights, 
understanding the differences and similarities between different types of IORs is crucial. 
Continuing the past trend in the literature of grouping different types of IORs together 
and labeling them all as “alliances” (e.g., Das and Teng, 2000; Gulati, 1995, 1998) would 
impede the development of the literature on experience spillovers between IORs or could 
lead to inaccurate conclusions. Experience spillovers are driven by similarities between 
the activities at hand (Cormier and Hagman, 1987; Gick and Holyoak, 1987; Gick and 
McGarry, 1992; Zollo and Reuer, 2009) and although different types of IORs have a lot 
of  commonalities,  there  are  also  some  crucial  differences  -  for  example  in  the 
antecedents, form and longevity of collaboration - that stand to impact the occurrence and 
magnitude of experience spillovers.  
Proposition 2: The occurrence and magnitude of experience spillovers between 
different types of IORs will depend on the similarity between the IORs.   
 
  In short, IORs do not operate in isolation from the firms’ broader strategies and 
actions. The maintenance of other concurrent IORs, the formation of new IORs and the 




evolution and dissolution of  a  focal IOR. In addition, as we will discuss  in the  next 
section, other strategic actions may also influence the evolution of IORs.  
The Interplay between IORs and Corporate Development Activities 
As previously noted, the idea that inter-organizational relations co-evolve with 
firms’  strategies  has  featured  in  a  number  of  conceptual  studies  and  in  several  case 
studies (e.g., Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Hoffman, 2007; Koza and Lewin, 1998, 1999). 
However, the emerging body of research  in this area  is  yet to examine  how specific 
actions firms take in pursuit of strategic goals influence IORs. One starting point would 
be to rigorously examine how firms’ corporate development activities, which constitute 
an integral part of their strategies, influence their existing IORs. Xia’s recent work (2010) 
already took one step in that direction. More precisely, his work indicated that as firms 
continue their corporate development efforts, through the addition of other collaborative 
arrangements  in  the  same  industry  or  country  to  their  portfolio,  they  influence  the 
stability of their existing equity joint-ventures. Moreover, the pursuit of acquisitions - 
which constitute another strategic action aimed at corporate development -  in the same 
industry  or  country  as  a  focal  partnership  by  one  of  the  partners  also  reduces  the 
likelihood of continuation for the focal partnership. Similarly, Ariño and de la Torre’s 
case study (1998) showed that the acquisitions of a company that could perform many of 
the same functions as a firm’s alliance partners, distorted the balance in the relationship, 
causing it to change and eventually dissolve.  
In  addition,  there  is  evidence  that  firms’  international  expansion  activities 
influence, and are influenced by, the relationships they maintain with suppliers (Buch, 
2000; Martin et al., 1995, 1998; Nigh, Cho and Krishnan, 1986; Schrage and Lu, 2009; Chapter 2        
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Seth and Quijano, 1991;  Wan et al., 2008). For example,  in the automotive  industry 
international  expansion  often  leads  to  ties  between  assemblers  and  component 
manufacturers being extended and recreated abroad (Martin et al., 1995). Yet, following 
customers abroad may lead to the erosion of the social relationships underlying the inter-
organizational  relationships,  resulting  in  weakened  relationships  (Wan  et  al.,  2008). 
Hence,  there  is  some  evidence  to  support  the  idea  that  some  forms  of  corporate 
development affect firms’ IORs. Makino and colleagues (2007), on the other hand, failed 
to  find  a  significant  effect  of  another  form  of  corporate  development,  i.e.,  firm 
restructuring,  on  the  termination  of  international  joint-ventures  formed  by  Japanese 
parents. In short, more systematic research is needed to fully understand which forms of 
corporate development and which activities influence the different types of IORs. Hence, 
we take a first step at understanding this complex interplay by discussing the effect of 
one  specific  corporate  development  activity,  namely,  M&As  on  IORs  in  general  and 
subsequently on supplier-buyer ties in particular.  
We  put  forth  two  main  pathways  to  advance  the  literature  on  the  interplay 
between  M&As  and  IORs.  On  the  one  hand,  M&As  can  be  viewed  as  a  source  of 
disruption to IORs. We will first discuss disruptive effect of M&As in general, followed 
by a discussion of some forms of disruption that are particularly relevant to supplier-
buyer ties. On the other hand, M&As can be seen as an opportunity for reconfiguration of 
IORs, which applies to both supplier-buyer ties and other IORs.  
M&As as Disruptions to IORs 
The disruptive effects of M&As on the organizations directly involved have been 




employee morale and productivity, structural changes, resistance to change, and conflict 
during  the  course  of  M&As  (e.g.,  Hambrick  and  Cannella,  1993;  Haspeslagh  and 
Jemison, 1991; Paruchuri, Nerkar, and Hambrick, 2006; Walsh, 1989). In addition, we 
know from previous research that these same factors are likely to cause disruptions in 
IORs, potentially leading to their dissolution (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Baker et al., 
1998; Broschak, 2004; Seabright et al., 1992). Combining these insights, we postulate 
that the  internal disruptions caused  by M&As  will also spillover to the  firms’ IORs, 
thereby affecting their stability. As a result of the differences between IORs, some types 
of  collaboration  may  be  more  resilient  than  others,  helping  them  to  overcome  the 
disruptions and changes that M&As bring about. Yet, we expect all types of IORs to be at 
risk  of  being  affected  by  the  disruptions  caused  by  M&As,  although  the  degree  of 
disruptions may vary across types. 
In addition, M&As often lead to changes in the firms’ resource requirements, as 
well  as  altering  the  resources  available  inside  the  firm,  which  in  turn  will  affect  the 
relationships  they  seek  to  establish  or  maintain  to  gain  access  to  the  resources  they 
require (Cui, Calantone, and Griffith, 2010; Seabright et al., 1992). Keeping everything 
else  constant,  we  would  expect  IORs  to  face  an  increased  likelihood  of  dissolution 
following an M&A involving one of the collaborating partners.  
Proposition 3: The occurrence of an M&A in one of the collaborative partners’ 
organization will increase the likelihood of relationship dissolution. 
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M&As as Disruptions to Supplier-Buyer Ties 
In addition to the M&A induced disruptions we discussed for IORs in general, 
which also apply to supplier-buyer ties, we identify a number of additional factors that 
stand to impact both the supplier and the buyer’s willingness to continue the relationship 
after one  of  the  parties  is  involved  in  an  M&A.  We  focus  on  changes  in  status  and 
competitive overlap in the supplier’s customer base as a result of buyer or supplier-side 
M&As.  
M&As may disrupt the competitive dynamics in suppliers’ customer portfolios. 
Competitive overlap in the supplier’s customer base, i.e., the degree to which it includes 
buyer firms that compete in the same industry, creates indirect linkages between rivals 
through the supplier. Firms are often reluctant to share partners with rivals as the latter 
may  free  ride  on  relational  investments  or  benefit  from  information  leakage  or 
inadvertent  spillovers  (Gimeno,  2004).  Consequently,  when  supplier  M&As  increase 
competitive overlap, the suppliers may end up losing customers (Rogan, 2008).  
Proposition 4: An increase in competitive overlap between a focal buyer and the 
other  buyers  in  the  supplier’s  customer  portfolio,  caused  by  a  supplier-level 
M&A,  will  decrease  the  likelihood  that  the  relationship  with  the  focal  buyer 
continues. 
 
Yet, these concerns are not limited to supplier-side M&As. When two buyers are 
consolidated  through  a  merger  or  acquisition,  they  have  to  take  into  account  the 




that  they  are  being  combined  with.
4  Hence,  we  expect  buyers  to  take  the  degree  of 
competitive overlap in each supplier’s customer base into consideration when deciding 
which ties to maintain. In addition, suppliers may preemptively end their relationship 
with the merging customer out of fear of losing important buyers due to an increase in 
competitive overlap. 
Proposition 5: An increase in competitive overlap between a focal buyer and the 
other buyers in the supplier’s customer portfolio caused by a buyer-level M&A, 
will decrease the likelihood that the focal relationship continues. 
   
M&As may also have status implications, which extend beyond the firms directly 
involved in the deal. An organization’s status is largely determined by its affiliations with 
other prestigious firms (Podolny, 1993; Podolny and Phillips, 1996). Organizations face 
status  contagion  through  associations,  meaning  that  they  can  improve  their  status  by 
interacting with organizations that enjoy high status but they also risk status decline when 
they are affiliated with lower status organization (Washington and Zajac, 2005). These 
status contagion processes, in turn, have implications for the success and performance of 
firms, as their ability to attract customers and partners depends on their reputation and 
status (Jensen and Roy, 2008; Podolny, 1993; Stuart, 2000). However, their ability to 
retain existing customers or partners may also be affected by their status. When a supplier 
becomes involved in an acquisition that deteriorates its status, by either being acquired by 
or acquiring a  lower status firm,  buyer  firms  may perceive this as a  negative  signal. 
                                                 
4 In the case of horizontal M&As, i.e., M&As between firms operating in the same industry, the acquisition 
does not change the industries the newly combined firm competes in. In other types of M&As the situation 
may be quite different as the expansion into a new industry through an acquisition also brings in a new set 
of competitors, some of whom the firm may be linked to through pre-existing supplier relationships. Chapter 2        
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Hence,  we  would  expect the  status  implications  of  supplier-side  M&As  to  affect the 
buyer’s willingness to continue the relationship with the merging suppliers.  
 Proposition 6: Buyers are more likely to terminate their  relationships  with a 
merging supplier if the supplier’s status is negatively affected by the M&A.  
 
Buyer-level M&As may also affect suppliers’ status and thereby their willingness 
to continue the relationship. The supplier of a buyer being acquired will experience a 
negative status effect if the acquirer is lower in status than the target, or if it is linked to 
suppliers that have a lower status than the focal supplier. Similarly, the supplier of a 
company acquiring a lower status target, or a target that works with low status suppliers, 
could potentially experience a decline in status if it continues to work with the merged 
buyer. If suppliers become directly or indirectly connected to organizations that could 
potentially bring down their status through the buyer-level M&A, status anxiety is like to 
prompt suppliers to detach themselves from the merging buyer in an attempt to protect 
their own status (Jensen, 2006).  
Proposition 7a: Suppliers will terminate their relationship with a merging buyer 
if, as a result of the buyer-level M&A, they become linked to a lower status buyer. 
 
Proposition 7b: Suppliers will terminate their relationship with a merging buyer 
if, as a result of the buyer-level M&A, they become indirectly linked to low-status 
suppliers.  




In addition, the relative standing of a focal supplier in comparison to the merging 
buyer’s other suppliers, is likely to impact its willingness to continue the relationship. In 
its  traditional  sense,  the  theory  of  relative  standing  focuses  on  the  importance  of 
individuals’ status relative to that of others in a proximate social setting (Frank, 1985). 
The few M&A studies that have invoked the concept of relative standing have used it to 
explain individual reactions to M&As and individual turnover (Hambrick and Cannella, 
1993; Lubatkin et al., 1999; Ranft and Lord, 2000; Very et al., 1997). This work showed 
that executives, scientists, engineers and sales personnel of target companies are more 
likely to depart if they enjoy a low relative standing in comparison to their counterparts at 
the acquiring organization (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Ranft and Lord, 2000). Saxton 
and  Dollinger  (2004)  pushed  this  even  further  and  extended  the  notion  of  relative 
standing to other attributes of the acquired company.  
We deem the notion of relative standing to also be of relevance to supplier-buyer 
ties. Suppliers enjoy a certain relative standing in their buyers’ portfolios of suppliers. A 
reconfiguration of that portfolio as a result of the buyer becoming involved in an M&A 
can significantly alter this relative standing. For example, a lead supplier - who enjoys a 
high relative standing - of a company that is subsequently acquired may suddenly become 
a lower-tier supplier of the merged company, thereby losing considerable status relative 
to the other suppliers. We expect changes in suppliers’ relative standing to affect post-
M&A supplier-buyer tie continuation.  
Proposition 8: Negative changes in the status of a supplier with its buyer (i.e., 
loss of relative standing) following the buyer’s M&A will increase the likelihood 
of the supplier ending the relationship.  Chapter 2        
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M&As as Opportunities to Reconfigure IORs 
Acquisitions are often pursued to gain access to specific resources that cannot be 
obtained separately through the market and that are hard or impossible to imitate or build 
up in a short period of time. IORs certainly fit this resource profile as they are often 
characterized by individual attachments or relation-specific assets that prevent replication 
or decoupling  from the original context (Kotabe et al., 2003; Seabright et al., 1992). 
Developing strong and valuable IORs takes considerable time and effort (Heide and John, 
1990; Martin et al., 1995). In addition, valuable partners are scarce and have a limited 
capacity  for collaboration,  making IORs difficult to imitate or replace. Consequently, 
IORs  are  important  resources  that  contribute  to  firm  performance  and  value  creation 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Madhavan et al., 1998; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). As a result, 
some firms attempt to acquire customer, supplier or other types of relationships through 
M&As (Anderson et al., 2001; Rogan, 2008). IORs can consequently be construed as 
resources that are subject to reconfiguration.  
Several scholars focused on the dynamics of post-M&A resource reconfiguration 
- resource redeployment and asset divestiture in particular - and its effects on business 
change and on firm performance (e.g., Capron et al., 1998; Capron, 1999; Karim and 
Mitchell, 2000). Yet, their work focused largely on resources residing within the target or 
acquirer’s  firm  boundaries.  Despite  the  fact  that  resources  that  span  across  firm 
boundaries, such as IORs, are deemed critical for a firm’s success, much of the literature 
has failed to discuss how these resources are reconfigured following an acquisition. The 
key difference with the reconfiguration of internal resources is that the acquiring firm is 




resources.  The  focal  resources  are  essentially  collectively  owned  and  can  only  be 
accessed  through  the  collaboration,  and  hence,  reconfiguration  decisions  will  also  be 
subject  to  the  partner’s  willingness  to  continue  the  cooperation  post-M&A.  In  other 
words, after an acquisition the  focal  firm  may  decide to terminate some of  its  inter-
organizational collaborations while maintaining others, but its partners may also opt to 
terminate  the  relationships.  Consequently,  examining  the  effect  of  M&A  on  IORs 
requires a two-sided perspective to fully understand the implications of M&As on the 
dynamics and dissolution of IORs.  
From the acquiring companies’ perspective, invoking insights from the resource 
redeployment  literature,  we  would  expect  the  likelihood  of  tie  continuation  after  an 
acquisition to be determined by the strength of the relationship and the quality of the 
partner (Capron, 1999; Capron et al., 1998; Capron et al., 2001).
5 Hence, we propose: 
Proposition 9a: Acquiring or merging firms will retain or redeploy the strongest 
IORs. 
Proposition 9b: Acquiring or merging firms will retain or redeploy the IORs that 
give them access to the best partners (i.e., those that have the most to offer). 
 
However, previous research showed that acquirers often exhibit a preference for 
their  own  resources,  regardless  of  their  relative  strength.  As  a  result,  the  target’s 
resources  are  more  often  divested  than  those  of  the  acquirer  (Berchicci  et  al.,  2009; 
                                                 
5 We distinguish between relationship strength and the quality of the partner. Partner quality refers to the 
quality of resources and capabilities that a firm can potentially bring to the collaboration, while relationship 
strength refers to the quality of the collaboration and the level of relation-specific assets that has developed 
in the relationship. This distinction reflects two definitions of network or relational resources that have 
emerged in the literature, i.e., the definition that focuses on resources that are embedded in the relationship, 
and the alternative that focuses  on the resources that partner firms possess and that can potentially be 
accessed through the relationship (Lavie, 2008).  Chapter 2        
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Capron, 1999). Hence, we argue that the target’s ties are at a disadvantage compared to 
the acquirer’s ties, regardless of their strength or value. This may be the result of the 
acquiring firm’s unfamiliarity with the target’s resources, its inability to recognize the 
value that resides in the target, political processes or of the acquirer’s overconfidence in 
its own resources and capabilities (Berchicci et al., 2009; Capron, 1999; Karim, 2006). 
Regardless of the source of the disadvantage, we expect it to increase the likelihood of 
dissolution of the target’s supplier ties.  
Proposition 10: Target ties have a higher likelihood of being terminated following 
an acquisition than acquirer ties.  
 
The previous propositions were developed from the perspective of the merging 
company  and  hinge on the assumption that their partners are willing to continue the 
relationship  after the  focal  firm  has  become  involved  in  an acquisition, which  is  not 
always the case. The limited body of work that examined the implications of M&As for 
the  firms’  exchange  relationships  illustrated  the  difficulties  associated  with  the 
acquisition of IORs. The case study conducted by Anderson et al. (2001), for example, 
showed  that  firms  often  become  reluctant  to  keep  their  relationships  with  partners 
involved in an M&A as they expect them to be less committed, or because one of the 
parties involved in the acquisition has a negative reputation. 
Proposition 11: The likelihood of a firm terminating an IOR will increase when 
the firm’s partner is involved in an acquisition. 
 




Long-Term Effects of M&As on IORs 
  So far, we focused on the effects of M&As on IORs in the immediate aftermath of 
the deal, focusing in particular on the reconfiguration of IORs and disruptive effects of 
M&As. Yet, the stability of the relationships that are maintained after the acquisition, i.e., 
those that survived the reconfiguration process, may also be jeopardized. Some inter-
organizational resources may simply not be redeployable or they may be damaged in the 
reconfiguration process. The value of IORs largely resides in the relation-specific assets 
(or skills) - i.e., idiosyncratic interaction routines, which allow partners to communicate 
and collaborate more effectively - that develop in them (Fichman and Levinthal, 1991; 
Kotabe et al., 2003; Levinthal and  Fichman, 1988). These relation-specific  assets are 
knowledge based and their value is assumed to be hampered if one of the partners is 
substituted (Kotabe et al., 2003; Wernerfelt, 1985). Yet, we have no knowledge about 
what happens to these relation-specific assets when one of the partners is involved in an 
acquisition, and as a result is subjected to major organizational changes. Due to their high 
context and partner specific nature and the severe changes induced by M&As, relation-
specific assets may lose their value over the course of the implementation of the deal. For 
example, organizational restructuring and individual mobility or turnover could lead to 
the destruction of individual or organizational attachments and relation-specific assets. 
These attachments and relation-specific assets largely determine the duration and stability 
of  IORs  (Levinthal  and  Fichman,  1988).  After  an  initial  “honeymoon”  phase,  IORs 
exhibit a decrease in the likelihood of dissolution over time. Yet, if M&As destroy the 
attachments and relation-specific assets that drive this duration effect, the likelihood of 
tie dissolution of the redeployed ties will no longer diminish, and may even increase Chapter 2        
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again after the M&A. At the organizational level, change disrupts routines and resets the 
liability-of-newness  clock,  i.e.,  it  creates  the  same  conditions  that  make  young 
organizations  more  likely  to  fail  (Amburgey,  Kelly  and  Barnett,  1993;  Hannan  and 
Freeman,  1984,  1989).  We  expect  a  similar  logic  to  apply  to  IORs.  In  other  words, 
M&As may in essence have the effect of “resetting the clock” of relationships.  
Proposition 12: The occurrence of an acquisition will reset the clock of the IORs 
that are maintained following the acquisition.  
   
The Effect of M&As on IOR Networks 
Hitherto we focused on the consequences of M&As for single relationships, yet as 
we previously argued, in many instances IORs do not operate in isolation from each other 
and are part of a broader system of collaborations. Hence, M&As are likely to impact the 
entire system or network of IORs that the target and acquirer were embedded in prior to 
their combination. Research on the  interplay  between  firms’  networks and  M&As,  is 
sparse and has so far focused on the effect of networks on M&A related decisions. For 
example,  IORs,  in  the  form  of  director  interlocks,  affect  firms’  acquisition  behavior 
(Haunschild,  1993;  Haunschild  and  Beckman,  1998;  Westphal,  Seidel  and  Stewart, 
2001). In addition, Beckman and Haunschild (2002) showed that acquisition success and 
the premium paid are significantly affected by the M&A experience of the firm’s network 
partners. Finally, some recent work suggested that the structural characteristics of the 
networks in which firms operate also influence firms’ acquisition behavior (Lin et al., 
2009;  Vanhaverbeke,  Duysters  and  Noorderhaven,  2002). In  short, only  a  handful  of 




focusing  solely  on  the  effect  of  networks  on  acquisition  behavior  and  ignoring  the 
possibility that acquisitions trigger network dynamics.  
Network change is hampered by the inertial pressures firms face - resulting from 
internal,  network-specific and external constraints - when attempting to change IORs 
(Kim et al., 2006). M&As have the ability to bring a shock to the system and give firms 
the  opportunity  to  re-evaluate  their  IORs.  Yet,  the  limited  body  of  work  that  has 
examined network dynamics has focused on environmental triggers of network change, 
such as major technological developments, changes in regulations, shifts in consumer 
preferences or the entry of a competitor (e.g., Koka et al., 2006; Madhavan et al., 1998). 
The possibility that intra-industry M&A activity also causes changes in the industry’s 
competitive landscape, and is therefore likely to be a trigger of change in the structure 
and the competitive dynamics of the network, has not yet been empirically examined.   
Networks consist of direct and indirect competitive and cooperative relations. Yet, 
previous research has focused predominantly on the cooperative relationships and the 
benefits firms can accrue through those. The fact that firms may be indirectly linked to 
rivals through these cooperate relationships has  been all  but ignored  in the  literature. 
Nevertheless,  the  competitive  aspect  of  networks  and  these  indirect  linkages  have  a 
significant bearing on alliance  formation and partner selection (Gimeno, 2004). More 
precisely, some firms may try to form alliances with the partners of their rivals to try to 
achieve the same benefits, while others will try to avoid indirect linkages to competitors 
to reduce the risk of spillovers or free-riding and instead search for similar partners to try 
to duplicate the rivals’ benefits. Consequently, changes in network structure will alter the Chapter 2        
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direct and indirect linkages, thereby triggering concerns of knowledge spillovers, leading 
to relationship dissolution and further changes in the network to restore its balance.  
Moreover, M&As affect firms’ resource needs which could mean their current 
partners can no longer provide access to the resources required. Consequently, firms may 
terminate or replace existing relationships with new ones thereby altering the network in 
which  they  operate (Halinen  et  al.,  1999;  Madhaven  et  al.,  1998;  Hite  and  Hesterly, 
2001).  
Proposition  13:  M&As  affect  the  structure  and  competitive  dynamics  in  IOR 
networks.  
CONCLUSION 
  This paper provided an overview of the literature on the evolution and dissolution 
of  inter-organizational  relations  in  general,  and  supplier-buyer  ties  in  particular.  This 
overview, while not exhaustive, conveys the basic directions in which research on this 
issue has progressed to date and the gaps that remain. In the process, we suggested a 
number of fruitful avenues for future research.  
  Firstly, future research would benefit greatly from an increased understanding of 
the interplay between different types of IORs. One interesting issue that has yet to be 
empirically examined is the potential for experience spillovers between different types of 
IORs and how these affect relationship stability. We emphasized the need to distinguish 
between different types of IORs rather than grouping them altogether under the label 
“alliances” in order to push the IOR and strategy literature forwards.  
Secondly,  we  highlighted  organizational  and  environmental  drivers  of  IOR 




conceptual papers and case studies have identified strategic actions and environmental 
change as drivers of IOR evolution, empirical research is still lacking in these areas. We 
focused on the effect of M&As on the evolution and continuation of IORs. We identified 
two pathways that hold significant promise. One way to push the literature forward would 
be  to  examine  the  disruptive  effects  of  M&As.  We  discussed  several  M&A  induced 
changes that stand to disrupt IORs. In addition, we focused on some additional disruptive 
forces  that  are  particularly  relevant  for  supplier-buyer  ties.  We  suggested  that  status 
anxiety will be an important determinant of tie dissolution and that the theory of relative 
standing  can  be  expanded  to  the  inter-organizational  level  to  understand  suppliers’ 
willingness to continue their relationship with a merging buyer. In addition to fears of 
status loss, changes in the competitive overlap in the suppliers’ portfolio as a result of 
M&As  will  affect  both  the  supplier  and  the  buyer’s  willingness  to  continue  their 
collaboration after the acquisition.  
In  addition,  we  argued  that  IORs  can  also  be  viewed  as  important  strategic 
resources that are subject to reconfiguration. Treating IORs as resources that are subject 
to reconfiguration opens up an interesting avenue for future research, which will help us 
gain a more complete understanding of the triggers of IOR change as well as offering 
additional insights into the wider ranging implications of M&As. Building on the post-
M&A resource redeployment literature, we suggested that merging firms will take into 
account the strength of the ties and the quality of partners when making reconfiguration 
decisions.  However,  we  also  explored  the  possibility  that  acquirers  do  not  make 
completely rational and efficient decisions and in fact are guided by a bias against the 
target’s resources. Yet, when treating IORs as resources subject to reconfiguration it is Chapter 2        
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still crucial to take into account the disruptions that may stand to affect the other party’s 
willingness to continue the relationship. Hence, the literature can only be advanced by 
taking a two-sided view of post-M&A tie continuation. 
In addition, moving away from the dyadic level of analyses, we suggested that 
M&As are a source of network change. More precisely, we argued that M&As are likely 
to affect the structure and the competitive dynamics in the networks of the consolidating 
firms. In  short, examining the effect of M&As  on single relationships, as well as on 
networks of IORs is a fruitful avenue for future research. Although we focused mostly on 
the effect of specific strategic actions on the evolution and dissolution of IORs, more 
fine-grained empirical research investigating the effect of environmental changes on IOR 
and networks is also long overdue.  
Our overview of the literature resulted in three additional striking observations 
that  offer  interesting  opportunities  for  future  research.  Most  of  the  research  that  we 
reviewed focused on the dynamics and dissolution of alliances or equity joint-ventures. 
Other  types  of  IORs  have  enjoyed  far  less  attention  in  this  field.  Research  on  the 
evolution and dissolution of supplier-buyer ties is relatively scarce. Moreover, the work 
that  does  focus  on  supplier-buyer  ties  takes  a  dyadic  level  of  analysis,  leaving  the 
network  or  portfolio  level  of  analysis  all  but  ignored.  Secondly,  with  a  few  notable 
exceptions,  most  of  the  IOR  and  supplier-buyer  tie  research  has  focused  on 
manufacturing  contexts.  Yet,  the  study  of  supplier-buyer  ties  in  professional  service 
contexts is well warranted. Professional services are a major corporate expenditure and 
contribute to the achievement of competitive advantage (Baker and Faulkner, 1991). In 




some of the determinants of stability as these relationships do not entail high levels of 
physical asset specificity, and it is often easier to move out of these relationships, thereby 
avoiding confounding the effects of the factors under investigation with the effects of 
specialized investments in physical assets on tie stability. Hence, studies focusing on the 
relationships  between  accounting,  advertising,  banking  or  consulting  firms  and  their 
clients could push the literature on supplier-buyer ties further. Finally, the literature has 
focused on the antecedents rather than on the performance implications of the evolution 
and dissolution of IORs. We do know that IORs have the potential to contribute to firm 
performance  and  IOR  dissolution  may  lead  to  organizational  failure  (e.g.,  Singh  and 
Mitchell, 1996). Yet, we know very little about the performance implications of network 
evolution or of the reconfiguration of IORs following major strategic events.  
Overall, despite the overwhelming body of research that exists on IORs, a number 
of promising questions remain, offering scholars ample opportunities to make significant 
contributions to the field.  
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We examine how a buyer firm’s experience with external corporate development activities 
- i.e., alliances, equity joint-ventures and acquisitions - differentially affects the stability of 
its supplier ties. We argue that corporate development activities provide opportunities for 
learning  resulting  from  experience  spillovers,  but  that  the  effects  of  different  types  of 
experience  are  not  uniform  and  vary  on  specific  dimensions  of  the  experience's 
applicability. We distinguish between two types of similarity that stand to affect spillovers: 
(1)  similarity  in  terms  of  the  mode  of  governance,  i.e.,  “modal  similarity”;  and  (2) 
“directional similarity”  which  captures the distinction between vertical and horizontal 
activities. We find support for the hypothesized differentiated relationships between CDA 
experience and the stability of supplier-buyer ties in a sample of 381 advertising agency-
client ties. Our results show that not all types of CDA experience matter in the same way. 
Alliance and equity joint-venture experience impact supplier-buyer ties, albeit to varying 
degrees, while M&A experience does not have a significant effect. This has implications 
for a generalized theory of the evolution of inter-organizational relationships. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This chapter is the result of joint work with Xavier Martin. Earlier versions of this chapter, under a different 
working title, appeared in the Best Papers Proceedings of the Academy of Management, the Proceedings of 
the Annual Conference of the Administrative Sciences Association of Canada and received the Strategic 





Researchers have long argued that inter-organizational relations (IORs) have the 
potential to create value by offering the parties involved access to valuable resources and 
capabilities (Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000; Sampson, 2007). Given the importance of 
IORs  for firms,  it  is  imperative to understand why and  how  firms  form,  maintain and 
terminate  relationships.  The  drivers  of  IOR  formation  and  their  consequences  for  firm 
performance  have  been  studied  extensively  (e.g.,  Ahuja,  2000a,  2000b;  Anand  and 
Khanna, 2000; Oliver, 1990). Yet, less is known about the dynamics of these relationships 
and  the  causes  of  relationship  termination.  Research  in  this  area  has  shown  that  as  a 
relationship continues over time, the parties involved develop relation-specific assets (or 
skills)  -  i.e.,  idiosyncratic  interaction  routines,  which  allow  them  to  communicate  and 
collaborate more effectively - which  in turn  strengthen the relationships (Fichman and 
Levinthal,  1991;  Kotabe,  Martin  and  Domoto,  2003;  Levinthal  and  Fichman,  1988). 
Hence, the development of these relation-specific assets acts as a stabilizing force to the 
relationship, thereby increasing its duration. In early research, relationship termination was 
often treated as the inverse of relationship formation (Seabright et al., 1992). This view 
suggests that firms establish IORs to overcome a resource need, and once this need or the 
ability of the other party to fulfill this need changes, the relationship will be terminated.  
More recently, Baker et al. (1998) argued that the termination of IORs is a function 
of the effects of competition, power and institutional forces. In addition, Broschak (2004) 
showed that managers’  mobility  increases the  likelihood of tie dissolution. Despite the 
valuable insights that have emerged from this work, relatively little is known on how a 
firm’s strategic actions affect the stability of its IORs, and particularly its relationships 




corporate expansion events affect supplier-buyer ties in the automotive industry (Martin, 
Mitchell and Swaminathan, 1995). We extend this work by examining how firms’ external 
corporate development activities (CDA) – which are considered to be important strategic 
actions - affect the stability of their relationships with suppliers.
2 By focusing on those 
corporate development activities that entail at least some degree of inter-organizational 
collaboration, i.e., alliances, equity joint-ventures (EJVs) and acquisitions, we also shed 
light on the interplay between different types of IORs and on the co-evolution of IORs 
with firms’ strategies (Koza and Lewin, 1998). Recent research has highlighted the need to 
understand how different IORs interact. Lazzarini, Claro and Mesquita (2008) examined 
how jointly occurring horizontal and vertical alliances reinforce or undermine one another. 
In this paper we go beyond the examination of the interplay between different types of 
concurrent alliances, by examining an array of corporate development activities, including 
both IORs and M&As, and their subsequent impact on supplier-buyer ties.  
Intuitively,  we  would  expect  that  corporate  development  activities  cause 
disruptions, and subsequently destabilize supplier ties, as they are often associated with 
organizational or strategic change, as well as potential individual mobility (Barkema and 
Schijven, 2008; Das and Teng, 2002; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Paruchiri, Nerkar 
and Hambrick, 2006; Walsh 1988). However, in this paper we argue that external corporate 
development activities - which entail collaboration across organizational boundaries - in 
                                                 
2 Firms pursue corporate development activities to expand or reshape their business. They can do this through 
alliances, equity joint-ventures, greenfield investments, restructuring or divestments. In this paper we focus 
on  external  corporate  development  activities  that  entail  at  least  some  cooperation  across  organizational 
boundaries,  i.e.,  alliances,  EJVs  and  M&As.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  level  of  inter-organizational 
cooperation differs across these activities. For example, in M&As inter-organizational cooperation ceases as 
soon as the deal is closed and the two companies become one or the acquired unit becomes part of the 




fact offer opportunities for the development of relational routines, which can guide firms in 
other forms of inter-organizational collaboration as well.  
Drawing  on  the  literature  on  experiential  learning,  we  argue  that  as  firms 
accumulate experience with corporate development activities their supplier ties become 
more stable as they learn how to collaborate. Ample research has examined the effect of 
prior experience on the outcome of different types of IORs (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000; 
Barkema et al., 1997; Sampson, 2005). Yet, this work has consistently looked at intra-
activity learning, i.e., the effect of experience with a specific activity on the outcome of 
activities of the same kind. Recently, scholars have started to challenge the assumption of 
separable learning processes that underlies much of the experiential learning literature, by 
arguing that activities are not learned in a vacuum, and therefore, the experience gained in 
one type of activity influences other activities, provided that there is sufficient similarity 
between them (Nadolska and Barkema, 2007; Zollo and Reuer, 2009). In this paper we 
seek to further advance this literature by studying how a firm’s experience with corporate 
development  activities  influences  the  continuation  and  stability  of  its  supplier  ties.  By 
focusing  on  the  effect  of  CDA  experience  on  supplier-buyer  tie  stability  we  provide 
additional insights into the dynamics and termination of IORs, and supplier-buyer ties in 
particular. In addition, this paper adds to the literature on experiential learning by showing 
that experience in one area can significantly affect other activities, and thereby challenging 
the  implicit  assumption  that  prevails  in  much  of  the  traditional  learning  theory  that 
suggests that experiential learning occurs in isolation.  
We  test  our  hypotheses  on  a  sample  of  381  advertising  agency-client  relations 
started in 1995 and tracked over a 12-year period. Prior to our study we  conducted a 




the  industry  and  into  factors  that  may  potentially  drive  relationship  stability  and 
dissolution. From these interviews and from advertising industry publications it became 
apparent that client firms face considerable switching costs in the event of a replacement of 
an incumbent agency. In fact, it has been estimated that the search for a new agency costs 
clients $1,500 daily for every million dollars of ad budget (Agency Finder, 2009). For a 
relatively short 60-day agency search for a client with a $25 million advertising budget 
these  cost  would  add  up to  more than  $2  million,  not taking  into  account the  loss  of 
marketing  momentum  or  market  share  that  may  result  from  the  search.  Despite  these 
significant switching costs, client firms differ considerably in the way they handle their 
relationships with ad agencies, or suppliers in general. In this paper we shed light on one of 
the origins of these differences and on the drivers of relationship stability.   
 
THEORY 
Learning Opportunities Arising from CDA 
Several  studies  have  shown  that  firms  can  learn  from  their  experiences  and 
subsequently,  improve  performance  in  specific  tasks  (e.g.,  Anand  and  Khanna,  2000; 
Baum  and  Ingram,  1998;  Darr,  Argote,  and  Epple,  1995;  Sampson,  2005).  The  sheer 
complexity associated with  corporate development activities, and the  high  failure rates 
associated with some of these activities, have fuelled the discussion on the importance of 
experiential  learning  processes  in  this  context. For  example,  in  the  context of  M&As, 
experience contributes to future acquisition performance (e.g., Fowler and Schmidt, 1989), 
even  though  these  benefits  may  only  start  to  materialize  when  a  firm  becomes  very 
experienced or when the knowledge gained through experience is codified (Haleblian and 




The link between the potential development of an “alliance capability”, through the 
accumulation  of  alliance  experience,  and  alliance  success  has  also  been  extensively 
discussed (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale and Singh, 2007). More precisely, Anand 
and Khanna (2000) asserted that learning is particularly important in the context of inter-
organizational relations as it entails an improvement in a firm’s ability to anticipate and 
react to contingencies that cannot be specified ex ante in a formal contract. Their results 
showed that experience is beneficial for some types of joint-ventures, but not for licensing 
agreements.  Similarly,  Sampson  (2005)  argued  that  organizations  can  coordinate  and 
interact  more  effectively  and  efficiently  with  their  partners,  which  in  turn  improves 
collaborative benefits, if they develop alliance management skills through experience. In a 
similar vein, several others have suggested that firms develop a “relational capability” or a 
“collaborative  capability”  through  experience,  which  improves  their  ability  to  identify 
suitable potential partners, choose an optimal governance structure, negotiate the form of 
the  collaboration,  manage  and  monitor  the  venture,  internalize  or  transfer  specialized 
knowledge, and determine when to terminate the collaboration (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999; Reuer et al., 2002; Simonin, 1997). 
However,  not  all  types  of  experience  have  proven  to  be  beneficial  for  future 
performance  (e.g.,  Anand  and  Khanna,  2000;  Reuer  et  al.,  2002;  Sampson,  2005), 
suggesting  that  relatively  little  is  known  about  the  development  of  collaborative 
capabilities, or even about their mere existence in certain contexts. As a result, several 
scholars  have  started  to  examine  additional  sources  of  learning  and  capability 
development, such as the experience of others and vicarious learning mechanisms (e.g., 
Baum,  Li  and  Usher,  2000;  Beckman  and  Haunschild,  2002).  Yet,  experience  that  is 




the firm, is often ignored as a potential source of valuable knowledge and learning. In other 
words, most of the literature has overlooked the possibility that firms may benefit from 
inter-activity learning, i.e., where they learn how to successfully perform an activity by 
gaining experience with other related activities. 
This emphasis on intra-activity learning mechanisms in much of the literature stems 
from  the  underlying  assumption  that  firms  learn  by  encoding  inferences  from  their 
experiences into routines, which in turn are generally deemed to be a source of inertia and 
inflexibility and highly context specific (e.g., Gersick and Hackman, 1990; Hannan and 
Freeman,  1984). These  routines  guide  future  behavior  and  lead  to the  development of 
organizational  capabilities  (Levitt  and  March,  1988;  Nelson  and  Winter,  1982). 
Consequently,  much  research  has  focused  on  the  potential  of  capability  development 
through intra-activity learning mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, more recent work has emphasized the potential of routines as a source 
of organizational learning and change, with potential applications across rather than within 
activities. A starting point is the distinction between the ostensive and performative aspects 
of  routines,  i.e.,  between  the  structure  and  the  enactment  of  the  routines,  respectively 
(Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003). It is the performative aspect of routines 
that leads to change as it creates, maintains and modifies the ostensive dimension of the 
routine to accommodate for changing contexts or unexpected circumstances (Feldman and 
Pentland,  2003).  Based  on  this  more  dynamic  view  of  routines,  we  argue  that  the 
enactment  of  routines  pertaining  to  inter-organizational  collaborations  will  lead  to  the 
adjustment of their ostensive parts when necessary to ensure their applicability to future 
collaborations,  even  if  these  collaborations  are  of  a  different  form.  We  postulate  that 




organizational collaboration, lead to the development of specific relational or collaborative 
routines, which can then be applied to other forms of collaboration. In light of this, we 
examine how experience with different types of corporate development activities affects 
future behavior in related activities. 
Kotabe et al. (2003: 312) argued that the collaborative mechanisms that arise in 
long-term supplier-buyer ties, i.e., the relational assets, are not unique to vertical inter-
organizational  relations  and  that  they  are  also  of  relevance  inside  firms  that  integrate 
vertically or diversify through acquisitions, or in horizontal inter-organizational relations. 
In all of these situations knowledge transfer and sharing is important to generate additional 
returns  among  the  parties.  Having  the  appropriate  routines  and  capabilities  in  place  is 
therefore critical. In fact, Dyer and Singh (1998) posited that the development of superior 
inter-organizational knowledge-sharing routines is crucial to generate relational rents from 
collaboration.  However,  achieving  successful  inter-organizational  collaboration  requires 
more than the development of knowledge-sharing routines, as  firms also  need to have 
sufficient  skills  to  select  suitable  partners,  decide  on  the  mode  of  collaboration,  and 
subsequently  coordinate,  manage  and  evaluate  the  collaborative  activities  and 
communicate and bond with partners (Gulati, 1998; Schreiner, Kale and Corsten, 2009). 
By gaining experience with the different facets of the inter-organizational collaboration 
process firms develop a variety of routines - which we label as relational routines - that 
will guide future behavior (Levitt and March, 1988). These relational routines aid firms in 
selecting and negotiating with potential partners, organizing the form of collaboration and 
planning, evaluating and adjusting the collaboration (Day, 1995; Lambe, Spekman and 




benefits of collaboration faster in future collaborations than firms who have not developed 
these routines through experience (Lambe et al., 2000). 
We  argue  that  as  these  relational  routines  accumulate  and  are  refined  through 
experience, a collaborative capability will start to develop. However, the development of 
this  capability  is  not  solely  dependent  on  the  accumulation  of  routines  but  also  on 
cognitive  factors  (Gavetti,  2005).  More  precisely,  we  argue  that  the  ability  of  key 
individuals  to  draw  inferences  from  different  types  of  experience  will  also  aid  in  the 
development of this collaborative capability. Gavetti, Levinthal and Rivkin (2005) argued 
that  analogical  reasoning,  based  on  direct or  vicarious  experience,  allows  managers  to 
transfer knowledge from one setting to another. Hence, experience with different activities 
allows managers to draw analogies between activities and apply what they have learned to 
different contexts. 
Despite the fact that the notion of analogical reasoning has enjoyed relatively little 
attention in the organization and strategy research, the field of psychology has extensively 
studied  its  effects  (Cormier  and  Hagman,  1987;  Gick  and  Holyoak,  1987;  Gick  and 
McGarry, 1992). More precisely, transfer theory showed that decision  makers  leverage 
knowledge  gained  in  one  task  when  performing  a  subsequent  task,  and  consequently 
improve  task  performance,  provided  that  the  tasks  exhibit  sufficient  similarities.  For 
example,  Singley  and  Anderson  (1989)  showed  that  individuals  who  used  one 
programming  language  exhibited  positive  transfers  of  what  they  learned  when 
subsequently using another  language. Similarly,  Loewenstein et al. (1999) showed that 
students transfer knowledge  from one decision scenario to another, and this transfer  is 
stronger when they were initially confronted with two different but similarly structured 




groups with experience with different types of strategic problem-solving tasks outperform 
groups that only have experience with the focal task. 
Recently, organization and strategy scholars have drawn on this theory to examine 
potential transfer effects at the organizational level. In particular, Finkelstein and Haleblian 
(2002) examined the transfer effects between first and second acquisitions. Both the early 
work  in  psychology  and  Finkelstein  and  Haleblian’s  (2002)  work  focused  on  transfer 
effects  between  two  specific  tasks,  but  largely  failed  to  take  expertise  in  those  tasks 
resulting from prior experience into account (Novick, 1988; Singley and Anderson, 1989). 
As a result, more recent work has tried to fill this void by looking at transfer effects from 
experience with one activity to a related activity. 
Zollo and Reuer (2009) showed that under certain conditions alliance experience 
spills over to acquisition performance. In a similar vein, Nadolska and Barkema (2007) 
showed  that  international  acquirers  can  benefit  from  international  M&A  experience, 
international JV experience and domestic M&A experience, provided that they have gained 
sufficient experience to determine which routines are applicable to the focal type of deal 
and thereby avoid incorrect inference making. 
Others  did  not  necessarily  explicitly  address  the  possibility  of  inter-activity 
experience  spillovers,  but  have  implicitly  assumed  that  firms  learn  how  to  improve 
performance of a specific activity by gaining experience with other, related activities. For 
example, Kale et al. (2002) distinguish between the effect of experience on alliances and 
on EJVs, yet their experience measure contains both types of collaborations. Hence, they 
implicitly assume that the experience developed through one activity is also of use in the 




  This  notion  that  firms  can  improve  performance  in  one  corporate  development 
activity by gaining experience with another type of activity, is grounded in the fact that 
firms are confronted with similar challenges  in  the different activities. Schreiner et al. 
(2009) argued that firms possess an alliance capability - which positively impacts their 
alliance outcomes - when they have distinct skills to manage coordination, communication 
and bonding needs in alliances. These skills are akin to those required in other forms of 
external corporate development activities. For example, alliances, EJVs, and M&As all 
require firms to manage and coordinate activities across organizational boundaries, design 
and negotiate appropriate contracts, evaluate performance and manage cultural differences. 
Sampson (2005) argued that firms learn how to deal with such complexities by gaining 
experience with any type of alliance, and subsequently use the skills they developed in the 
context of other alliances as well.  
To  summarize,  experience  spillover  effects  exist  across  various  corporate 
development activities (Meschi and Metais, 2006; Wang and Zajac, 2007; Zollo and Reuer, 
2009),  but the  literature to  date  has  left  out the  possibility  that  these  spillover  effects 
extend beyond corporate development activities. We believe that experience with CDA 
spills over to other activities. As firms accumulate experience with corporate development 
activities they develop a collaborative capability, through the accumulation of relational 
routines and by drawing analogies between different activities. This capability, in turn, 
facilitates the collaboration with suppliers and results in closer and more stable relations as 
firms face many challenges in supplier-buyer relations akin to those faced in other forms of 
inter-organizational collaboration, including those aimed at corporate development. As a 
result of the increased stability resulting from positive experience spillovers, we expect the 




such  spillovers  is  the  buyer,  which  can  dissolve  the  relationship  at  any  time.  We 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis  1:  A  buyer  firm’s  corporate  development  experience  will  have  a 
negative effect on the likelihood of dissolution of its supplier-buyer ties in a given 
year. 
 
The Role of Similarity 
So far we have  focused on experience with a  variety of corporate development 
activities,  without  distinguishing  between  specific  activities.  However,  some  types  of 
activities will have a more pronounced effect on the continuation of supplier-buyer ties 
than others. M&As, alliances and EJVs lead to the development of different routines or 
different degrees of routines, which are therefore more or less transferrable to supplier-
buyer  ties.  Consequently,  we  expect  the  direction  of  the  effect  of  experience  on  tie 
dissolution to be uniform but effect magnitudes to differ for different types of activities. 
According to transfer theory, the occurrence, direction and magnitude of spillovers 
will largely be determined by the similarities or cognitive distance between the activities 
(Cormier  and  Hagman,  1987;  Gick  and  Holyoak,  1987).  More  specifically,  Zollo  and 
Reuer (2009) contended that alliance experience spills over to acquisition performance, 
albeit as a function of the cognitive distance between these two activities, which in turn is 
dependent upon the level of integration and the relational quality between the organizations 
involved. Similarly, Meschi and Metais (2006) argued that in an acquisition the acquirer 
can in fact leverage the skills and knowledge it developed in other activities, such as in 
joint-ventures.  Yet,  the  knowledge  and  skills  obtained  through  acquisitions  tend  to  be 




pursuing alliances in the future, while the knowledge and skills resulting from alliances 
will be beneficial for future deals of both types and will in fact increase the likelihood of a 
firm engaging in future acquisitions (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Wang and Zajac, 
2007). Acquisition experience thus seemed to be associated with less fungible knowledge 
and skills. 
Together, this work suggests that in some cases experience spillovers exist between 
different types of corporate development activities, but they do not occur symmetrically or 
between  all  modes.  Our  arguments  are  consistent  with  this  view,  and  we  extend  it  to 
spillover effects from alliances, EJVs, and M&As to supplier-buyer relations. Given that 
the  operational  and  cognitive  distance  between  these  activities  varies,  we  expect 
differences in the magnitude of these spillover effects. We distinguish between two types 
of  similarity  that  stand  to  affect  spillovers:  (1)  similarity  in  terms  of  the  mode  of 
governance,  which  we  label  “modal  similarity”;  and  (2)  “directional  similarity”  which 
captures the distinction between vertical and horizontal activities. 
 
Modal Similarity 
First we focus on modal similarity and compare three types of CDA (i.e., M&As, 
EJVs and alliances) to supplier-buyer ties. These three modes all entail the combination or 
collaboration of two or more organizations. However, one difference lies in the way these 
organizations  are  brought  together.  Alliances  and  joint-ventures  involve  voluntary 
cooperation while acquisitions are either friendly or hostile and often lead to conflict and 
resistance  to  change  and  cooperation.  Furthermore,  acquisitions  entail  one  party  (the 
target) relinquishing control thoroughly and permanently to the other (the acquirer), and 




on  the  other  hand,  inter-organizational  interactions  are  ongoing  until  the  end  of  the 
partnership. The partners maintain their autonomy and identity, as is the case in supplier-
buyer ties. The operation of alliances and EJVs is also more likely to be of a democratic 
nature and intended for a shorter period of time than that of M&As (Wang and Zajac, 
2007). 
Hence, compared to M&As, alliances and EJVs exhibit a higher modal similarity to 
supplier-buyer ties. These similarities will translate into stronger positive spillovers, and 
therefore a lower likelihood of tie dissolution. We expect the spillovers from alliances and 
EJVs to be substantial, while we only anticipate minor spillovers from M&As. In keeping 
with this logic, we anticipate that the risks of supplier-buyer tie dissolution will be reduced 
by alliance and EJV experience more than by M&A experience: 
Hypothesis  2:  The  negative  effect  of  a  buyer’s  alliance/EJV  experience  on  the 
likelihood of supplier-buyer tie dissolution will be stronger than that of its M&A 
experience. 
 
  Up  to  this  point,  we  have  treated  alliances  and  EJVs  as  rather  similar,  and 
consequently, leading to a similar relationship with the likelihood of supplier-buyer tie 
dissolution. Nevertheless, some substantial differences between alliances and EJVs exist. 
Alliances entail the  interaction  between partners who do not become part of the same 
entity, nor do they jointly set up a legally separate venture. Equity joint-ventures achieve 
their cooperative purpose by creating a new entity, which requires equity contributions as 
well as commitment of resources and employees to make the new venture work (Martin 
and Salomon, 2003). EJVs generally entail higher employee mobility between the parents 




flexible and easier to adjust (Colombo, 2003). In this sense, alliances are more similar to 
supplier-buyer ties than EJVs in terms of modal similarity. It follows that the potential for 
spillovers from alliance experience is higher than that of EJV experience, resulting in a 
stronger  decrease  in  the  likelihood  of  tie  dissolution  for  alliances  than  for  EJVs.  We 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the negative effect of a buyer’s alliance experience 




So far we restricted our discussion to the role of modal similarity in experience 
spillovers without considering the intended goals and the tasks to be performed. Focusing 
merely on the way collaborations are organized only provides a limited account of the 
spillover potential  from corporate development experience.  We  now turn to a different 
form  of  similarity:  directional  similarity,  which  pertains  to  the  goals  and  tasks  of 
collaborations. Antecedents and requirements of cooperation differ considerably between 
vertical and horizontal forms of collaboration. These differences will be pertinent as long 
as the firms continue to operate as independent firms. This is not the case in acquisitions as 
interactions occur under the same ownership and via managerial authority once the deal is 
closed (Wang and Zajac, 2007); once interactions become internalized, inter-organizational 
collaboration ceases and many of the issues we will outline below no longer exist. Hence, 
we focus our discussion on the differences between horizontal and vertical collaborations - 




Horizontal collaborations, by definition, entail the collaboration of competitors. As 
a result, there is more room for - and potential damage from - opportunism in horizontal 
collaborations  (Krishnan,  Martin  and  Noorderhaven,  2006).  Due  to  the  potentially 
conflicting goals of the partners, the likelihood of failure is also considerably higher in 
horizontal  collaborations  (Park  and  Russo,  1996).  Compared  to  vertical  relations, 
horizontal relations exhibit a lower degree of reciprocity and closeness among participants 
(McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). At the same time, they 
manifest greater knowledge redundancy due to their structural equivalence (Rindfleisch 
and Moorman, 2001). 
In short, horizontal and vertical collaborations require similar capabilities, but also 
come with different challenges in terms of achieving cooperation and the intended goals of 
the collaboration. Given that supplier-buyer ties are of a vertical nature, vertical alliances 
and EJVs are more directionally similar to these ties than their horizontal counterparts. Yet 
they  are  distinctly  different  from  supplier-buyer  ties,  since  the  latter  are  market-type 
procurement relationships which typically rely on competitive bidding.
3 Moreover, vertical 
alliances and supplier-buyer ties are generally accompanied by different contracts, in terms 
of payment terms and incentives, administrative structure, and dispute resolution (Mayer 
and Teece, 2008).  
Despite  these  differences,  firms  face  tasks  and  challenges  in  vertical  corporate 
development activities similar to those encountered in less formalized relationships with 
suppliers,  for  example,  in  terms  of  information  sharing,  joint-problem  solving, 
communicating,  negotiating  and  achieving  coordination.  Through  CDA  firms  become 
                                                 
3 In our context, as further discussed below, advertising agency-client ties clearly fall in the latter category as 
they are essentially market relationships and entail agencies pitching for the same account (Baker et al., 




proficient in the coordination of vertical partnerships along the value chain, which in turn 
helps  them  lower  production  costs  (Mesquita  and  Lazzarini,  2008).  Accordingly,  we 
expect  firms  to  develop  vertical  collaboration  skills  through  vertical  CDA  that  can 
subsequently be applied to supplier-buyer ties, given the underlying similarities between 
these activities. Consequently, we contend that vertical CDA experience is more readily 
transferable to supplier-buyer ties than experience with horizontal corporate development 
activities. 
Hypothesis 4a: Ceteris paribus, the negative effect of a buyer’s vertical alliance 
experience on the likelihood of supplier-buyer tie dissolution will be stronger than 
that of its horizontal alliance experience. 
Hypothesis  4b:  Ceteris  paribus,  the  negative  effect  of  a  buyer’s  vertical  EJV 
experience on the likelihood of supplier-buyer tie dissolution will be stronger than 
that of its horizontal EJV experience. 
 
The Mitigating Effect of Directional Similarity 
We expect that the degree of learning that will take place, and consequently also 
the spillover effects to other activities that arise through directional similarity, varies by 
type of vertical CDA. The mode of collaboration will play an important role in this as the 
level  of  commitment,  the  degree  of  learning  and  the  duration  and  the  intensity  of 
collaboration  differ  considerably  between  alliances  and  EJVs.  Hence,  the  form  of 
collaboration has the potential to enhance or attenuate the degree of learning pertaining to 
vertical tasks that occurs.  
In EJVs, the presence of equity is aimed at aligning the interests of the partners, 




Moreover,  EJVs  facilitate  knowledge  sharing  because  they  generally  entail  exclusive 
assignment of some employees to the venture, formal joint management and more efficient 
routine development than alliances (Sampson, 2007). Alliances are also  more prone to 
opportunistic behavior, limiting the incentive for knowledge sharing. Hence, as Anand and 
Khanna (2000) argued, EJVs provide more opportunities for learning. EJVs entail high set-
up and dissolution costs, which motivates a continuity of collaboration (Harrigan, 1988; 
Pangarkar,  2003;  Santoro  and  McGill,  2005).  Consequently,  they  allow  for  a  more 
thorough  understanding  of  the  specific  tasks  and  challenges  inherent  to  vertical 
collaborations, and for the development of more widely applicable relational routines. 
In our earlier discussion of the effect of modal similarity, ignoring the directional 
similarity  just  discussed,  we  concluded  in  Hypothesis  3  that,  ceteris  paribus,  alliance 
experience allows for greater spillovers than EJVs due to modal similarity to supplier ties 
alone. However, the discussion of directional similarity shows that EJVs allow for a larger 
scope of  inter-organizational  learning  from  vertical  interactions. It remains to combine 
these ideas. We expect that modal similarity still plays a role in the vertical CDA context, 
but given directional similarity the relationship in Hypothesis 3 becomes contingent. More 
precisely, in vertical CDAs, the lower level of modal similarity in EJVs is compensated by 
the  higher  level  of  learning  about  vertical  collaboration  resulting  from  their  higher 
collaborative  intensity  and  commitment.  Therefore,  we  expect  the  relationship  to  be 
weakened in the presence of directional similarity. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5: While  we expect the negative effect of alliance experience on tie 
dissolution to be stronger than that of EJV experience, ceteris paribus, we expect 
this difference to be smaller in the case of vertical collaborations. 





Data and Sample 
In order to test our hypotheses we study the dissolution of relationships between 
advertising  agencies  (suppliers)  and  their  clients  (buyers).  This  context  is  particularly 
attractive to study the effect of CDA experience on tie dissolution. Firstly, advertising is of 
great importance to the firms that buy advertising agencies’ services - especially in the 
industries we focus on in our study, as described below - as it constitutes a major operating 
expense and affects the demand and potential  success of products or services. In  fact, 
decisions pertaining to advertising and to changes in agency relations even affect the value 
of the firm, as the onset of a new agency-client relationship leads to negative stock market 
reactions (Mathur and Mathur, 1996). Thus advertising ties are of substantial importance to 
clients. Secondly, agency-client relationships exhibit substantial variation in their duration. 
Thirdly, advertising agency-client relations are of a legally open-ended nature, and usually 
entail  no  more  than  a  90-day  notice  for  cancellation  (Horsky,  2006).  Hence,  the 
observation of tie dissolution is not complicated by contractual details or delayed by pre-
specified terms that could lead to the continuation of the relationship on paper even when 
actual  collaboration  has  ended.  Finally,  the  setting  allows  us  to  distinguish  between 
vertical  alliances  and  the  focal  supplier-buyer  ties,  a  distinction  which  can  be  more 
complex  in  other  contexts.  The  former  are  characterized  by  longer-term,  open-ended 
contracts that are formalized and announced as alliances. The latter, on the other hand, are 
market-like  procurement  relationships  which  rely  on  competitive  bidding  (i.e.,  in  this 
context several agencies pitching for the same account). There is thus a clear distinction 
between vertical alliances, which entail other partners than advertising agencies or their 




supplier-buyer ties. Formal vertical alliances between agencies and clients are extremely 
rare, and we do not observe any in our sample. 
Our unit of analysis is the client-agency tie in a given year. Data on client-agency 
ties were obtained from The Standard Directory of Advertising Agencies and The Standard 
Directory of Advertisers, also known in the industry as The Red Books. This directory 
provides a comprehensive listing of U.S. advertising agencies and their clients and has 
been published on an annual basis for the past 80 years. It contains detailed information on 
advertising agencies and on advertisers, including account information, specialization of 
the agency, core business of the advertisers, contact information on key agency personnel, 
ownership details, and the number of employees. These data have been used successfully 
in several past studies (e.g., Baker et al., 1998; Broschak, 2004). To obtain a sample of 
agency-client ties, we selected all client companies active in the pharmaceutical industry, 
financial  service  sector, tobacco  industry,  cosmetics,  retail  trade  (including  department 
stores, grocery stores, restaurants etc.), and food and kindred products from the 1995 Red 
Book  volume  and  identified  all  of  their  agency  relationships.  These  industries  are 
advertising-intensive
4 enough that agency-client ties are of substantive interest, and have 
enough  companies  (clients)  in  them  that  we  can  observe  variance  among  firms  (and 
implement  industry  effects  to  control  for  differences  among  sectors).  Subsequently  we 
verified which of these ties did not exist in previous years, and hence could be considered 
to be new ties. We selected 1995 as a start year to ensure that we could track relationships 
for a sufficiently long time, thereby limiting the number of right-censored observations.
5 
By restricting our sample to newly created ties in 1995 we avoid any problems that may 
                                                 
4 These industries are all in the top 20 in the ranking of industry advertising expenditure published by Ad $ 
Summary in 1994, and five of them rank in the top 10.   
5 Selecting an earlier starting year would preclude the observation of a sufficiently large experience window 




emerge from left-censoring. We ended up with 381 ties that started in 1995, which we 
tracked until 2006 or until they dissolved or disappeared from the Red Books, whichever 
came first. 
Information  on  the  clients’  CDA  experience  was  derived  from  the  Thomson 
Financial Security Data Corporation (SDC) database. A number of additional sources, such 
as Thomson Financial Datastream database, Compustat, SEC 10K filings, company annual 
reports and company websites were also used to obtain the necessary control variables. 
Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is dichotomous and takes on the value 1 if a tie ends in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables 
For every client firm we developed a measure of cumulative CDA experience – i.e., 
the combined experience with alliances, EJVs and M&As - from 1988 until the focal year.
6 
We constructed similar measures for M&A experience, alliance/EJV experience, alliance 
experience,  EJV  experience,  horizontal  M&A  experience,  vertical  M&A  experience, 
horizontal alliance experience, vertical alliance experience, horizontal EJV experience, 
and vertical EJV experience.
7 Consistent with previous research, collaborations involving 
partners operating in the same three-digit SIC code were coded as horizontal activities 
(e.g., Chan et al., 1997). We use the input-output tables published by the Survey of Current 
                                                 
6The SDC database includes some data on alliances prior to 1988, but it is very sparse. The database manual 
indicates  that  reliable  data  on  alliances  is  available  in  SDC  from  1988  onwards.  We  use  alternative 
experience windows in the robustness checks to deal with any potential concerns about the completeness of 
the data prior to 1990 (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000; Schilling, 2009), and to deal with the potential decay 
of learning from experience over time.  
7 Not only do vertical alliances differ conceptually from supplier-buyer ties, as explained earlier, empirically 
they are also distinct. The SDC alliance/JV database relies on alliance announcements in a variety of news 
sources. However, advertising agencies or clients do not announce their collaboration as an alliance, but 
rather as a market type of relationship. More precisely, agencies announce which accounts they have won 




Business and the OECD to determine whether an acquisition, alliance or EJV had a vertical 
scope. An activity was coded as vertical when the industry of one party sold more than 5 
percent of its output to, or received more than 5 percent of its inputs from, the industry of 
the other party (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Haunschild, 1993). 
Control variables 
In addition, we include a number of relationship, client and agency level control 
variables. The duration of a client-agency tie reflects the number of consecutive years the 
agency has worked with the client since the tie started in 1995. We approximate the client 
firm’s size by the number of people employed in the firm. In addition, we measure the 
change in sales between the focal year and the previous year for a client and use it as a 
proxy for agency effectiveness. We control for the number of agencies a client has, as a 
higher number of agency ties increases the complexity and costs of managing ties, which 
could increase the likelihood of tie dissolution (Broschak, 2004). Moreover, clients with 
only one agency may become increasingly dependent on that agency, making it harder to 
end the tie. In addition, we control for a client’s history of ending ties by including the 
number of tie dissolutions in the past three years as this is likely to affect the likelihood of 
dissolution of the focal tie (Broschak, 2004; Kim et al., 2006). We also control for client 
age, as firm age is often associated with inertia, which in turn could reduce the likelihood 
of tie dissolution (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Miller and Chen, 1994). Industries differ in 
their level of advertising intensity and in the level of CDA taking place. Hence, we control 
for the client’s primary industry based on 2-digit SIC codes. In addition, we control for the 
number of industries (at the 2-digit level) a client operates in, as highly diversified clients 
may require more agencies to deal with their complex needs. We include a dichotomous 




As a way to control for alternative causes of tie dissolution, we also included a dummy 
variable, agency acquisition, to indicate whether or not the agency of the focal tie had been 
involved in a merger or acquisition in the previous year. In addition, we control for the 
number of accounts the focal agency has. Agencies with few accounts are more dependent 
on each individual client than agencies with a high number of clients, and hence, may be 
more willing to do whatever it takes to keep an account. A high number of accounts may 
lead to dispersion of the agency’s attention and efforts due to the complexity and costs 
associated with managing high numbers of ties (Broschak, 2004). We also control for the 
number of accounts an agency has lost or terminated in the three years preceding the focal 
year. Finally, we also control for agency CDA experience, as agency-client ties may also 
benefit from CDA experience on the agency side. 
Analysis 
Given the nature of our data, we rely on event history analysis techniques to test 
our hypotheses regarding the probability that an agency-client tie ends, i.e., an event will 
occur, at a particular time. Although a tie can end at any given point in a year, our data 
only allows us to observe tie dissolution on a yearly basis. As a result, the events in our 
sample take place within discrete time intervals. If these intervals are sufficiently small, it 
is acceptable to treat them as continuous and apply continuous-time methods for event 
history analysis such as the Cox model (Allison, 1984). Yet, in our case the time units are 
large, i.e., years. In addition, the presence of tied data, i.e., events happening at the same 
time may bias the results of a continuous time model (Yamaguchi, 1991). Therefore it is 
more suitable to employ discrete-time methods such as logistic regression (Allison, 1984). 
In such discrete time models, the hazard rate is the probability that an event will occur at a 




probability that a relationship between a client and an agency will end in a given year, 
provided that it has  not already ended prior to that  year. Our goal  is to determine the 
influence of our explanatory variables on the hazard rate. This can be described as follows: 
[ ] ir r i i i X X P P Log β β β + + + = − ... ) 1 /( 1 1 0  
Where i P  is the probability that our dependent variable is 1, ) 1 /( i i P P − represents 
the  odds  of  dissolution  and  the  coefficients 1 β ,…, r β represent  the  effect  of  the 
independent variables on the natural logarithm of the odds of tie dissolution. 
 
In  order  to  perform  the  analysis  described  above,  we  constructed  a  sample 
containing one record for each year a tie is at risk of experiencing an event and a record for 
the year an event takes place. Ties that were still active at the end of the period of our study 
period were considered right-censored. For ties that ended in an event, the last record is for 
the event year. For a number of ties information on control variables or CDA experience 
was incomplete or inaccurate, leading to their exclusion from the sample. Our final sample 
consisted of 1,114 tie-year records. 
The observations in our sample are not independent. We have multiple records for 
the same tie if it lasts more than one year. Secondly, our sample contains a number of ties 
that share the same client or agency, creating clusters in the data in which records are not 
independent. Therefore, we estimated our models with robust Huber-White standard errors 
and  adjusted  standard  errors  for  within  cluster  correlation,  clustering  on  the  client 
organization (Long and Freese, 2006).
8  
                                                 




For Hypotheses 2-5, we need to assess the magnitudes of the experience effects. 
The  fact  that  we  use  logistic  regression  implies  that  we  cannot  simply  interpret  the 
coefficients as we would in OLS regression analysis to determine the magnitude of the 
effects. In logistic regression the effect of a change in one variable depends on the initial 
probability of the event occurring, i.e., on the values of the other variables (Hoetker, 2007). 
The  recommended  approach  is  to  calculate  the  change  in  odds,  and  subsequently  the 
change in probabilities, caused by a change in the focal variable while keeping the other 
variables at their mean or at another theoretically meaningful value (Jaccard, 2001). Given 
the varying ranges in experience that we observe for different types of CDA experience, 
we opt to calculate the change in probabilities caused by a one-standard deviation increase 
in experience, keeping everything else at the mean. This procedure provides the effect of a 
change in the focal variable for an average observation (Hoetker, 2007). 
 
RESULTS 
On average, ties in our sample lasted 3.9 years and over 25 percent of ties lasted 
longer than 5  years.
9 The vast  majority of clients only  have one agency (68%). These 
findings are fairly consistent with results of other studies on agency-client relations (e.g., 
Baker  et  al.,  1998).  Summary  statistics  and  correlations  for  these  ties  and  the  clients 
involved can be found in Table 1. 
We ran separate models for the different types of experience. Table 2 provides a 
summary of the results. All models provided significant statistical fit according to the log 
likelihood test and they are significantly better than the intercept only model. To verify that 
                                                 
9 This is an underestimation of the tie duration as it treats right-censored ties as if they ended in the last year 
they were observed. So the actual average duration may be somewhat higher. This number differs from the 
mean duration provided in Table 1 due to the fact that the mean reported in Table 1 includes repeated 




multicollinearity is not a problem in the models that include multiple types of experience, 
which are in some cases highly correlated, we check the variance inflation factors of our 
independent variables. These factors are all well below 10 (Neter et al., 1996). 
In our base model (Model 1), we find that the dummy variable indicating whether a 
tie is with an in-house agency or not is significantly negative. In addition, we find that the 
clients’  history  of  tie  dissolutions  has  a  significant  positive  effect  on  the  odds  of  tie 
dissolution. This is in line with Kim et al.’s (2006) claims that the likelihood of a firm 
dissolving or replacing a tie in a network is a function of its past history with such changes. 
Moreover, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between relationship duration and the 
likelihood of dissolution. This pattern is in line with the honeymoon phase and the negative 
duration dependence found in previous research (e.g., Baker et al, 1998; Levinthal and 
Fichman, 1988).
10 
Model 2 includes the general CDA experience measure. In support of Hypothesis 1, 
we find a negative relationship between CDA experience and the odds of tie dissolution 
(p<0.001). In terms of practical magnitudes, we find that a one-standard deviation increase 
in CDA experience reduces the probability of tie dissolution by 43.4%. Subsequently, we 
distinguished between M&A experience and alliance/EJV experience to test Hypothesis 2. 
Model 3 shows that alliance/EJV experience has a significant negative effect on the odds 
of  tie  dissolution  (p<0.05),  while  M&A  experience  does  not  exhibit  any  significant 
spillover effects. A one-standard deviation increase in alliance/EJV experience reduces the 
probability of tie dissolution  by  53.4%. A  similar  increase  in  M&A experience would 
reduce the probability by a mere 5.8%, though due to the lack of significance the range of 
                                                 
10 The peak of our curve occurs around 6 years, while the risk of dissolution reached its maximum at 11 years 
in the advertising industry study of Baker et al. (1998). Industry experts indicated to us that the difference 
may  be  attributed  to  changing norms  of  agency-client relationships  between  the respective  time  periods 




that  estimate  solidly  encompasses  zero.  Taking  both  the  significance  levels  and  the 
practical magnitudes into account, we find support for Hypothesis 2, but the results also 















In Model 4 we further refine our categories of CDA experience by distinguishing 
between  alliance  and  EJV  experience.  The  results  show that  alliance  experience  has  a 
significant negative effect on the odds of dissolution (p<0.05), while the coefficients for 
EJV and M&A experience are not significant. The lack of spillovers resulting from EJV 
experience  is  somewhat  unexpected.  A  one-standard  deviation  increase  in  alliance 
experience reduces the probability of tie dissolution by 50.1%. A similar increase in EJV 
experience would reduce the probability of dissolution by only 9.4%, though again the 
plausible  range  of  this  estimate  encompasses  zero.  These  results  are  consistent  with 
Hypothesis 3, though they lead to a further caveat on Hypothesis 1. 
Next we examine spillovers resulting from directional similarity. Models 5 and 6 
(Table 3) show that both vertical alliance (p<0.01) and vertical EJV experience (p<0.05) 
have  a  significant  impact on  the  odds of  tie  dissolution,  while  for  horizontal  types  of 
collaborations only alliances lead to experience spillovers (p<0.1). The magnitudes of the 
spillovers provide some unexpected results. Contrary to what we proposed in Hypothesis 
4a we find that a one-standard deviation increase in vertical alliance experience reduces the 
probability  of  tie  dissolution  by  28.1%,  while  a  similar  increase  in  horizontal  alliance 
experience reduces the likelihood by 56.2%. For EJV experience, on the other hand, the 
magnitudes are in line with what we predicted in Hypothesis 4b. A one-standard deviation 
increase in vertical EJV experience reduces the probability of tie dissolution by 28.5%, 
while a similar increase in horizontal EJV experience reduces the likelihood by 13.2%, 
though due to the lack of significance the range of the latter estimate solidly encompasses 
zero. In short, our results pertaining to the effect of directional similarity on the occurrence 
of experience spillovers are mixed.  















However,  our  results  pertaining  to  the  interaction  effect  between  modal  and 
directional similarity offer some valuable insights into these mixed findings. By computing 
the magnitudes we find that, in the context of vertical CDA, EJV experience shows slightly 
larger  spillovers  than  alliance  experience  (i.e.,  28.1%  vs.  28.5%).  Both  estimates  are 
significantly different from zero, but the two estimates are not statistically different from 
each other. This shows that the strong positive spillovers resulting from modal similarity - 
as reflected in the negative effect of overall alliance experience on tie dissolution - are 
weakened  in  the  presence  of  directional  similarity.  This  pattern  lends  support  to 
Hypothesis 5. The graphical representation of the effects of different types of experience 
on the probability of tie dissolution is provided in Figure 1. This further illustrates the 
differences among the CDA categories in Hypotheses 2-5. 
Additional Analyses 
To verify the robustness of our results, we performed several additional analyses. 
First, we included all types of horizontal and vertical CDA together in Model 7. Our results 
are consistent with the ones we presented above. Secondly, we re-ran the models with 
alternative specifications for experience, i.e., starting in 1991, rolling experience windows 
of different durations, and with the logarithmic transformation of experience. The results 
were consistent with those presented above. Thirdly, our original analyses were performed 
on a sample that included ties between clients and their in-house agencies.
11 To ensure that 
our results are not driven by their inclusion, we re-ran the models without the in-house ties. 
These  analyses  essentially  replicated  our  previous  results.  Finally,  we  calculated  the 
magnitudes of spillovers, keeping all other variables at their median rather than at their 
mean. Although the percentage changes in magnitudes caused by a one-standard deviation 
                                                 




increase  in  experience  differ  slightly,  the  differences  between  the  different  types  of 
activities remain consistent with the results reported above. 
  In order to understand the unexpected lack of support for Hypothesis 4a, illustrated 
by the higher spillovers from horizontal alliances than from vertical alliances, we perform 
some additional analyses. Hypothesis 4a was predicated on the overlap in routines between 
vertical  alliances  and  supplier-buyer  ties  originating  from  directional  similarity,  or  the 
content of collaboration. Hence, in order to understand this surprising result we examine 
the  content  of  horizontal  alliances  in  more  detail.  Consistent  with  prior  research  we 
classified alliances as horizontal based on the SIC codes of the partners in the alliance 
(e.g., Chan et al., 1997; Oxley, Sampson and Silverman 2009; Park and Russo, 1996). 
However, this fails to capture the potential heterogeneity that resides in these horizontal 
alliances. Direct competitors could form an alliance to perform a variety of tasks, entailing 
vertical,  horizontal  or  other  activities,  all  of  which  would  be  considered  horizontal 
alliances given that they entail the cooperation of firms operating in the same industry. Yet 
the spillover potential could vary depending on the type of activities that occur in these 
horizontal alliances. Therefore, we distinguish between horizontal alliances that are fully 
horizontal, i.e., the activities performed in the alliance are classified in the same industry as 
the partners, and those that entail activities that are not of a horizontal nature. Our results 
show that fully horizontal alliances allow for lower experience spillovers (-13.1%) than 
direct  competitors  forming  a  horizontal  alliance  but  performing  vertical  tasks  in  the 
alliance (-50.6%). These additional insights further illustrate the importance of directional 
similarity as a driver of experience spillovers, which is in line with our core arguments 
underlying Hypotheses 4a-4b.  




DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
  Recent research has devoted considerable attention to the benefits of maintaining 
and investing in long-term IORs (e.g., Kotabe et al., 2003; Nobeoka et al., 2002). In this 
paper we examined how firms’ external corporate development activities, which constitute 
an important part of firms’ strategies and entail at least some degree of inter-organizational 
collaboration, affect the  longevity of their supplier-buyer ties. We  argued that whether 
firms are prone to maintain long-term supplier-buyer ties depends on the presence of CDA-
related routines that foster such ties. We explored the effect of a buyer firm’s history of 
corporate  development  activities  on  the  likelihood  of  its  supplier  ties  dissolving.  We 
argued  that  firms  with  considerable  CDA  experience  benefit  from  valuable  learning 
opportunities,  pertaining  to  inter-organizational  collaboration,  which  spill  over  to  their 
supplier ties, leading to a decrease in the likelihood of tie dissolution. We find support for 
our  arguments  for  CDA  experience  in  general,  and  for  several  of  the  more  refined 
experience  categories.  Subsequently,  we  compared  the  magnitudes  of  the  spillovers 
resulting from different types of CDA. Our results showed that spillover effects do occur 
but that they vary for different types of experience. 
Although we initially expected to observe at least some experience spillovers from 
M&A experience to supplier-buyer ties, we did not uncover any significant effects. This 
reiterates  the  arguments  from  previous  research  which  has  suggested  that  acquisition 
experience  is  associated  with  less  fungible  knowledge  and  skills,  indicating  that 
acquisitions benefit from experience spillovers while they do not necessarily contribute to 
them,  resulting  in  asymmetric  spillovers  (Villalonga  and  McGahan,  2005;  Wang  and 
Zajac, 2007). M&As are very heterogeneous activities, in terms of the level of integration 




Reuer, 2009). Hence, our results may be at least partially explained by the fact that there is 
more variance in the way these activities are conducted than in the other forms of CDA, 
and hence the level of similarity between the acquisitions and supplier-ties may be very 
low or even nonexistent in some instances. Moreover, inter-organizational collaboration 
ceases in M&As when the organizations are combined and the organizational boundaries 
are dissolved. Hence, collaboration across organizational  boundaries  is relatively short-
lived, limiting the opportunities to develop relational routines. 
In general, alliance experience seems to be most beneficial for supplier-buyer ties, 
which is consistent with the high level of modal similarity between these activities. Next, 
our  results  show  that  directional  similarity  also  plays  an  important  role.  We  find  that 
among  vertical  relationships,  i.e.,  with  similarity  in  the  direction  of  the  collaboration, 
experience  with  higher-commitment  collaborative  relationships  is  particularly  useful, 
provided  that  there  is  a  moderate  level  of  modal  similarity  as  is  the  case  with  EJVs. 
Although the difference between spillovers from vertical alliances and from vertical EJVs 
is small, our results suggest that firms can make the most of their vertical collaboration 
experience  if  it  took  the  form  of  EJVs.  This  suggests  that  the  lower  level  of  modal 
similarity is compensated by the higher opportunities for learning in high-commitment, 
high-intensity  collaborations  such  as  EJVs.  By  contrast,  any  experience  spillovers  that 
arise from horizontal activities only reflect the more superficial modal similarity. Thus, 
horizontal alliance experience turns out to be a stronger predictor of the continuation of 
supplier-buyer ties than horizontal EJV experience. 
These findings have some noteworthy implications for research and practice. For 
one, we contributed to the learning literature by showing that learning processes are not as 




organizational  settings.  Recent  work  already  provided  some  support  for  the  notion  of 
experience spillovers from one activity to another (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Zollo 
and Reuer, 2009). In other words, firms can learn how to perform a specific activity by 
gaining  experience  with  other  activities.  By  looking  at  the  effect  of  experience  with 
different  types  of  corporate  development  activities  on  relationship  continuation,  the 
presence and importance of experience spillovers is further corroborated. In our context, 
this  implies  that  firms  can  improve  the  stability  of  their  supplier-buyer  ties  by 
accumulating experience with external corporate development activities.  
Our  findings  on  the  respective  role  of  modal  and  directional  similarity  in 
determining  the  magnitude  of  experience  spillovers  emphasize  the  importance  of 
distinguishing  between  learning  from  the  form  and  from  the  content  of  collaborative 
experience. Traditionally, research has focused on comparing the effect of experience on 
the outcome of IORs under different conditions, rather than examining the differential 
effects of specific types of experience. More precisely, previous research has examined 
which types of collaborations benefit more from prior experience (e.g., Sampson, 2005), 
but has only rarely examined which types of collaborative experience offer the highest 
learning potential. Recently, Gulati et al. (2009) called for a more detailed examination of 
the differential effects of different types of partnering experiences on alliance outcomes. In 
line with this, we suspect that some of the mixed or limited support for the proposition that 
a firm’s partnering experience contributes to its relational capability may be due to an 
over-aggregation of experience measures. Our results suggest that both intra-activity and 
the inter-activity learning research would benefit greatly from paying more attention to the 
differential  learning  potential  that  different  types  of  collaborative  experience  -  both  in 




Recently, the literature on inter-organizational relations has been advanced by a call 
for  more  precision  in  the  definitions  used  in  IOR  research  and  the  categorization  of 
different types of IORs (Mayer and Teece, 2008) and for a better understanding of the 
black box that constitutes the capability to manage these different types of relationships 
(Schreiner et al., 2009). In line with this, we make clear distinctions between different 
forms  of  inter-organizational  collaborations,  i.e.,  between  those  aimed  at  corporate 
development  and  supplier-buyer  ties,  and  build  on  the  underlying  differences  and 
similarities to gain  a  better understanding of the capabilities that accrue through these 
different activities and their applicability to other forms of collaborations. Our additional 
analyses  on  the  effect  of  horizontal  alliance  experience  -  distinguishing  between  fully 
horizontal alliances where both the partners and the alliance operate in the same industry 
and collaborations where direct competitors pursue vertical or other activities -  further 
illustrates  the  importance  of  developing  more  fine  grained  measures  and  classification 
schemes.  
Our results also have important implications for the literature on the formation, 
evolution and termination of long-term inter-organizational relations. Previous research has 
largely focused on the benefits and drawbacks of different types of inter-organizational 
relationships in order to explain the different types of relationships, or different sourcing 
strategies we observe in reality, ignoring other factors that may affect firms’ tendencies to 
pursue specific types of relationships. We fill this gap by looking at the way organizations’ 
corporate  development  histories  affect  their  propensity  to  maintain  long-term  supplier-
buyer ties.  
Finally, previous research has called for a co-evolutionary perspective on alliances 




strategies (e.g., Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Koza and Lewin, 1998). In this paper we 
examine  how  a  firm’s  strategy  in  terms  of  corporate  development  affects  its  inter-
organizational relationships, and supplier-buyer ties in particular. Our results suggest that 
strategies characterized by extensive pursuits of corporate development, which generally 
entail  considerable  organizational  change,  need  not  be  disruptive  to  relationships  with 
external partners and instead create valuable learning opportunities.  
From a practical point of view, we provide advertising agencies (and other types of 
suppliers) with an additional way to identify particularly attractive clients. Agencies invest 
considerably in those relationships starting even before the relationship is formalized by 
investing time and resources in account pitches. Pitching for an account is a high risk, high 
investment activity. Not only is the outcome of these pitches often very unpredictable, the 
winners of the account may find themselves investing in what could be a very short-lived 
relation. Our interviews with agency executives suggested that they are looking for ways to 
distinguish  between  clients  that  will  be  able  and  willing  to  build  up  a  long-term 
relationship and clients who will only keep their agencies for a short period of time. As 
Davies  and  Prince  (1999:76)  pointed  out:  “agencies  clearly  need  guidance  concerning 
when relationships, or which accounts, are most vulnerable”, and our results offer agencies 
insights into this. Yet, the termination of a relationship is not only detrimental for suppliers 
- although this negative effect is more often emphasized as it potentially endangers their 
livelihood  -  but often  also  has  severe  implications  for  the  client  who  stands  to  lose  a 
partner with in-depth knowledge of its current and future products, industry and customers 
(Horsky, 2006). Therefore, we believe that clients would also benefit from the realization 
that the collaborative experiences gained in one activity could also prove valuable in other 




LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The limitations and contributions of the present study suggest several avenues for 
future  research.  One  limitation  lies  in  the  fact  that  we  restricted  our  study  to  two 
dimensions  of  similarity.  CDA  and  supplier-buyer  ties  could  be  similar  on  other 
dimensions that may affect the  level of spillovers between CDA and supplier-buyer ties. 
For example, we already showed the importance of the directional similarity which has 
some bearing on the tasks at hand, but this could be  further refined  by  looking at the 
purpose of the activities and the tasks involved (e.g., R&D vs. marketing or manufacturing 
alliances/EJVs). 
Although  we  tested  our  hypotheses  on  a  sample  of  advertising  agency-client 
relationships, we believe our arguments and findings apply to other types of supplier-buyer 
ties as well. For instance, major corporate expansion events have also been shown to affect 
supplier-buyer ties  in the automotive  industry (Martin et al., 1995). Future research  in 
different settings is therefore promising too. Furthermore, a different setting would also 
allow for further examination of the role of supplier CDA experience. We focused on the 
role  of  buyer-side  CDA  experience  because  the  clients  play  a  critical  role  in  shaping 
relationships with advertising agencies. We controlled for agency CDA experience, but 
failed to find a significant result. Yet, this could potentially be attributed to a limitation of 
our context. Advertising agencies do not frequently engage in alliances or EJVs and most 
of their CDA experience comprises of M&A activity, making this a less than ideal context 
to examine the importance of supplier-side CDA experience. Hence, it is worth examining 
in  other  contexts  whether  supplier-side  CDA  experience  would  allow  for  experience 
spillovers. Eventually, the comparison of the respective roles of supplier and buyer-side 




We examine only one direction of experience spillovers, i.e., from CDA experience 
to supplier-buyer ties. This is not to say that experience spillovers cannot occur in the 
opposite direction. Previous research showed that experience spillovers are not necessarily 
symmetric,  as,  for  example,  alliance  experience  influences  acquisitions  but  the  reverse 
does not hold (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). Unfortunately, our data does not allow us 
to test whether experience spillover occur in both directions between the various forms of 
CDA and supplier-buyer ties. Given the longitudinal nature of our study, we do not believe 
that  our  findings  are  in  fact  the  result  of  reverse  causality  but  we  acknowledge  the 
possibility  that  experience  spillovers  occur  in  both  directions  and  suggest  that  future 
research explores this possibility.    
Another  limitation  of  this  study  pertains  to  the  inferences  we  make  about  the 
accumulation of experience and the development of relational routines, and our reliance on 
a count measure of CDA experience. Our data does not allow us to examine the underlying 
mechanisms that lead to CDA experience having a stabilizing effect on supplier-buyer ties. 
Examining  different  dimensions  of  firms’  CDA  experience  stocks  or  pursuing  more 
detailed field work could shed more light on the underlying mechanisms. Since we cannot 
determine  the  exact  mechanisms  leading  to  the  experience  spillovers  we  observe,  we 
cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  that  the  relationship  between  CDA  experience  and  tie 
dissolution may be more pronounced in some types of firms than in others. The supplier 
ties of extremely large, diversified organizations may benefit less from CDA experience 
because sourcing decisions are made at the divisional or departmental level and may be 
less influenced by company-wide CDA activity. However, most firms in our sample are 
not very diversified. The average number of 2-digit SIC codes the client firms are active in 




controlled for the number of SICs in which the client operates, and found no significant 
effect. Still, in diversified firms CDA and supplier related decisions and interactions may 
occur in different parts of the organization. Hence, future research on experience spillovers 
would also benefit from a better understanding of the mechanisms that allow managers to 
learn from the collaborative experiences in other parts of the organization. 
In  this  paper  we  looked  at the  probability  of  a tie  ending  and  argued  that this 
depends on the firm’s CDA history. Our results imply that CDA experience affects the 
development of relational routines and consequently a firm’s propensity to keep a tie in a 
given year. Future research could examine whether there are performance benefits to such 
long-lasting ties, and whether this depends on  firms’ experience with  various types of 
CDA. Altogether, further research on the dynamics between CDA and supplier-ties, and 
their respective consequences, appears well warranted.  

















IT TAKES TWO TO CONTINUE TO TANGO: A TWO-SIDED VIEW ON POST-
M&A SUPPLIER-BUYER TIE CONTINUATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
We  examine  the  effect  of  buyer-side  M&As  on  the  continuation  of  buyer-supplier  ties, 
distinguishing between the supplier’s and the buyer’s incentives to keep their relationship 
going.  We  focus  on  post-M&A  changes  in  competitive  overlap  between  the  merged 
company  and  the  other  buyers  in  the  focal  supplier’s  customer  base.  We  test  our 
hypotheses on a sample of 798 advertising agency-client ties, for which the client  was 
involved in an acquisition. Our results show that, from the buyer’s perspective, an increase 
in competitive overlap has a negative effect on the likelihood of tie continuation which is 
moderated by the importance of the service provided by the focal suppliers to the buyer. 
From  the  supplier’s  perspective  we  find  that  the  negative  effect  of  an  increase  in 
competitive overlap on the likelihood of tie continuation is moderated by the importance of 
the buyer to the supplier. Our results suggest that buyers are concerned about sharing a 
supplier  with  competitors,  but  these  fears  are  mitigated  when  they  are  in  a  better 
bargaining position. Moreover, our findings suggest that suppliers also exhibit concerns 
about competitive overlap, but they are less likely to terminate a focal relationship to avoid 
conflicts with other buyers when the focal buyer is an important or prominent buyer. 
                                                 
1 This chapter is the result of joint work with Xavier Martin. It is due to appear in the 2011 Best Papers 
Proceedings of the Academy of Management.  





Supplier-buyer ties have proven to be of intrinsic value for firms as they have the 
potential to bring about the development of relation-specific assets and lead to performance 
improvements (Kotabe et al., 2003; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988). Yet, we only have a 
limited understanding of the evolution and dissolution of these relationships. Early work 
predominantly focused on the formation of these relationships as an alternative to vertical 
integration  and  on  the  different  types  of  exchange  relationships  firms  maintain  with 
suppliers  (e.g.,  Baker,  1990;  Cusumano  and  Takeishi,  1991;  Heide  and  John,  1990; 
Monteverde  and  Teece,  1982).  More  recent  work  has  in  turn  focused  on  knowledge 
sharing, the development of relation-specific assets, the role of trust in supplier-buyer ties 
and on their performance  implications (e.g., Kotabe et al., 2003; Lazzarini, Miller and 
Zenger, 2008; Mesquita, Anand and Brusch, 2008; Mudambi and Helper; 1998; Srinivasan 
and  Brush,  2006).  Although  research  on  the  evolution  and  dissolution  of  inter-
organizations in general, and alliances in particular (e.g., Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; 
Koza and Lewin, 1998; Reuer and Ariño, 2002; Reuer and Zollo, 2005), is growing, the 
supplier-buyer tie literature has remained relatively mum on this issue. Some of the most 
important insights we gained so far stem from the work on the development of relation-
specific assets. More precisely, the evolution and the dissolution of supplier-buyer ties 
have been depicted as a function of the past duration of these relationships and the relation-
specific assets that develop in them (Asanuma, 1989; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988). In 
addition,  we  have  some  indication  that  firms’  corporate  development  activities  (CDA) 
affect the evolution of their supplier relationships. For example, supplier-buyer ties are 
affected  by  the  foreign  expansion  efforts  of  the  firms  involved  (Martin,  Mitchell  and 
Swaminathan, 1995; Wan et al., 2008). In addition, Baker et al. (1998)’s results suggested It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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that  M&As  increase  the  likelihood  of  supplier-buyer  tie  dissolution,  but  they  do  not 
provide  any  insights  into  the  underlying  decision  processes.  Although  this  work  has 
offered  valuable  insights  and  laid  the  foundations  for  future  research,  more  detailed 
examinations  of  the  interplay  between  corporate  development  activities,  or  strategic 
actions  and  change  in  general,  and  supplier-buyer  ties  have  yet  to  emerge.  This  is 
particularly  important  in  light  of  the  growing  recognition  of  the  notion  that  inter-
organizational relations co-evolve with firms’ strategies (Koza and Lewin, 1998), an issue 
which has enjoyed relatively little attention in the context of supplier-buyer ties. 
A  second  and  equally  important  gap  in  the  literature  pertains  to  the  effect  of 
competitive  dynamics  on  supplier-buyer  tie  stability.  When  forming  relationships  with 
suppliers firms take into account how these relationships could affect their competitive 
position. Ample research has focused on the benefits firms can achieve by selecting the 
right suppliers and maintaining relationships that are conducive to knowledge sharing and 
joint problem solving (Hoetker, 2005; Lakshman and Parente, 2008; Petersen, Handfield 
and Ragatz, 2005). Yet, the competitive implications of sharing suppliers with competitors 
have enjoyed less attention. Suppliers can leak sensitive strategic information from one 
buyer to another, thereby deteriorating the focal customer’s competitive advantage (Frazier 
et  al.,  2009).  The  consequences  of  these  potential  leakage  or  spillover  effects  remain 
unclear. On the one hand, research has shown that it reduces the likelihood of information 
sharing,  and  thereby  potentially  the  value  firms  can  accrue  through  relationships  with 
suppliers  (Frazier  et  al.,  2009;  Li,  2002).  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  some  anecdotal 
evidence that the risks of knowledge sharing with suppliers who also serve competitors 
may be minimal in some instance. For example, inter- and intra-firm barriers to knowledge 




advantages as Toyota, even though the latter engages in extensive knowledge sharing with 
its suppliers (Dyer and Hatch, 2006). The limited empirical evidence and the potential lack 
of generalizability of some of this work, highlights the need to further examine competitive 
dynamics triggered by supplier-buyer relationships. In addition, we have no insights into 
what  happens  if  the  competitive  dynamics  are  altered  due  to  changes  in  one  of  the 
exchange  partners  or  the  environment,  and  in  particular  how  this  affects  the  partners’ 
willingness to continue the collaboration.  
Yet, the pursuit of corporate development activities - and M&As in particular - by 
one of the exchange partners may considerably alter these competitive dynamics. In this 
study we focus on the competitive dynamics triggered by buyer-level M&As. When two 
buyers are consolidated through a merger or acquisition, their suppliers may suddenly be 
faced with the potential of serving a buyer who is also a competitor of one of its other 
incumbent buyers, leading to concerns of information leakage or spillovers. Hence, buyer 
M&As may affect the intensity of competitive overlap in the suppliers’ customer bases, 
i.e.,  the  degree  to  which  it  includes  buyers  that  compete  in  the  same  industry.  By 
examining  the  effect  of  M&As  on  supplier-buyer  tie  continuation,  and  by  focusing  in 
particular on the M&A induced changes in competitive dynamics, we contribute to both 
the literature on the interplay between corporate development activities and supplier-buyer 
ties, and the literature on competitive dynamics in the context of supplier-buyer-ties.  
In  addition,  we  contribute  to  the  supplier-buyer  tie  literature,  and  to  the  IOR 
literature more generally, by considering both the supplier and the buyer’s incentives to 
continue  their  relationship.  Previous  research  has  largely  taken  a  one-sided  view  of 
supplier-buyer ties. At best it has taken into account the characteristics of both parties, but 
it has largely failed to take into account the dynamics and reactive processes that take place It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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in relationships when changes occur in one of the firms. This omission in the literature can 
be attributed to the implicit assumption that clients call the shots in exchange relationships, 
which  underlies  most  of  the  literature  on  supplier-buyer  relationships.  However,  we 
challenge this assumption and contribute to the  general  supplier-buyer tie  literature by 
taking a two-sided view of post-M&A tie continuation.  
We test our hypotheses on a sample of 798 relationships between firms and their 
advertising agencies, which constitute important service suppliers. The buyer firms in the 
sample were all involved in an acquisition in 1995, either as a target or as an acquirer. 
Prior to our study we conducted a number of interviews with agency executives in Europe 
and  the  U.S.  to  gain  insights  into  the  industry  and  factors  that  may  potentially  drive 
relationship stability and dissolution. From these interviews and from advertising industry 
publications it became apparent that client acquisitions are disruptive to agency-client ties 
but that very little is known about what determines post-M&A tie continuation. A recent 
study  of  11  mega-mergers  by  advertising  industry  publication  Adweek  showed  that  - 
despite  the  common  belief  that  clients  maintain  the  leading  agencies  of  the  acquiring 
company - post-M&A agency relationship reconfiguration takes many forms (Baar, 2005). 
Recent examples further illustrate that post-M&A agency-client relationship continuation 
is not simply a case of the acquirer dominantly enforcing its ties upon the target. IBM’s 
agency,  Ogilvy  &  Mather,  was  chosen  to  represent  the  Lenovo  account  following  its 
acquisition of the IBM personal computer business (Adweek, 2005). Whirlpool on the 
other hand consolidated all of its creative tasks with its incumbent agency, Publicis USA, 
after the acquisition of Maytag (Sampey, 2006). 
 






In many cases, suppliers serve customers from the same industries, thereby creating 
competitive overlap in their customer base. Changes in the suppliers’ customer base, either 
through  the  addition  of  new  customers  or  as  a  result  of  one  of  its  clients  becoming 
involved in an acquisition or merging with another firm, in turn may affect the level of 
competitive overlap. We focus on the latter source of changes in competitive overlap and 
on its implications for the post-M&A continuation of supplier-buyer ties.  
A  change  in  competitive  overlap  in  the  supplier’s  portfolio  has  different 
implications  for the supplier and  buyer. From the supplier’s perspective an  increase  in 
competitive overlap could lead to economies of scale, but at the same time it increases the 
risk of losing incumbent buyers. From the buyer’s perspective, an increase in competitive 
overlap  in  the  supplier’s  portfolio  will  trigger  concerns  about  potential  knowledge 
spillovers. Hence, the implications of an increase in competitive overlap differ between the 
supplier and the buyers but both parties’ willingness to continue the collaboration will be 
affected, making this a particularly interesting effect to study from a two-sided perspective. 
Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 illustrate changes in post-M&A competitive overlap from 
the buyer’s and the supplier’s perspective, respectively. 
 
Buyers’ Perspective  
  A number of scholars have argued that the success of supplier-buyer ties, and the 
benefits  that  accrue  to  the  parties  involved,  are  largely  determined  by  the  level  of 
knowledge sharing and transfer between the exchange partners (e.g., Kotabe et al., 2003; 
Uzzi, 1996; 1997). The benefits of knowledge transfer are particularly likely to accrue to It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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firms that have been in a long-term relationship which has resulted in the development of 
relation-specific assets that facilitate knowledge sharing (Kotabe et al., 2003). Some of the 
knowledge  shared  between  exchange  partners  is  relation-specific,  while  some  may  be 
redeployable in other contexts, or give insights into the firms’ overall strategies and future 
plans (Nobeoka et al., 2002). Sharing the  latter type of knowledge  may put the  firms’ 
competitive position at risk. Yet, the literature has only paid limited attention to the risks 
associated with extensive information sharing between buyers and suppliers. These risks 
have been well documented in the context of collaborations between competitors (e.g., 
Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Oxley and Wada, 2009). In 
horizontal collaborations  firms  face the challenge of  finding the right balance  between 
knowledge sharing to achieve the goals of the collaboration and controlling knowledge 
flows to avoid unintended leakage to competitors (Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Although 
the threat of information leakage may be less obvious in supplier-buyer relations than in 
horizontal  collaborations,  the  damage  it  could  potentially  cause  should  not  be 
underestimated. Extensive knowledge sharing with a supplier could be detrimental to a 
firm’s competitive position if that supplier is linked to some of the firm’s competitors, as 
indirect linkages can lead to knowledge spillovers (Ahuja, 2000a).  
Knowledge leakage to competitors through a common supplier may be the result of 
intentional  actions  on  the  supplier’s  part  or  of  inadvertent  spillovers.  The  prospect  of 
keeping the relationship going should offer incentives to the supplier to keep the buyer’s 
knowledge confidential (Heide and Miner, 1992; McEvily and Marcus, 2005). However, 
when buyers engage in an M&A, suppliers have had an ongoing relationship with only one 
of the parties involved in the acquisition, i.e., with either the target or the acquirer.
2 Yet, it 
                                                 
2 In theory, the target and the acquirer could have coincidently been using the same supplier before the 




is the party with whom they do not have a prior relationship that will cause a potential 
increase in competitive overlap.
3 So it is not unrealistic to assume that in fact the supplier’s 
loyalties  lie  more with  its other  incumbent buyers than with the  merging organization, 
thereby reducing their incentives to keep information confidential.  
Even  if  the  supplier  does  keep  the  information  it  receives  from  its  buyers 
confidential, other buyers may be able to make inferences from the supplier’s actions for 
the focal buyer (Li, 2002). Firms often use signals from competitors - which are sent out 
with  a  variety  of  goals  in  mind  ranging  from  pre-emption  to  colluding  on  prices  -  to 
determine their own strategic actions (Heil and Robertson, 1991). When a firm sends the 
signals out themselves, they can  control what  is  made public and competitors need to 
assess whether the signal is a bluff or a true sign of what the firm is about to do. However, 
competitors can also pick up signals from suppliers’ actions (Li, 2002). For example, by 
observing the actions of a common advertising agency, competitors may infer when new 
products or promotions will be launched, or when an increase in advertising intensity will 
take place. Rather than waiting for the actual action, competitors can then prepare their 
reaction based on the knowledge obtained through spillovers, which could have substantial 
implications  for  the  focal  client’s  planned  strategic  actions.  The  success  of  a  firm’s 
competitive attack is a function of both the speed of other firms’ reactions to the attack, as 
well as the unpredictability of the original attack (Bowman and Gatignon, 1995; Ferrier, 
2001). Hence, a reduction in unpredictability and an increase in the speed of reaction of 
                                                 
3 The post-merger entity will include the activities of both pre-merger entities, i.e., those of the target and of 
the acquirer. Unless the target and acquirer operate in exactly the same industries, the supplier will find itself 
dealing with a buyer that is active in more industries in comparison to the pre-M&A situation, should the 
relationship continue post-M&A. As a result, the supplier could be faced with higher levels of competitive 
overlap in its portfolio. For example, if the target and acquirer operate in different industries, the target’s 
supplier will have to deal with a potential increase in competitive overlap caused by the addition of the 
acquirer’s  businesses.  Hence,  the  increase  in  overlap is  caused  by  the  buyer  firm  with  whom the  focal 
supplier didn’t have a relationship prior to the acquisition, i.e., the acquirer in this example.  It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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competitors,  as  a  result  of  information  leakage  through  a  common  supplier,  could  be 
detrimental for a firm’s performance or competitive advantage.   
It has to be noted that sharing a  supplier with  direct competitors is  not always 
problematic - as evidenced by Toyota which managed to sustain a quality advantage over 
its U.S. competitors despite sharing valuable information with common suppliers (Dyer 
and Hatch, 2006) - and in some instances may even provide benefits. For example, having 
a common supplier may offer opportunities to collude (Bernheim and Whinston, 1985). 
Despite  the  potential  benefits,  concerns  about  intentional  or  inadvertent  information 
leakage  to  competitors  through  a  common  supplier  are  pervasive  in  many  industries 
(Anand and Goyal, 2009; Asker and Ljunqvist, 2008; Boot, 2000; Boyd and Spekman, 
2008;  Henke,  1995;  Rogan,  2008;  Villas-Boas,  1994).  For  example,  large  firms  are 
generally reluctant to share a bank with a rival in their industry for underwriting purposes 
because  they  fear  conflicts  of  interest  and  information  leakage  (Asker  and  Ljunqvist, 
2008). Firms are often also reluctant to share an advertising agency with direct competitors 
as this may lead to spillovers of sensitive information and faster competitive responses to 
the  client’s  actions,  e.g.,  in  the  form  of  retaliatory  price  promotions,  preempting 
advertising campaign releases or accelerated product launches (Villas-Boas, 1994). The 
consequences of competitive overlap - in general and as a result of agency-level M&As - 
have been well documented in advertising industry publications. For example, when Bozell 
merged into Lowe, one of the former’s prominent clients, The Andrew Jergens Company, 
decided  to  terminate  its  relationship  with  Bozell  since  the  newly  merged  agency  also 
served  Johnson  &  Johnson,  a  competitor  of  the  Andrew  Jergens  Company  in  several 
markets (Advertising Age, 2003). Yet, there are also examples of agencies that handle 




Folger’s coffee  brand and rival  Kraft Food’s Maxwell House coffee brand (Fitzgerald, 
2004).   
Previous research has shown that firms are less likely to form relationships with 
partners of their rivals if their collaboration requires significant co-specialization to avoid 
rivals  potentially  free  riding  on  relational  investments,  or  proprietary  knowledge  or 
capabilities (Gimeno, 2004). When they do form relationships, the potential leakage effect, 
Li  (2002)  argued,  discourages  firms  from  sharing  information  along  the  supply  chain, 
thereby  not  achieving  the  potential  benefits  associated  with  knowledge  sharing  with 
exchange  partners.  However,  Li’s  model  does  not  take  into  account  the  possibility  of 
switching to a supplier that does not serve a direct competitor and consequently, opting for 
extensive  knowledge  sharing  in  a  setting  in  which  the  risks  of  information  leakage  to 
competitors is reduced considerably. Yet in many contexts this is a very viable option, 
which many buyers opt to take. Hence, we argue that an increase in competitive overlap 
between the merged company and the supplier’s other incumbent buyers, in terms of the 
industries in which they operate, will reduce the likelihood of the focal tie continuing after 
the acquisition.   
Hypothesis 1: An increase in competitive overlap between the industries in which 
the newly combined buyer operates and those represented in the focal supplier’s 
customer base, will decrease the likelihood of post-M&A tie continuation. 
 
So  far  we  focused  on  the  downside  of  competitive  overlap  and  knowledge 
spillovers. Yet, there may also be an upside to an increase in competitive overlap, i.e., 
potentially  being  on  the  receiving  end  of  knowledge  spillovers.  In  fact,  some  firms 
strategically use knowledge spillovers by actively seeking out suppliers or customers that It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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also deal with competitors or by locating close to potential sources of knowledge spillovers 
(Alcácer and Chung, 2007). While we have focused on the effects of being a potential 
source of leakage, much of the literature on location choice and knowledge spillovers has 
largely focused on firms as recipients of spillovers. Recent work in this area showed that 
firms  base  their  location  choices  on  their  own  capabilities,  the  location’s  knowledge 
activity  and  competitors’  anticipated  actions  in  order  to  maximize  the  net  spillovers 
(Alcácer and Chung, 2007; Shaver and Flyer, 2000). The fears associated with being a 
source of knowledge spillovers are particularly pertinent amongst leading firms, who have 
more to lose from information leakage, while laggards are more likely to actively pursue 
knowledge  spillovers  and  also  benefit  more  from  spillovers  (e.g.,  Alcácer  and  Chung, 
2007; Salomon and Jin, 2008, Shaver and Flyer, 2000). Extending these arguments to the 
context of spillovers originating from sharing suppliers with competitors, we argue that the 
more a focal buyer stands to lose from spillovers, the less likely they will be to continue 
the relationship. Although spillovers through common suppliers can extend well beyond 
information that pertains directly to the services or products provided by the supplier, e.g., 
to information on firm strategy, we predominantly focus on the spillover effects that are 
directly associated with the service or products provided in the supplier-buyer relationship. 
Hypothesis  2:  The  negative  effect  of  an  increase  in  competitive  overlap  on  the 
likelihood of tie continuation will be further intensified by the importance of the 
service (product) provided by the supplier to the buyer.  
 
Suppliers’ Perspective  
The  implications  for  suppliers  of  one  of  their  clients  becoming  involved  in  an 




overlooked this issue, the limited research that exists on this issue in the field of finance 
has shown that M&As have important implications for supplier’s cash flows, market share 
and performance, as well as for their retention as a supplier post-M&A (Fee and Thomas, 
2004). Yet, the literature has failed to discuss under which conditions suppliers would opt 
to  terminate  a  relationship  with  a  buyer,  in  general,  or  more  specifically  after  their 
customer has been involved in an acquisition. Despite this theoretical void, there is ample 
evidence that in reality it is not always the buyer deciding which relationships will be 
maintained post-M&A. For example, when PNC Bank acquired National City recently, 
executives decided to revise and restructure their advertising agency portfolio. Yet, PNC 
Bank’s  incumbent  agency  Doner  declined  to  defend  the  account  (McMains,  2009). 
Agencies rarely openly discuss the reasons why they will not defend an account, or why 
they would sever the tie themselves before it is called in review. We postulate that buyer-
level  M&As,  and  the  changes  they  bring  about,  will  affect  suppliers’  willingness  to 
continue their relationships with the consolidated buyers. We focus on one important factor 
that stands to affect the supplier’s willingness to continue the collaboration, namely the 
effect of an increase in competitive overlap in the supplier’s portfolio.  
  From the suppliers’ point of view, an increase in competitive overlap offers both 
opportunities and threats. By serving more customers in the same industry, suppliers can 
leverage their knowledge about the focal industry and achieve economies of scale. Despite 
these potential benefits, suppliers also face the risk of losing business as a result of the 
increase in competitive overlap and the accompanying concerns regarding the protection of 
buyers’ valuable private information. For example, LB Works terminated its relationship 
with Starbucks after LB Works became integrated with its parent Leo Burnett, to avoid 
conflicts with the latter’s McDonalds account (Fitzgerald, 2004). A lot of attention has It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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been devoted in advertising industry publications to the actions agencies take after they 
become involved in an acquisition in order to deal with potential account conflict. Yet, it 
remains unclear how agencies react to potential account conflicts resulting from a buyer-
level M&A. In many instances a supplier will have to decide whether it will sever its tie 
with  the  merging  organization,  and  avoid  information  leakage  concerns  from  other 
competing incumbent buyers, or keep the relationship and risk losing one or more other 
clients. Given that the merging company itself may be considering reviewing its supplier 
portfolio, the latter option could be very risky. Consequently, the fear of losing important 
clients due to competitive overlap is likely to lead to suppliers preemptively ending their 
relationship with the merging customer. The more buyers that are at risk of defecting if the 
supplier continues to serve the merging buyer, the more likely it will be that the supplier 
will sever the tie with the merging company.  
Hypothesis 3: An increase in the proportion of the supplier’s customers that is at 
risk as a result of post-M&A changes in competitive overlap will have a negative 
effect on the likelihood of post-M&A tie continuation.  
 
  Yet, under certain conditions the supplier may be willing to incur the risk of losing 
other incumbent buyers to continue to serve the merging company. This is particularly 
likely if the merging buyer is a big buyer, or could potentially become a bigger buyer down 
the line. In addition, if the merging company is a very prominent buyer and maintaining 
the  relationship  will  have  a  positive  bearing  on  the  supplier’s  status,  visibility  and  its 
ability to attract new buyers in the future, the supplier will be more willing to keep the 
focal  relationship  even  it  if  leads  to  an  increase  in  competitive  overlap  and  potential 




Hypothesis  4:  The  negative  effect  of  an  increase  in  competitive  overlap  on  the 
likelihood of tie continuation is moderated by the importance of the merging buyers 
to the focal supplier.   
 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
In  order  to  test  our  hypotheses  we  study  the  post-M&A  continuation  of 
relationships between firms (buyers) and their advertising agencies (suppliers). We deem 
this setting to be particularly suited for our research purpose for several reasons. First of 
all, advertising agencies are suppliers of important services. Advertising has the potential 
to contribute to brand recognition, growth and sales, and consequently to firm performance 
(Assmus, Farley and Lehmann, 1984; Dekimpe and Hannsens, 1995; Jones, 2007; Kim, 
1993). Moreover, decisions pertaining to changes in agency relations even affect the value 
of the firm, as the onset of a new agency-client relationship leads to negative stock market 
reactions (Mathur and Mathur, 1996). Hence, decisions on the retention of agency-client 
ties are important to firms. In addition, physical asset specificity tends to be extremely low 
or non-existent in agency-client relationships and agreements usually entail no more than a 
90-day notice for cancellation (Horsky, 2006). Consequently, post-M&A tie continuation 
decisions can be made relatively quickly and are not hindered by long-term contracts or 
high levels of assets specificity that may cause partners to be locked into the relationship. 
Although  the  acquisition  process  and  the  integration  phase,  including  resource 
reconfiguration, can take several years to be completed, trade press and industry experts 
emphasized that in this context the decision to maintain or dissolve agency relationships is 
made soon after the deal is closed. This reduces the risk of confounding the consequences It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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of  the  focal  M&A  on  tie  continuation  with  those  of  other  strategic  events.  Finally, 
advertising agency-client relations provide a context in which we observe varying levels of 
competitive overlap in the suppliers’ portfolios, and knowledge spillovers pose a potential 
threat.  
Our  unit  of  analysis  is  the  supplier-buyer  (agency-client)  tie.  In  order  to  get  a 
sample  of  supplier-buyer  ties  for  which  the  buyer  was  involved  in  an  acquisition,  we 
collected data from the Thomson Financial Security Data Corporation (SDC) database on 
all completed, domestic  M&As that took place  in the U.S.  in 1995. Subsequently, we 
verified for which acquisitions data on supplier (agency) relationships was available for 
both the target and the acquirer prior to the acquisition and for the acquirer or the merged 
company  after  the  acquisition.  This  resulted  in  a  sample  of  237  M&As,  which  were 
associated with 798 supplier-buyer relationships. Data on agency-client ties were obtained 
from  The  Standard  Directory  of  Advertising  Agencies  and  The  Standard  Directory  of 
Advertisers,  also  known  in  the  industry  as  The  Red  Books.  This  directory  provides  a 
comprehensive listing of U.S. advertising agencies and their clients and has been published 
on an annual basis for the past 80 years. It contains detailed information on advertising 
agencies and on advertisers, including account information, specialization of the agency, 
core business of the advertisers, contact information on key agency personnel, ownership 
details, and the number of employees. These data have been used successfully in several 
past studies (e.g., Baker et al., 1998; Broschak, 2004).  
Dependent variable 
Our  dependent  variable  is  dichotomous  and  takes  on  the  value  1  if  a  tie  is 
maintained post-acquisition (in 1997), and 0 otherwise. We opted to determine post-M&A 




industry publications and interviews with agency executives indicated that tie retention 
decisions are made relatively soon after the deal is announced in this context.  
Independent Variables 
Buyer Perspective Variables. Our measure of competitive overlap from the buyer’s 
perspective should reflect the buyer’s concern about knowledge spillovers to competitors 
in each of the industries the firm operates in, as well as the degree of potential spillovers in 
each  industry.  We  start  by  identifying  all  the  clients  of  the  focal  agencies,  and  the 
industries (SIC codes) they operate in. Next we look at the number of the focal buyer’s SIC 
codes that are also represented in the agency’s account portfolio through other customers, 
and the degree of overlap in all of these SIC codes, prior to the acquisition. Hence, we 
determined how many SIC codes of the merged company overlap with the SIC codes in the 
supplier’s portfolio and the degree of overlap in each SIC code. Next, we divided this 
number  by  total  number  of  SIC  codes  that  overlap.  This  gives  us  a  measure  of  pre-
acquisition  competitive  overlap  from  the  buyer’s  perspective,  reflecting  the  extent  of 
spillovers buyer firms may face. In order to determine a measure of buyer perspective 
change in competitive overlap resulting from the acquisition we need to determine what 
the implications would be for competitive overlap if the newly combined buyer would 
continue to work with the supplier after the acquisition. Hence, we compare all of the 
merged  buyer’s  SIC  codes  with  those  of  the  other  incumbent  buyers  in  the  supplier’s 
portfolio,  thereby  calculating  a  virtual  level  of  competitive  overlap  –  i.e.,  the  level  of 
overlap that would arise if the tie continued after the acquisition and everything else stayed 
constant.
4 The change in competitive overlap is then defined as:  
                                                 
4 This is a virtual level of competitive overlap as some of the ties are terminated and the actual level of 
competitive overlap cannot be computed. Hence, we compute the level of competitive overlap that would 
arise post-M&A if the relationship were to continue and everything else would stay equal.  It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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Change in buyer perspective competitive overlap =    
overlap  that  codes   SIC   of Number 
Codes   SIC   all   in   overlap   of   Degree
overlap  that  codes   SIC   of number    Virtual
codes   SIC   all   in   overlap   of   degree   Virtual
−  
For Hypothesis 2 we need a measure of the importance of the service or product 
provided by the supplier, which in this context translates to the importance of advertising 
to the firm. In order to determine the importance of advertising to the client firm, we 
computed  a  ratio  of  the  client’s  advertising  expenditure  to  its  (primary)  industry’s 
advertising expenditure. The higher the ratio, the more important advertising is to the firm. 
Firms that represent a higher share of the industry’s total advertising expenditure can be 
construed  as  leaders  while  those  representing  a  small  share  can  be  considered  to  be 
laggards in terms of advertising. Data on firm and industry level advertising expenditure 
was obtained from the 1994 volumes of the Standard Directory of Advertisers and Ad $ 
Summary.   
Supplier  Perspective  Variables.  From  the  supplier’s  perspective  competitive 
overlap is predominantly a concern in terms of the potential loss of clients. Hence, for the 
supplier perspective change in competitive overlap measure we focus on the number of the 
agency’s clients that share at least one SIC code with the focal client as a proportion of the 
agency’s total number of clients. This measure takes into account both the potential loss of 
clients and the agency’s dependence on these clients. We identified all clients of the focal 
agency that share at least one SIC code with the focal buyer prior to the acquisition. Then 
we combined the SIC codes of the target and the acquirer and calculated how many of the 
agency’s incumbent clients share at least one SIC code with the consolidated buyer, to 
obtain a virtual measure of post-M&A competitive overlap, i.e., the competitive overlap 




everything else stays equal. Subsequently, we measured the change in competitive overlap 
as follows:  
Change in supplier perspective competitive overlap =  
 
buyers   s supplier'   of Number 
buyer    A) & M - (pre    with codes   SIC   share  that  buyers   of Number 
buyers   s supplier'   of number    Virtual
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  For  Hypothesis  3  we  need  a  measure  of  the  focal  client’s  importance  to  the 
supplier. We use the client’s absolute level of advertising expenditure for this purpose. A 
firm with a large advertising budget, is an attractive client to maintain from an agency’s 
point of view, even if the agency only represents a small part of the client’s budget as it 
may lead to an increase in business in the future in addition to the benefits associated with 
increased status and visibility. 
Control Variables 
We include a number of relationship, client, agency and acquisitions level control 
variables.  We  control  for  the  strength  of  an  agency-client  relationship  by  its  duration 
(Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Kotabe et al., 2003), i.e., the number of years it has existed 
from its formation until 1995. We tracked the relationship back to 1970 or the earliest year 
we could observe it. For some relationships we could not determine the start date, either 
because it was prior to 1970 or as a result of missing information for the client companies. 
Hence, we included a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if a tie is potentially left 
censored, i.e., the start date may precede the earliest year we observe the relationship.  
We  constructed  two  measures  to  determine  agency  quality  and  performance. 
Firstly, we use the advertising industry rankings published annually in Advertising Age. It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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These  are  based  on  the  total  billings  of  an  agency,  which  is  an  indication  of  its 
performance and also affects its reputation (Polonsky and Waller, 1995). We coded the top 
100 agencies, assigning a score of 100 to the highest ranking agency, 99 to the second 
highest, and so on. A score of 0 was assigned to any agency not appearing in the top 100 of 
the  1994  ranking.  Secondly,  we  use  the  awards  advertising  agencies  win  in  annual 
competitions as an indication of their performance and the quality of their services. We 
focus  on  two  competitions,  i.e.,  the  Andy  Awards  and  the  Effie  Awards.  Although  a 
variety of industry-wide competitions are held each year, we opted to focus on these two as 
they are both prestigious awards,  yet they  focus on different performance criteria. The 
Effie Awards reward agencies for efficient and effective campaigns and services, while the 
Andy Awards focus more on the recognition of outstanding creative work (Polonsky and 
Waller, 1995). As agencies can win multiple awards in the same competition each year, but 
in different categories, we counted the number of awards each agency won in the period of 
1992-1995 in both competitions.   
We also control for changes in status that an agency incurs as a result of being 
linked to the combined organization, rather than to the independent client it served prior to 
the deal. A firm’s status affects its ability to attract customers and partners (Jensen and 
Roy, 2008; Podolny, 1993; Stuart, 2000). Consequently, the fear of experiencing a decline 
in status, i.e., status anxiety, can prompt firms to detach themselves from certain partners 
in an attempt to protect their own status (Jensen, 2006). In order to determine an agency’s 
status, we identified all the agency’s clients and determined which ones were high profile 
and  high status clients. Serving  leading and  highly  visible advertisers affects agencies’ 
visibility, legitimacy and status. Hence, we determined the position of all clients served by 




published annually, based on firms’ annual advertising expenditures, by Ad $ Summary. 
We assigned a score of 500 to the highest ranking advertiser, 499 to the second highest, 
and so on. A score of 0 was assigned to any company not appearing in the top 500 of the 
1994 ranking. Subsequently, we computed the average position of a focal agency’s clients, 
and use this as a measure of status. The post-M&A change in status is then defined as the 
change in the average position of the focal agency’s accounts in case the agency also starts 
serving the other party or the combined organization, keeping everything else constant. 
In  addition,  we  control  for  the  type  of  acquisition  by  means  of  three  dummy 
variables. If an acquisition is between firms that operate in the same 4-digit primary SIC 
code,  the  acquisition  is  coded  as  horizontal.  When  the  target  and  acquirer’s  primary 
industries  are  in  the  same  2-digit  SIC  code,  we  coded  them  as  related  deals.  If  the 
acquisition  was  not  related  or  horizontal,  we  coded  them  as  other  types  of  deals.  We 
identified whether a focal tie was associated with the target or acquiring organization prior 
to the deal. We constructed a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the tie was 
associated with the target and 0 otherwise, as target ties may have a lower likelihood of 
being maintained post-M&A (Baker et al., 1998; Karim and Mitchell, 2000).  
We control for the number of agencies a client has, as a higher number of agency 
ties increases the complexity and costs of managing ties, while a lower number of ties may 
increase dependence on the focal agency (Broschak, 2004). We control for an agency’s 
dependence on the focal client by the number of accounts the focal agency has. Agencies 
with few accounts are more dependent on each individual client than agencies with a high 
number of clients, and hence, may be more willing to do whatever it takes to keep an 
account.  We  also  control  for  the  pool  of  alternatives  available  to the  clients  after  the 
merger by including the number of agencies available in the same state as the client’s focal It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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agency. Finally, we include a dichotomous control variable to indicate whether a tie is with 
an in-house agency (coded 1) or not (0).  
Analysis 
Given the nature of our data and our dependent variable, we use logistic regression 
to test our hypotheses. Our goal is to determine the influence of our explanatory variables 
on the likelihood of post-M&A tie continuation. This can be described as follows: 
 
[ ] ir r i i i X X P P Log β β β + + + = − ... ) 1 /( 1 1 0  
Where i P  is the probability that our dependent variable is 1, ) 1 /( i i P P − represents 
the odds of continuation and the coefficients 1 β ,…, r β represent the effect of the 
independent variables on the natural logarithm of the odds of tie continuation.  
 
Our sample contains a number of ties that share the same client or agency, creating 
clusters in the data in which records are not independent. Therefore, we estimated our 
models with robust Huber-White standard errors and adjusted standard errors for within 




On average, ties were 6.1 years old at the time of the acquisition. Clients have, on 
average, just under two agencies. The majority of the clients in the sample have only one 
agency. The agencies  in our sample  have, on average,  just under 25 accounts. Ties of 
acquiring clients account for just over half of the ties in our sample (57%). Additional 
summary statistics and correlations can be found in Table 1.  
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Table  2  provides  a  summary  of  the  results.  All  models  provided  significant 




intercept only model. In our base model (Model 1), we find that tie age at the time of the 
acquisition has a significant positive effect (p<0.05) on the likelihood of post-M&A tie 
continuation, suggesting that the strength of the ties and the relation-specific assets that 
develop in them create attachments that increase the likelihood of the tie surviving the 
acquisition  (Levinthal  and  Fichman,  1988;  Seabright  et  al.,  1992).  The  quality  of  the 
agency, captured by the number of awards they have won, also has a marginally significant 
(p<0.1) and positive effect on the likelihood of tie continuation. Yet, target organizations’ 
ties have a lower likelihood of being maintained after the deal (p<0.05). Surprisingly, the 
type of acquisition does not have a significant effect on tie continuation.  
Our  first  set of  hypotheses  focused  on  the  buyer’s  perspective  and  is  tested  in 
Models 2-3. In Model 2 we test the effect of a change in competitive overlap, brought 
about by the acquisition, on the likelihood of a tie continuing after the deal. In line with 
Hypothesis  1,  we  find  that  an  increase  in  competitive  overlap,  between  the  agency’s 
customer base and the industries the merged client operates in, reduces the likelihood of tie 
continuation (p<0.1). Subsequently, we postulated that the negative effect of an increase in 
competitive overlap would  be  intensified  by the  importance of advertising to the  focal 
client. In  model 3 we  included an  interaction term  between the change  in competitive 
overlap  and  the  ratio  of  the  firm’s  advertising  expenditure  to that of  its  industry.  The 
results indicated a significant positive interaction effect. This finding is at odds with our 
hypothesized negative interaction effect. Yet, simply relying on the sign and significance 
of the coefficient of an interaction effect in logistic regression may be misleading (Hoetker, 
2007;  Wiersema  and  Bowen,  2009).  More  precisely,  the  interpretation  of  interactions 
between variables is complicated in logistic regression by the fact that the marginal effect 
of  an  interaction  is  not  simply  the  coefficient  for  their  interaction,  and  in  fact,  the It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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magnitude and the sign can differ across observations (Hoetker, 2007; Huang and Shields, 
2000). To ensure the accuracy of our conclusions we opted for the method proposed by 
Wiersema and Bowen (2009) to calculate the true interaction effects. In order to draw 
accurate  conclusions  for  interaction  effects  in  logistic  regression  models,  the  sign  and 
statistical  significance  of  the  value  of  the  moderator  variable’s  marginal  effect  on  the 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variables over all sample 
values  of  the  model  variables  should  be  assessed  (Wiersema  and  Bowen,  2009).  To 
examine the nature and significance of the marginal effects, we computed its values and 
the associated z-statistic  values at each observation. Graph 1  shows the results of this 
procedure. The graph shows that the value and significance of the true interaction effect 
differs over the range of the predicted probabilities of tie continuation. Yet, the sign of the 
interaction effect seems to be fairly consistently positive.  
 
Our calculations also show that the value of the true interaction effect computed at 
the  variable  means  is  0.806  with  a  standard  error  of  0.406  (p=0.047).  Based  on  the 




conclude that the interaction effect is indeed positive and significant. Hence, in contrast to 
what we predicted in Hypothesis 2, the ties of leading advertisers in fact have a lower 
likelihood of termination after an increase in competitive overlap than those of firms which 
lag in terms of advertising expenditure. This is surprising since leading advertisers have 




  Subsequently,  we  test  our  predictions  on  the  effect  of  changes  in  competitive 
overlap from the supplier’s point of view in Models 4-5. In Model 4 we fail to find a 
significant effect for the change in competitive overlap from the supplier’s perspective. In 
other words, an increase in the number of clients that the agency could potentially lose as a 
result of competitive overlap in its customer base, does not decrease the likelihood of tie 
continuation. Hence, we fail to find support for Hypothesis 3.  
  In  Model  5,  we  examine  the  interaction  effect  between  change  in  competitive 
overlap,  from  the  agencies’  perspective,  and  the  clients’  advertising  expenditure.  The 
logistic regression results provide evidence of the predicted significant positive interaction 
effect. Graph 2 shows the true interactions effects and the associated z-statistic values we 
computed at each observation. The graph indicates that the interaction effect is positive and 
significant for most observations.  It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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  Our  results  show  that  the  value  of  the  true  interaction  effect  computed  at  the 
variable  means  is  positive  and  highly  significant  (p<0.001).  Based  on  the  graphical 
analysis and the value of the interaction effect at the variable means, we can conclude that 
the  interaction  effect  is  indeed  positive  and  significant.  Hence,  we  find  support  for 
Hypothesis 4. Table 4 provides more information on the effect of the moderator client 
advertising expenditure on the marginal effect of change in competitive overlap on the 
probability of tie continuation.  
 
 




Additional Analyses  
  We performed some additional analyses to further our understanding of the impact 
of changes in competitive overlap, particularly from the buyer’s perspective. Our main 
analysis led to some unexpected results with respect to the interaction effect posited in 
Hypothesis 2. We found that the importance of the focal service to the buyer, an indication 
of how much they stand to lose, moderated the negative effect of a change in competitive 
overlap on the likelihood of tie continuation rather than intensify it as we predicted. This 
may be partially due to the measurement we use to proxy for the importance of the focal 
service,  i.e.,  the  firm’s  advertising  expenditure  relative  to  the  average  in  its  primary 
industry,  as  it  doesn’t  capture  the  full  impact  of  spillovers.  We  use  two  alternative 
measures to verify the robustness of our results. Firstly, we replicated the analysis with an 
interaction between change in competitive overlap and advertising intensity, defined as the 
ratio of firm-level advertising expenditure to total sales. This measure has been used as a 
proxy for intangible assets in prior research (e.g., Delios and Beamish, 2001) and although 
it is related to the measure we use in our main analysis, it may in fact be more suitable to 
test for the importance of the service to the buyer or for the intangible assets that may be at 
risk by sharing a supplier with competitors. As an alternative, we interact the change in 
competitive overlap with client firm size (measured by the number of employees). Large 
firms are often imitated because their size is perceived to be a sign of success (e.g., Baum, 
Li and Usher, 2000; Haunschild and Miner, 1997) and they are more likely to contribute to 
spillovers in specific locations (Shaver and Flyer, 2000). However, our results show that 
the negative effect of changes in competitive overlap is mitigated by advertising intensity 
and size, respectively, which is consistent the results from our main analysis. 
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our study examined the determinants of post-M&A supplier-buyer tie continuation, 
thereby making several contributions to the literature on supplier-buyer ties, but also to the 
literature on IORs in general and to the M&A literature.  
Firstly, we provided additional insights into the drivers of relationship continuation 
and dissolution. In doing so, we emphasized the need to take into account both the buyer 
and the supplier’s willingness to continue their relationship. Research on supplier-buyer 
ties has predominantly focused on the buyer’s perspective when it comes to studying tie 
continuation. Consequently, relatively little is known about the implications of changes at 
the buyer level for the supplier’s willingness to continue the relationship. In this paper we 
took a two-sided view on the implications of buyer-level acquisitions for the survival of 
supplier-buyer ties. Our results suggested that an increase in competitive overlap between 
the focal client and the other clients in the supplier’s portfolio seems to matter for both the 
buyer and the supplier, although from the supplier’s perspective the effect is contingent on 
the importance of the client.  
From the buyer’s perspective, our results showed that an increase in competitive 
overlap  reduces  the  likelihood  of  tie  continuation.  These  findings  suggest  that  clients 
believe  that the  risks  associated  with  an  increase  in  competitive  overlap  outweigh  the 
benefits of economies of scale or positive spillovers. Contrary to what we expected, this 
effect is moderated by the relative importance of the service provided by the supplier for 
the buyer. This unexpected result  may  be explained  by the  fact that firms that have  a 
relatively high advertising budget also have the potential to exert great power and may be 
able to force the supplier to put Chinese walls or other protective mechanisms in place, or 




not allow us to examine this explanation for the unexpected results. From the suppliers’ 
perspective, our results show that an increase in competitive overlap is less of an issue 
when the relationship involves a prominent client, suggesting that under these conditions 
suppliers may be more willing to terminate other relationships to avoid conflicts with the 
focal one, or they are more willing to put protective mechanisms in place that allows them 
to keep all of their incumbent buyers.  
In addition, we contribute to the M&A literature by examining the implications of 
M&As for the reconfiguration of inter-organizational relations, which are often deemed to 
be a critical resource for firms. Yet, research on resource reconfiguration has traditionally 
focused on resources that are owned and controlled by the merging organizations, i.e., that 
reside  within  firm  boundaries  (e.g.,  Capron  et  al.,  1998;  Capron,  1999;  Karim  and 
Mitchell, 2000). We contribute to this stream of work by taking into account the unique 
challenges  that  the  reconfiguration  of  boundary  spanning  resources  provide.  The 
consolidated firm does not have sole ownership of these relationships and the relation-
specific  assets  that  have  been  developed  in  them,  and  consequently,  reconfiguration 
decisions are not entirely within its control. By taking a two-sided view of post-M&A 
supplier-buyer  tie  continuation  we  provide  insights  into  the  unique  challenges  that 
reconfiguration of inter-firm resources presents to merging firms. Our results also showed 
that, despite a common belief in our setting, as well as in many other settings, that clients 
maintain  the  leading  suppliers  of  the  acquiring  company,  target  ties  may  be  at  a 
disadvantage due to their origin but they do survive in many cases. In general, the strength 
of the tie and the quality of the supplier matter in the reconfiguration decision process.  
Secondly, we also contribute to the M&A literature by taking one step towards a 
better understanding of the implications of M&As for the merging companies’ suppliers.  It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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Research  in the organization and  strategy  field  has  largely  ignored the  implications of 
buyer-level  M&As  for  suppliers.  In  the  area  of  finance,  however,  some  scholars  have 
recognized that this is an important avenue for future research, as suppliers of merging 
companies will  be  affected  in  many ways,  including changes  in their client portfolios, 
performance, bargaining power, and even their future survival (Fee and Thomas, 2004; 
Shahrur, 2005).  
Finally, our results also provide additional insights into the competitive dynamics 
following M&A. Previous research has focused on the direct implications of M&A for the 
competitive  dynamics  in  the  industries  of  the  merging  companies.  Yet,  the  indirect 
competitive dynamics that may  be triggered  by  potential knowledge  spillovers through 
shared suppliers have been left unexplored in this area, and more generally as well. The 
benefits  and  risks  associated  with  knowledge  spillovers,  and  their  implications  for 
competitive dynamics, have been well documented in the context of horizontal alliances as 
well as in the context of location choice. Yet, in the context of supplier-buyer relationships, 
both in terms of partner selection as well as in terms of tie continuation, relatively little is 
known about the causes and implications of knowledge spillovers.  
  From  a  practical  point  of  view,  we  provide  agencies,  and  other  suppliers,  with 
insights into what drives relationship continuation after a client undertakes an acquisition. 
Overall, there seems to be a consensus in the advertising industry that such events will 
cause  major  changes.  A  recent  study  of  11  mega-mergers  by  advertising  industry 
publication Adweek  focused on determining the  patterns of relationship reconfiguration 
(Baar, 2005). Nevertheless, very little is known about what really drives these changes and 
what the parties involved can do to keep the relationship going. Our results showed that an 




represents  through  other  clients  reduces  the  likelihood  of  a  tie  surviving  after  the 
acquisition. Being aware of the clients’ concerns about this could provide agencies the 
opportunity  to  tackle  this  issue  early  on  and  try  to  convince  clients  that  they  have 
appropriate mechanisms in place to deal with this overlap. Our results also illustrated the 
importance of quality and strength of the ties for tie continuation, as well as the fact that 
target ties are at a disadvantage over acquirer ties when it comes to being maintained post-
M&As.  These  insights  could  help  agencies  in  general  prepare  for  the  aftermath  of  an 
acquisition by proactively emphasizing their quality and the strength of their relationship 
to the client, which is particularly important for the target’s agencies as they are already at 
a disadvantage compared to those of the acquirer.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The contributions and limitations of the present study indicate several avenues for 
future research. The main contribution of the paper lies in unraveling the effect of changes 
in competitive overlap on post-M&A tie continuation. By focusing on a context in which 
the suppliers of one party can serve as substitutes  for the suppliers of the other party, 
regardless of whether or not the acquisition expands the scope of the firm, and the level of 
competitive overlap in suppliers’ customer bases varies widely we were able to provide 
some  interesting  insights  into  this.
6  Yet,  this  may  also  raise  concerns  about  the 
generalizability  of  our  results,  in  particular  to  manufacturing  contexts  where  suppliers 
often  only,  or  predominantly,  serve  firms  from  one  industry,  and  suppliers  of  firms 
operating in different industries are less likely to be substitutes for each other. Hence, this 
                                                 
6 Supplier of advertising, legal or auditing services can serve clients from a wide variety of industries, even 
though they may be specialized in some industries in some instances. As a result, the suppliers of the target 
firm can also serve the acquirer and those that serve the acquirer can also serve the target, even if the target 
and acquirer operate in different industries.  It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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complicates the study of post-M&A tie continuation for M&As aimed at expanding the 
scope of the firm, i.e., related and unrelated deals, in manufacturing contexts. Studying 
post-M&A tie continuation and the role of competitive overlap may require researchers to 
focus on horizontal M&As, in which it is more likely that the suppliers of the target and 
the  acquirer  can  act  as  substitutes  for  each  other.  This  in  turn  may  further  reinforce 
concerns  about  the  pertinence  of  competitive  overlap.  Nevertheless,  the  dynamics  of 
competitive overlap are still relevant  in these  settings. For example,  in the automotive 
context  an  engine  manufacturer  with  multiple  customers  will  have  a  high  level  of 
competitive  overlap  in  its  customer  base  as  they  will  predominantly  sell  to  car 
manufacturers. Yet, at a more subtle level, competitive overlap may be low if the buyers 
operate in different market segments, or higher if all the buyers for example operate in the 
high end sports cars segment. Hence, buyers and suppliers will face the same concerns 
about  increases  in  competitive  overlap  following  a  buyer-level  horizontal  M&A.  The 
existence  of  exclusive  supplier-buyer  relationships,  for  example  in  the  context  of  the 
Japanese automobile industry, further suggest that concerns about knowledge spillovers 
resulting from competitive overlap in the supplier’s customer base are also prevalent in 
manufacturing  contexts  (Nobeoka  et  al.,  2002). Similarly,  Gimeno  (2004)  showed  that 
firms  in  the  airline  industry  are  often  reluctant  to  form  alliances  with  partners  of 
competitors  when  collaborations  require  co-specialization  out  of  fear  of  spillovers.  In 
short, our results are generalizable to other ties between buyers and service providers, such 
as law firms and auditors, but also to manufacturing settings even though in the latter case 
the generalizability may be limited to the context of horizontal buyer-level M&As.  
We postulated that, from the  buyer’s point of  view, an  increase  in competitive 




We argued that the more the focal buyer has to lose, the more they will try to avoid sharing 
the supplier with competitors. Yet, the measure we used to get at how much a firm has to 
lose, i.e., the firm’s advertising expenditure relative to that of its primary industry, presents 
an important limitation, which may explain our failure to find support for our hypothesis. 
More precisely, our measure may not fully capture how much a firm potentially has to lose 
from spillovers through a common supplier. Hence, future research would benefit from 
examining whether the effect of competitive overlap differs for firms that are leaders in 
their industry and firms that are laggards. Focusing on a firm’s overall performance, rather 
than whether or not it is a leading advertiser, should offer a more comprehensive account 
of the effect of an increase in competitive overlap. 
Although we advance the literature by examining the consequences of buyer-level 
M&As for supplier-buyer ties from both the supplier’s and the buyer’s perspectives, the 
main limitation of this study presents itself in our inability to empirically determine who 
ends  the  ties.  Our  differential  measures  for  changes  in  competitive  overlap  from  the 
buyers’  and  suppliers’  perspectives  take  into  account  important  differences  in  what 
competitive  overlap  means  and  its  implications  for  the  different  parties.  Yet,  future 
research would benefit greatly from examining in more detail who makes the decision to 
terminate  or  continue  supplier-buyer  ties,  both  in  general,  and  following  buyer-level 
M&As in particular.  
Moreover, we only look at the impact of buyer-level M&As for a set of focal ties, 
examining the determinants of tie continuation at the dyadic level. Yet, as some of our 
theoretical arguments suggest, other ties in the suppliers’ portfolios may also be affected 
by  a  buyer-level  M&A.  For  example,  when  the  supplier  is  faced  with  an  increase  in 
competitive overlap it may consider terminating the tie with the merging buyer or with It Takes Two to Continue to Tango 
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some of its other incumbent buyers to reduce the impact of competitive overlap, or some of 
the incumbent buyers may choose to terminate their relationships with the focal supplier. 
Hence, looking at the dynamics in the suppliers’ entire portfolio of relationships would 
provide additional insights into the implications of buyer-level M&As on supplier-buyer 
ties, and on suppliers in a broader sense. 
  Our results provided the first step in understanding the implications of M&As on 
boundary spanning resources. As a next step, research should focus on what happens to 
these resources after they have been reconfigured, in terms of their value and their survival. 
Much of the research on resource reconfiguration and redeployment has focused on the 
direction of redeployment and its implications for performance, implicitly assuming that 
the  resources  that  are  maintained  or  redeployed  are  not  negatively  affected  by  the 
reconfiguration process. However, successful redeployment or reconfiguration should not 
be taken for granted when the focal resources are knowledge-based and span across firm 
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We  take  into  account  both  tie  formation  and  tie  dissolution  to  examine  how  supplier-
portfolio reconfiguration affects firm performance. We discuss the drawbacks and benefits 
of stability and churn in portfolios from different perspectives. We postulate that the effect 
of reconfiguration will be moderated by the size of the portfolio and the strength of the ties 
in the portfolio. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 1,118 firms whose portfolios of 
relationships with advertising agencies (suppliers) we tracked for a period of 5 years. Our 
results suggest that supplier-portfolio reconfiguration affects performance, but its effect is 
complex and contingent on the characteristics of the portfolio.  
 
   
                                                 
1 This chapter is the result of joint work with Xavier Martin.  Chapter 5 
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INTRODUCTION 
The value firms can create through inter-organizational relations (IORs) - and the 
pivotal  role  these  relations  play  in  firms’  performance  and  survival  -  has  enjoyed 
considerable attention in the literature (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998; Singh and Mitchell, 1996). In fact, research has  increasingly  started to 
depict  IORs  as  resources  that  can  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  a  sustainable 
competitive  advantage,  thereby  extending  the  Resource  Based  View  (RBV)  which  has 
traditionally  focused on resources owned or controlled by the  focal  firm (Lavie, 2006; 
Wassmer  and  Dussauge,  2011).  The  RBV  in  its  traditional  sense  has  emphasized  the 
importance of combining resources, rather than focusing on single resources, to gain a 
competitive advantage (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Grant, 1991). Yet, a large portion of 
the  work  focusing  on  IORs  as  resources  has  failed  to take  into  account that  in  many 
instances firms maintain multiple IORs at the same time, which together make up the inter-
firm  resources  that  have  the  potential  to  lead  to  value  creation  and  achievement  of  a 
competitive  advantage  (Lavie,  2006;  Wassmer,  2010;  Wassmer  and  Dussauge,  2011). 
Focusing on single IORs only offers a partial account of the role inter-firm resources play 
in achieving organizational success.  
Consequently, recent literature has started to redirect its focus to the portfolio level 
of analysis, particularly in the context of alliances (e.g., Lavie and Miller, 2008; Reuer and 
Ragozzino, 2006). Research in this area has examined the emergence, configuration and 
the management of alliance portfolios (Baum, Calabrese and Silverman, 2000; Hoffmann, 
2007; Lavie, 2007; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Wassmer, 2010). In addition, recent work 
has also examined the performance implications of alliance portfolios (Lavie, 2007; Lavie 




However, the dynamics that emerge in these portfolios over time have been left 
relatively  unexplored  (Ozcan,  2007;  Wassmer,  2010).  Research  on  the  evolution  and 
dissolution of inter-organizational relations has predominantly focused on the dyadic level 
of analysis (e.g., Ahuja, Polidoro and Mitchell, 2009; Baker, Faulkner and Fisher, 1998; 
Pangarkar, 2009), and research on these dynamics at the portfolio level is very sparse. 
Moreover,  the  work  focusing  on  changes  in  IOR  portfolio  configurations  has 
predominantly been of a conceptual nature or case-based (Dittrich, Duyster and de Man, 
2007; Hoffman, 2007; Kim, Oh and Swaminathan, 2006; Koka, Madhavan and Prescott, 
2006).  
It is clear that, despite the proliferating interest in inter-organizational networks and 
alliance portfolios, the  need to empirically examine the effect of changes  in  inter-firm 
resources on firm performance remains. We contribute to this stream of work by focusing 
on  firms’ portfolios of supplier relationships, a  context in which the portfolio  level of 
analysis has been underemphasized so far. More precisely, we examine the performance 
implications of supplier-portfolio reconfiguration, focusing on all the relationships firms 
maintain concurrently with suppliers of a specific service. We go beyond the question as to 
whether  or  not  reconfiguration  is  beneficial  to  performance  by  examining  potential 
moderating effects. More precisely, we examine how the characteristics of portfolios affect 
the relationship between reconfiguration and firm performance.  
 
THEORY 
Performance Implications of portfolio reconfiguration  
Recent  research  has  highlighted  the  positive  effects  of  alliance  portfolios  on  a 
variety  of  outcomes,  such  as  innovative  performance,  value  creation  and  overall  firm Chapter 5 
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performance (Baum, Calabrese and Silverman, 2000; Lavie, 2007; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 
2009). In addition to these recent findings in the context of alliances at the portfolio level 
of  analysis,  there  is  ample  evidence  at  the  dyadic  level  that  strong  supplier-buyer 
relationships have the potential to improve both the buyer and the supplier’s performance 
(Kotabe et al., 2003). Extending and combining these  findings, we argue that a firm’s 
portfolio of supplier relationships will impact its performance. The configuration of the 
portfolio will determine the costs and benefits that are associated with its management. 
More precisely, it will determine the complexity and costs of managing the relationships, 
the quality, quantity and diversity of information and resources that are available to the 
focal firm, the level of dependence on specific partners, as well as potential redundancy 
and  conflict  in  the  portfolio  (Baum,  Calabrese  and  Silverman,  2000;  Hoffmann,  2007; 
Wassmer, 2010).  
Despite the static perspective taken in a lot of the IOR portfolio research, portfolio 
configurations may change over time, either as a result of deliberate actions taken by the 
focal firm, or as a result of factors outside of its control. Yet, extant literature has failed to 
examine how these changes in portfolio configuration affect firm performance (Kim et al., 
2006). We start off by discussing the benefits and drawbacks of relationship stability and 
change, drawing on a variety of perspectives.  
By  extending  the  RBV,  the  relational  view  has  argued  that  firms  can  obtain 
significant  benefits  from  the  development  of  relation-specific  assets  and  knowledge 
sharing  routines  in  IORs  (Dyer  and  Singh,  1998).  These  assets  and  routines  generally 
develop  over  time  and  through  interaction,  suggesting  that  developing  stable  ongoing 
collaborations  are  particularly  conducive  for  their  development.  Accordingly,  several 




development  of  relation-specific  assets,  which  in  turn  lead  to  increased  efficiency  and 
performance improvements (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Asanuma, 1989; Kotabe et al., 
2003). The development of these relation-specific assets has the potential to increase joint 
dependence,  i.e., both parties’ reliance on the relationship and each other. Building on 
resource dependence theory, Gulati and Sytch (2007) argued that joint dependence, in turn, 
leads  to  performance  improvements  in  supplier-buyer  ties.  In  addition,  Lorenzoni  and 
Lipparini (1999) argued that over time relationships with suppliers become more stable as 
trust starts to emerge, resulting in a reduction in coordination and transaction costs and 
increased levels of innovation. Stability may also provide buyers with the reputation of 
preserving  long-term  relationships  with  suppliers,  which  fosters  suppliers’  cooperation 
(Lazzarini,  Miller  and  Zenger,  2008;  Podolny  and  Page,  1998).  In  short,  relationship 
stability has often been associated with performance improvements.  
Nevertheless, others have focused on the detrimental side of relationship stability 
and the benefits of change. Despite the benefits described above, very high levels of joint 
dependence can actually act as constraints to exchange partners (Gulati and Sytch, 2007). 
Maintaining long-term relationships can cause firms to become too dependent on partners, 
creates  overembeddedness,  and  increases  the  risk  of  firms  missing  out  on  novel 
opportunities  and  valuable  information  (Baker,  1990;  Hansen,  1999;  Rindfleish  and 
Moorman, 2001; Uzzi, 1996). In line with this, research on the dark side of social capital, 
for example, has suggested that strong, cohesive bonds may prevent individuals or firms 
from making the necessary adjustments to changes in their environments (Gargiulo and 
Benassi, 1999). Despite the need to adjust IORs to changes in the environment to ensure 
that the firm continues to have access to the resources it requires, achieving change in 
inter-organizational  relations  is  often  challenging  as  these  relationships  are  subject  to Chapter 5 
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inertial forces (Kim et al., 2006). Firms that are able to pursue change in their IORs may be 
at an advantage over those with stable IOR portfolios as they are better able to adapt their 
resources to changes in the environment, which is of vital importance to firms (Augier and 
Teece, 2009; Teece, 2007; Zott, 2003). 
Accordingly, we have no theoretical grounds to believe that the effect of portfolio 
reconfiguration will be uniformly positive or negative. In fact, this suggests that the effect 
of change or stability will be contingent on a number of other factors. We expect the effect 
of portfolio reconfiguration to be contingent on the type of change that occurs and the 
characteristics of the portfolio, which stand to impact the level of dependence on partners, 
the information available to them and the relation-specific assets that are available to the 
partnering firms, amongst other things (e.g., Baker, 1990).  
Based on previous IOR research at the dyadic and network levels of analysis, we 
opted to  focus  on  the  size  and  the  relational  dimensions,  which  can  be  altered  by  tie 
addition and by tie deletion (Wassmer, 2010). The size of the portfolio, i.e., the number of 
ties a firm maintains in a specific portfolio, has important implications for both the benefits 
the firm can accrue through the portfolio and the costs it will incur. In the context of R&D 
collaborations,  previous  research  has  linked  the  number  of  collaborations  that  a  firm 
pursues to various performance related outcomes, such as innovative output (e.g., Deeds 
and  Hill, 1996; Shan,  Walker and  Kogut, 1994). In the context of supplier-buyer ties, 
several scholars have argued that the number of supplier ties that a firm maintains has a 
bearing on the level of dependence of the buyer on the suppliers, the level of competition 
between suppliers, and the complexity and cost of managing the portfolio, amongst other 
things (e.g., Baker et al., 1998; Broschak, 2004). Yet, there is little consensus on how 




supplier  tie  portfolios.  The  importance  of  relationship  characteristics,  and  relationship 
strength in particular, has also been well established at the dyadic and network levels of 
analysis  (e.g.,  Capaldo,  2007;  Dhanaraj  et  al.,  2004;  Kotabe  et  al.,  2001),  but  the 
implications of changes in these relational features at the portfolio level have been largely 
ignored. Consequently, we focus on the size and relational dimensions of portfolios when 
examining the effect of reconfiguration on performance.
2    
 
The Role of Portfolio Size 
  In the context of alliances, evidence on the effect of portfolio size on performance 
has  been  mixed  (Wassmer,  2010).  Some  scholars  found  that  having  more  direct  links 
improves innovative output (e.g., Ahuja, 2000a), while others argued that it is not only the 
number of links that affects performance but also the efficiency of the portfolio or the 
network (e.g., Baum, Calabrese and Silverman, 2000). Increasing the number of ties in a 
portfolio can significantly reduce the efficiency of a portfolio as it increases the complexity 
and  coordination  costs.  In  addition,  expanding  portfolio  size  also  increases  potential 
partner redundancy (Baum, Calabrese and Silverman, 2000). Moreover, the formation of 
new supplier ties, particularly if they create redundancies in the portfolio, triggers reactions 
amongst incumbent suppliers (Gadde and Mattson, 1987; Lazzarini and Zenger, 2007). For 
example, incumbent suppliers may lose their exclusivity status or perceive the increased 
competition  between  suppliers  in  the  buyer’s  portfolio  as  a  sign  of  distrust  and 
                                                 
2We recognize that there are additional dimensions that we could be focusing on, such as the structural and 
partner characteristics of the portfolio (Wassmer, 2010). However, the structural dimension, which pertains 
to portfolio breadth and the redundancy in the portfolio, is less relevant than the dimensions we focus on in 
our context. By focusing on the portfolio of ties a firm has with suppliers of a given service, rather than the 
portfolio of all the supplier relations it has for all inputs, or its entire system of IORs, the breadth of the 
portfolio  becomes  less  relevant.  Moreover,  the redundancy  of  the  portfolio  is  also  captured  by  the  size 
dimension in this case. Although the partner dimension certainly remains valid in this context, focusing on 
this dimension would require fine-grained data on characteristics of the partners, which unfortunately we do 
not have at our disposal. Chapter 5 
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consequently,  reduce  their  commitment  to  the  buyer  (Anderson  and  Weitz,  1992).  To 
summarize, a change in supplier portfolio size affects the costs of managing the portfolio, 
its efficiency and suppliers’ commitment. The effect of these changes will be contingent on 
the pre-reconfiguration size of the portfolio. On the one hand, a firm with a small portfolio 
in which the suppliers are not able to fully meet the buyer’s demands may in fact benefit 
from the addition of one or more suppliers, but they would be harmed by tie deletion. The 
addition of ties may also offer firms more switching opportunities between its incumbent 
suppliers and may reduce their dependence on any single supplier. On the other hand, the 
effects of an increase in portfolio size will be very different for a firm that already has a 
large portfolio, and is consequently faced with the accompanying costs and complexities of 
managing  a  large  number  of  supplier  ties.  These  firms  may  in  fact  benefit  from 
reconfiguration that leads to a reduction in portfolio size. Hence we postulate:  
Hypothesis 1: The effect of portfolio reconfiguration on firm performance will be 
moderated by the size of the portfolio prior to reconfiguration. 
 
The Role of Tie Strength  
  Next we focus on the relational dimension of portfolio configurations, of which tie 
strength is an important aspect (Wassmer, 2010). At the dyadic level, a lot of attention has 
been devoted to the benefits and drawback of strong and weak ties. In addition, alliance 
portfolio research has recognized the importance of tie strength in assessing the benefits 
that firms derive from alliance portfolios (Wassmer, 2010). Weak ties are often used to 
provide access to new opportunities and maintain flexibility, while strong ties are often 
associated  with  higher  levels  of  commitment,  trust  and  the  development  of  relation-




Moorman, 2001). Lazzarini and Zenger (2007) emphasized the need for firms to foster 
churning in tie portfolios - thereby adjusting the tie strength in their portfolio - in order to 
capture the benefits of both weak and strong ties. 
Nevertheless,  achieving  churn  may  come  at  a  cost.  More  precisely,  when 
attempting to achieve change in IORs, firms may “set back the liability of newness clock”, 
which will negatively affect performance in the short run (Kim et al., 2006:716). In other 
words, change in portfolios with strong ties may lead to the destruction of the relation-
specific assets that have developed in those ties over time as a result of the emergence of 
idiosyncratic  interaction  routines  that  allow  for  more  effective  communication  and 
collaboration. This  is particularly problematic as these assets are often associated with 
efficiency and performance improvements for both the suppliers and the buyers (Fichman 
and Levinthal, 1991; Kotabe et al., 2003; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988). Hence, achieving 
reconfiguration through tie deletion will have a negative effect on firm performance if the 
portfolio contains strong ties, as it will lead to the destruction of the relation-specific assets 
that have developed over time. However, the addition of new ties to a portfolio of strong 
ties, may help firms achieve the necessary balance between weak and strong ties (Uzzi, 
1996). Hence, we expect the performance  consequences of portfolio reconfiguration to 
differ depending on the strength of the ties in the portfolio.  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of portfolio reconfiguration on firm performance will be 
moderated by the strength of the ties in the portfolio.  
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METHODS 
Data and Sample 
In order to test our hypotheses we focus on the relationships firms maintain with 
advertising agencies, which constitute important service suppliers. Advertising ties are of 
substantial importance to clients and decisions pertaining to these relationships may even 
affect  the  value  of  the  firm,  as  the  onset of  a  new  agency-client  relationship  leads  to 
negative stock market reactions (Mathur and Mathur, 1996). In addition, advertising affects 
the image of the firm and its products or services, its brand equity, and it sales (Dekimpe 
and  Hannsens,  1995;  Jones,  2007;  Kim,  1993). In  addition,  agency-client  relationships 
usually entail  no more than a 90-day  notice  for cancellation,  making reconfiguration a 
feasible  option  (Horsky,  2006).  In  short,  these  relationships  are  important  to  firms, 
reconfiguration  can  be  achieved  in  a  relatively  short time  span  and  is  likely  to  affect 
performance,  making  this  an  ideal  setting  to  study  the  effects  of  supplier  portfolio 
reconfiguration. 
Our unit of analysis is the portfolio of relationships firms maintain with advertising 
agencies,  i.e.,  all  the  relationships  they  have  in  a  given  year.  Data  on  supplier-buyer 
(agency-client) ties was obtained from The Standard Directory of Advertising Agencies 
and The Standard Directory of Advertisers, also known in the industry as The Red Books. 
This  directory  provides  a  comprehensive  listing  of  U.S.  advertising  agencies  and  their 
clients and has been published on an annual basis for the past 80 years. It contains detailed 
information  on  advertising  agencies  and  on  advertisers,  including  account  information, 
specialization of the agency, core business of the advertisers, contact information on key 
agency personnel, ownership details, and the number of employees. These data have been 




Moreover, the richness of the data ensures us that we capture all relationships firms have 
with agencies at a given point in time. This allows us to get a complete picture of the 
firms’ supplier (agency) portfolios on a yearly basis.  
We use a sample of 1,118 North American firms from a variety of industries listed 
in the Standard Directory of Advertisers.
3 We restricted our sample to firms for which we 
were  able  to track  the  start  dates of  the  relationships  they  reported  in  1994,  which  is 
essential to examine the relational dimension of the portfolio.
4 Subsequently, we tracked 
these firms from 1994 to 1999 to determine their portfolios of agency ties, providing us 
with a panel data set.    
  We collected performance data from the Thomson Financial Datastream and from 
Compustat North America databases. In addition, we collected information on the firms’ 
M&A  activity  in  the  focal  time  period  from  the  Thomson  Financial  Security  Data 
Corporation (SDC) database.  
For  a  number  of  clients  performance  data  was  not  available,  or  we  could  not 
observe the portfolio’s configuration for more than one year - thereby preventing us from 
examining  the  changes  in  the  portfolio.  These  firms  were  excluded  from  our  sample, 
reducing our sample size to 2,633 firm-year records.  
 
                                                 
3 Information on these companies and their advertising agencies was collected in light of a series of studies 
focusing on the determinants of supplier-buyer tie continuation. More detailed information on the selection 
criteria is available in Chapters 3 and 4. The focal sample also contains a set of companies comparable to 
those included in Chapter 4 in terms of size and industry, but which were not involved in acquisitions. As a 
result, the sample contains companies from a wide variety of industries, varying in size and along other 
dimensions, for which we control to the extent possible.  
4  Despite  the  comprehensiveness  of  the  directories,  tracking  relationships  and  firms  is  sometimes 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  firms  change  names,  ownership,  or  the  level  at  which  they  report  their 
advertising agencies in the directory. Although in most cases we were able to overcome these difficulties, in 
some instances it was impossible to find the focal company or be certain that we were tracking the right 
company. The absence of a company from the directory in a given year can also reflect the fact that the firm 
didn’t meet the criteria to be included in the directory, i.e., spending a minimum of $200,000 on national or 
multi-state advertising in a given year.  Chapter 5 
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Dependent Variable 
  We used Return on Sales (ROS) as our primary indicator of firm performance. We 
deem ROS to be particularly suitable as a dependent variable for our purpose as it takes 
into account both the potential cost and revenue effects of portfolio reconfiguration. Ample 
research has examined how advertising affects sales (e.g., Dekimpe and Hannsens, 1995; 
Jones, 2007; Kim, 1993). Most of the early research in this area examined the effect of 
advertising expenditures on sales (e.g., Assmus, Farley and Lehmann, 1984; Clarke, 1976; 
Dhalla, 1978). Yet, changing the level of advertising expenditure is not the only way to 
alter sales, changes in advertising copy and quality also influence sales and profitability 
(Jedidi et al., 1999). Hence, changes in advertising agency-client relationships are often 
made to obtain different perspectives and improve quality, with the underlying goal of 
increasing sales, but also potentially to affect advertising costs. ROS captures the effects of 
these changes. We measured ROS at different time intervals as we expect the impact of the 
different aspects of reconfiguration to vary in the time frame they need to materialize. For 
example, tie deletion will have a relatively quick impact on performance, as a result of the 
immediate cost cutting effects, while the effect of the addition of new ties will need more 
time to materialize. More precisely, industry experts claim it takes new agencies about 
three  to  six  months  to  establish  a  sound  relationship  with  the  client  and  familiarize 
themselves with the company and its products, and the results will start to show after this 
familiarization period (Parekh, 2010).  
Independent Variables 
Firms can achieve reconfiguration in their supplier portfolios in several ways, i.e., 
by adding ties, by eliminating ties or a combination thereof. Hence, we constructed several 




between  the  addition  and  deletion  of  ties  as  vehicles  to  achieve  reconfiguration.  We 
constructed  a  measure  of  the  gross  number  of  ties  deleted  and  the  net  number  of  ties 
deleted (i.e., deleted and not replaced by a new supplier). We build similar measures for 
the gross number of ties added and the net number of ties added.  
For  the  interaction  effects  with  portfolio  size  we  use  the  number  of  ties  per 
thousand employees the firm had prior to the reconfiguration taking place. We chose to use 
a measure that takes into account the size of the firm as well as the size of the portfolio to 
avoid confounding the effect of portfolio size with that of firm size. For the interaction 
effect with tie strength, we use the age of the ties in the portfolio as a measure of their 
strength. We recognize that prior duration is only one of multiple factors that contribute to 
tie strength (Granovetter, 1973). Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to further refine 
this  measurement  by  looking  at  for  example  intensity  of  interaction  or  the  level  of 
reciprocity in the relationship (Granovetter, 1973). We focus on duration as an indication 
of  tie  strength  as  previous  research  has  shown  that  over  time  relation-specific  assets 
develop  in  supplier-buyer ties which  foster collaboration and  increase the  strength and 
stability of the relationship, thereby reducing the likelihood of tie dissolution (Fichman and 
Levinthal, 1991; Kotabe et al., 2003; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988).
5 For our interaction 
with strength of the ties  in the portfolio, we use the average age of portfolio ties and 
interact it with the measures of tie addition and tie deletion, respectively.  
Control Variables 
We control for firm age as well as firm size, which we approximate by the number of 
people employed in the firm. At the supplier-portfolio level we control for the average age 
                                                 
5 Moreover, the results of Chapter 4 show that duration also improves the likelihood of a tie being maintained 
post-M&A. Hence, duration is associated with the ability to overcome major changes, which in turn can be 
seen as an indication of tie strength.  Chapter 5 
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of ties in the portfolio in the focal year. In some cases firms rely on an in-house advertising 
agency, either as a sole provider of advertising services or in combination with external 
agencies. We included a dummy variable which takes on the value of one if the in-house 
agency  is  the  only  agency  they  maintain  in  a  given  year.
6  In  order  to  capture  any 
performance effects of the occurrence of an M&A in the focal firm, we include a dummy 
which takes on the value of one if an acquisition took place in the year prior to the focal 
year. Since ROS may vary considerably across industries, we also control for the average 
ROS  of  the  focal  firm’s  primary  industry.  Finally,  we  include  a  lagged  value  of 
performance (ROS) in all our models.  
Analysis 
Given the nature of our data, i.e., its panel structure, we used a Hausman test to 
determine whether fixed- or random-effects models should be used (Greene, 2008). This 
test  showed  that  fixed-effect  models  are  the  most  appropriate.  Hence,  we  tested  our 
hypotheses by means of ordinary least squares regressions for panel data with firm fixed-
effects. We used robust Huber-White standard errors in all our models.  
We took several measures to alleviate concerns about reverse causality. Firstly, our 
independent variables are lagged. Secondly, we include a lagged dependent variable in all 
our models. Finally, we tested for so-called Granger Causality, i.e., whether lagged values 
of  t x have explanatory power in a regression of a variable  t y on lagged variables of t y and 
t x  (Greene, 2008). Hence, to establish potential reversed causality, we examine whether 
lagged values of performance explain reconfiguration. We do not find any evidence of 
reversed causality, i.e., changes in performance driving portfolio reconfiguration, through 
                                                 
6 This does not preclude the possibility that the client changes between in-house and external agencies over 
time,  or adds  external  agencies  to  their  own  in-house  agency.  We  return  to  this  issue  in the  additional 




this test. Although a Granger causality tests does not definitively establish cause and effect, 
we  feel that these results  in combination with the other  measures we took, reduce the 
likelihood that we are in fact observing the effects of reversed causality.  
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for clients and tie portfolios can be found in 
Table 1. On average, firms have 1.93 ties in their portfolio. The average tie age in the 
portfolios is 5.80 years. The average Return on Sales is 11.40%. 
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Before  testing  our  hypotheses,  which  predict  interaction  effects  between 
reconfiguration  and  the  characteristics  of  the  portfolio,  we  test  for  direct  effects  of 
reconfiguration.  We  fail  to  find  evidence  of  any  direct  effects,  suggesting  that  as  we 
postulated, the effect of reconfiguration on performance is not uniform. 
Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of the results for Hypothesis 1. The F-statistics 
show that the models are significant relative to an intercept-only model. To verify that 
multicollinearity  is  not  a  problem  we  checked  the  variance  inflation  factors  of  our 
independent variables. These factors are all well below 10, thereby alleviating concerns 
about multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1996). 
As we expect the impact of reconfiguration to differ over time, we performed our 
analyses on ROS at time t and at time t+1. Hence, we will discuss the results for both these 
windows. In our base models (Model 1 in Table 2 and Model 6 in Table 3 for time t and 
t+1, respectively), we observe a marginally significant negative effect of firm size (at t+1) 
and a positive effect of industry average ROS on firms’ ROS (at t).  
We first examined the interaction between tie addition and portfolio size. When we 
looked at the gross number of ties that were added to the portfolio, regardless of whether or 
not they replaced dissolved ties, we found that tie addition has a positive effect on ROS but 
this effect is moderated by portfolio size (Model 2, Table 2 and p<0.01 in Model 7, Table 
3). Bringing new suppliers into the portfolio could render the portfolio more complete. 
Yet, when the firm already has a large portfolio, adding new ties may reduce the efficiency 
of the portfolio as a result of more redundant ties. Our results suggest that the potential 
benefits of adding new ties to the portfolio needs some time to materialize as the effect is 
not significant in the immediate aftermath of reconfiguration.  
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To determine whether this effect is due to the effect of rejuvenation of the portfolio 
or the expansion of the portfolio, we subsequently looked at the net number of ties added 




the  interaction  between  portfolio  size  and  net  number  of  ties  added  is  negative  and 
significant (p<0.05 in Model 3, p<0.001 in Model 8). Hence, the findings are consistent 
with those for the gross number of ties added. Hence, expanding a portfolio by adding ties 
could be detrimental for performance if the firm already has a large portfolio in place, as 
shown in Figures 1a-c. This suggests that the cost of managing extra ties is an important 
factor to take into account when considering portfolio reconfiguration. 
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Meanwhile, as shown in Models 4 and 9, the gross number of ties deleted has a 
negative effect on performance, but this effect is moderated by portfolio size. This effect 
only becomes significant at time t+1 (p<0.001 in Model 9, Table 3), but is consistent over 
time. When we restrict our analysis to ties that are deleted but not replaced, i.e., the net 
number of ties deleted, we observe the same effect. Hence, as Figures 2 a-b show, the 
deletion  of  ties  deteriorates  performance  of  firms  with  small  portfolios,  but  improves 
performance for those that have large portfolios in place (p<0.001 in Model 10, Table 3).  
This negative effect for firms with small portfolios illustrates the danger of cutting into 
supplier portfolios, which could result into lower sales, less complete marketing programs, 
or lower commitment of other suppliers out of fear of being eliminated next. Firms with 
large portfolios may be more able to overcome these pitfalls because they have a more 
comprehensive portfolio to turn to, and by eliminating ties they significantly reduce the 
complexity and costs associated with managing a large portfolio. To summarize, we find 




reconfiguration and on the time window we focus on, but we find consistent evidence that 
the effect is moderated by portfolio size. Hence, we find support for Hypothesis 1. 
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In Hypothesis 2 we postulated that the effect of reconfiguration is contingent on the 
strength  of  the  ties  in  the  portfolio.  We  examine  the  interaction  effect  between 
reconfiguration and the average age of the ties in the portfolio, which we use as a proxy for 









We failed to find any significant evidence for the predicted moderating effect of 
average tie age on the relationship  between tie  addition and deletion, respectively  and 
performance, in the immediate aftermath of the reconfiguration efforts. However, at t+1 we 
find evidence that the positive effect of tie addition is moderated by the average age of the 
ties in the portfolio (p<0.05 in Model 15,Table 5). 
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As Figure 3 illustrates, firms with a low average age of portfolio ties benefit from 
tie addition, while firms with a high average age see their performance deteriorate after tie 
addition. Yet, we only observe this for the gross number of ties added. Moreover, we fail 
to find a significant interaction between the (gross or net) number of ties deleted and the 
average age of the ties in the portfolio (Models 13-14, Table 4 and Models 17-18, Table 5). 
Summarizing these results, we only  find  limited evidence  in  support of the  interaction 
between reconfiguration and average tie strength postulated in Hypothesis 2. 
 
 
Additional Analyses  
  We performed several additional analyses to verify the robustness of our results 
and gain additional insights into the effect of reconfiguration on firm performance. Firstly, 
we  examine  the  possibility  that  reconfiguration  decisions  are  not  random,  but  rather 
endogenous to their expected performance implications. To alleviate these concerns, we 
used instrumental variable (IV) regression techniques for panel data.
7 Firstly, we tested 
whether  the  different  measures  of  reconfiguration  are  indeed  subject  to  endogeneity 
                                                 
7 We opted for instrumental variable methods because recent developments in this area (e.g. the xtivreg2 
command in Stata developed by Schaffer (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2010)) deal with the panel structure 




concerns (Baum, 2006). This is particularly important since using IV estimation techniques 
leads to a loss of efficiency, which is well warranted when OLS estimators are biased and 
inconsistent as a result of endogeneity but not when the explanatory variable(s) are in fact 
uncorrelated with the error term (Baum, 2006; Woolridge, 2009). We identified several 
potential instruments that impact reconfiguration but not ROS at times t or t+1, namely 
lagged measures of reconfiguration, history of tie addition, history of tie dissolution over 
the past four  years, and a  lagged  measure of  industry sales growth. We tested for the 
exogeneity and relevance of these instruments in all models and retained those that were 
both exogenous and relevant. Subsequently, we performed the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
which compares the coefficient vectors resulting from OLS and from IV estimation and 
provides a test statistic for the null hypothesis that the OLS estimator is consistent and 
fully  efficient  (Baum,  2006).  The  tests  failed  to  identify  the  different  reconfiguration 
measures as endogenous. Hence, we deem our original analyses appropriate. 
In addition we re-did our analyses with an alternative dependent variable, i.e., sales 
growth, which is defined as:  
















 - IndustryAverage Sales Growth 
The effect of reconfiguration on performance works through two mechanisms, i.e., 
(1) changes in the costs associated with the supplier ties, and (2) changes in the firm’s 
revenues as a result of changes in its supplier ties. This alternative dependent variable will 
only capture the second effect, so we do not expect an exact replication of our results. We 
observe  a  negative,  albeit  immediate,  effect  of  the  net  number  of  ties  added  on  sales 
growth, moderated by portfolio size. However, this effect changes over time as we observe 
a positive effect of (both net and gross) tie addition on sales growth (at t+2), which is Chapter 5 
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moderated by portfolio size. Although the immediate effect is at odds with our findings for 
ROS, the longer-term effect is in line with our findings. We fail to find any evidence of the 
interaction between the average age of ties in the portfolio and tie addition or deletion.  
  Our analyses only provided limited insights into the role of the relational dimension 
in the relationship between portfolio reconfiguration and performance. This may be partly 
due to the fact that we use the average age of ties in the portfolio to get at the strength of 
the ties, while the balance between strong and weak ties may be more important. Hence, 
we constructed a measure of balance by calculating the proportion of old (strong) to new 
(weak) ties  in  the  portfolio.  Based  on  previous  research  and  industry  publications,  we 
deemed ties that have existed for 5 years or more as old and strong ties. Subsequently, we 
performed  a  sample  split  based  on  the  direction  of  the  imbalance,  i.e.,  whether  it  is 
imbalanced towards more old than new ties or vice versa. Since, old ties cannot be added 
by definition, the only way to achieve  balance  in a portfolio dominated by  young ties 
would be to delete young ties. Yet, we do not find any effect of tie deletion in general (not 
taking into account the age of the ties deleted). Moreover, we fail to find evidence of a 
deterioration of performance as a result of tie addition, which aggravates the imbalance. In 
the  subsample  with  portfolios  that  are  dominated  by  old,  strong  ties  we  find  that  tie 
deletion has a negative effect on performance. Although this does not guarantee that the 
imbalance is reduced, as it does not distinguish between the deletion of old and new ties, 
this may suggest that the damage done by deleting ties from a strong portfolio exceeds the 
benefits of achieving a better balance between strong (old) and weak (young) ties.  
Our sample contains a substantial number of firms that have only one supplier in 
their portfolio. Many of these firms change suppliers, or expand their portfolios during the 




throughout the entire time period. Although we believe the  inclusion of these  firms  is 
imperative  to  understanding  the  performance  implications  of  the  full  range  of 
reconfiguration choices firms pursue, we recognize that this may raise concerns about the 
relevance  of  studying  portfolio  reconfiguration  for  these  firms.  Hence,  we  re-did  our 
analyses  excluding  firms  that  maintained  one  tie  and  did  not  implement  any  type  of 
reconfiguration throughout the entire period. The results are consistent with the results on 
the full sample.  
Finally, we used an alternative measure of portfolio size to test the interaction with 
the different measures of reconfiguration. While in the main analyses we used a measure 
that takes into account firm size, i.e., the number of ties per thousand employees, when 
measuring portfolio size, we now use a simple count of the number of ties in the portfolio. 
The results are consistent with those presented in our main analyses.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Extant research has predominantly taken a dyadic perspective when examining the 
effect  of  inter-organizational  relations,  and  supplier-buyer  ties  in  particular,  on  firm 
performance. In addition, the tendency has been to focus on the performance implications 
of  IORs  from  a  static  perspective,  rather  than  focusing  on  the  changes  in  these 
relationships  and  the  subsequent  effects  on  performance.  To  address  this  void  in  the 
literature, we examined the performance implications of supplier portfolio reconfiguration. 
Drawing  on  different  perspectives,  we  highlighted  both  the  benefits  and  downsides  of 
stability in IOR portfolios and aimed to empirically determine which effect prevails and in 
particular, how this depends on the characteristics of the portfolio. Previous research has Chapter 5 
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shown  that  supplier-buyer  ties  affect  performance;  in  a  service  context  we  found  that 
advertising agency-client relationships affect returns on sales  in particular. Our results, 
however, showed that the effect of portfolio reconfiguration on performance is complex 
and  depends  on the  dimension  of  reconfiguration,  as  well  as  the  characteristics  of  the 
portfolio. Moreover, the immediate performance effects of reconfiguration may differ from 
the longer-term effects, as evidenced in our robustness checks.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, our study improves 
our understanding of the effect of IORs, which constitute an important resource, on firm 
performance. In particular, by  focusing on changes  in these relationships, we provided 
insights  into  the  risks  associated  with  the  reconfiguration  of  inter-firm  resources.  
Secondly, we moved away from the dyadic level, recognizing that IORs are part of a larger 
system of relationships. Hence, changes at the dyadic level will have broader implications 
on the entire system in which the IORs are embedded. What’s more, the impact of these 
changes  will  be  contingent  on  the  broader  context,  i.e.,  the  portfolio,  in  which  these 
relationships are engrained. Not considering the entire portfolio, may therefore distort the 
true implications of IOR change. Thirdly,  by taking  into account a  firm’s portfolio of 
supplier-buyer  ties,  and  thereby  offering  a  more  comprehensive  view  of  inter-firm 
resources, we were able to examine the effect of change along a number of dimensions that 
cannot be assessed by studying ties in isolation. As a result, we further our understanding 
of the dynamics of inter-organizational relations. Moreover, Wassmer (2010) called for 
longitudinal research taking both the inflow and outflow of alliances into account to gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of alliance portfolio evolution. Along the same vein, 
Lazzarini and Zenger (2007) argued that tie formation and dissolution cannot be studied in 




take into account both dynamics when studying the evolution of IOR portfolios and their 
performance implications. Finally, our results offer some guidelines to avoid the pitfalls of 
inappropriate  portfolio  reconfiguration  and  suggest  that  firms  would  benefit  from 
developing an IOR portfolio reconfiguration capability that can help them make changes in 
their portfolios when necessary. Augier and Teece (2009:411) argued that the dynamic 
capabilities of firms constitute “the capacity to sense and seize opportunities, and then 
transform and reconfigure as opportunities and competitive forces dictate”. Consequently, 
firm  performance  is  contingent  on  the  ability  to  transform  and  reconfigure  resources 
configurations when necessary (Zott, 2003). Our results suggest that developing a dynamic 
portfolio  reconfiguration  capability  may  be  instrumental  in  helping  firms  achieve  the 
benefits of reconfiguration, while avoiding the pitfalls of making inappropriate changes to 
IOR portfolios.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
  Although our study has provided numerous useful insights into the performance 
consequences  of  portfolio  reconfiguration,  additional  research  is  required  to  fully 
understand the dynamics and performance implications of these changes. The time frame 
we focus on may only give us partial insights into the consequences of reconfiguration. 
Focusing on the immediate effect of reconfiguration and the effect in the subsequent year 
showed us that the effect becomes more pronounced or may even change over time, hence 
additional research on the long-term effects of portfolio reconfiguration is well warranted.  
  We built on prior research that has suggested that portfolio size determines the cost 
and complexities associated with the management of portfolios, as well as the efficiency 
and the degree of redundancy in the portfolio (Baum et al., 2000; Wassmer, 2010). Yet, we Chapter 5 
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do not empirically assess whether changes in portfolio size also affect the redundancy in 
the portfolio, i.e., the number of suppliers providing the same products or services. In our 
setting all suppliers, broadly speaking, provide the same service, i.e., advertising related 
services. Nevertheless, suppliers may still vary in the exact services they provide, e.g., 
whether they focus on promotion, on brand building, or on general advertising, suggesting 
that the degree of redundancy in two portfolio of the same size may still differ. Hence, 
future  research  would  benefit  from  examining  whether  the  effect  of  tie  addition  and 
deletion on firm performance is contingent upon the level of redundancy in the portfolio. 
In addition, the limited effects of tie strength that we uncovered may be due to the fact that 
we only capture one aspect of tie strength, i.e., prior duration, while the strength of ties can 
also be affected by other factors such as the intensity of collaboration and communication, 
for example. Unfortunately, we were unable to present a more fine-grained analysis of the 
role of tie strength, or the relational dimension of the portfolio configuration, leaving this 
as an important issue to be addressed in future research.  
Another  limitation  lies  in  the  fact  that  our  data  did  not  allow  us  to  study  the 
changes in the partner dimension of the portfolio. As a result, we may not be capturing the 
full effect of changes in inter-firm resources. Some scholars have argued that inter-firm 
resources,  or  network  resources  as  they  are  sometimes  referred  to,  reside  in  the 
relationships between a firm and its partners (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1999). 
Others have suggested that the resources that the partner firms possess, and which can be 
accessed through the relationship, constitute network resources (e.g., Lavie, 2006). Based 
on the insights obtained from previous research is it likely that both have the ability to 
contribute to firm performance. Consequently, research would benefit from examining and 




partners’ resources that can be accessed through the relationship, instead of arguing in 
favor of one definition over another. The examination of IOR portfolio reconfiguration can 
provide insights into this by simultaneously examining changes along the relational and the 
partner dimensions.  
  Another  shortcoming  of  our  study  is  that  we  focused  solely  on  portfolio 
characteristics as moderators of the relationship between reconfiguration and performance. 
However, the effect of reconfiguration may also be contingent on firm characteristics. For 
example,  some  firms  may  possess  skills  that  help  them  implement  reconfiguration 
decisions more successfully. Future research may examine whether prior experience with 
reconfiguration, of supplier tie or other IOR portfolios, provides firms with such skills and 
moderates the relationship between reconfiguration and performance.  
  We  statistically  deal  with  the  issue  of  endogeneity,  but  we  do  not  address  the 
causes  of  reconfiguration  theoretically,  which  would  be  an  interesting  issue  for  future 
research. Firms may pursue supplier portfolio reconfiguration for a variety of reasons. For 
example, they may add ties to their portfolio to reduce their dependence on their incumbent 
suppliers and shift the power balance in the relationships. Reconfiguration may also be the 
result of the occurrence of a merger or acquisition. M&As are often seen as a way to 
reconfigure firm resources in order to achieve higher levels of efficiency or build stronger 
capabilities  (Capron,  1999).  The  performance  implications  of  M&A  induced 
reconfiguration may therefore be very different from the consequences of, for example, 
reconfiguration aimed at shifting the power balance between the firm and its suppliers. 
Furthermore, the firm’s environment may also play a crucial role in the desirability of, or 
even  need  for,  portfolio  reconfiguration.  Reconfiguration  triggered  by  environmental 
changes may have a different effect on performance than reconfiguration pursued by firms Chapter 5 
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in  a  stable  environment.  Hence,  focusing  on  both  the  causes  and  consequences  of 
reconfiguration  would  provide  a  more  comprehensive  view  on  the  performance 
implications of portfolio reconfiguration.  
Finally, we  focused on the portfolios of ties  firms  maintain with  suppliers of a 
specific service, i.e., advertising. This context provides many benefits over manufacturing 
settings. For example, reconfiguration may be more easily attainable in these contexts as 
physical asset specificity tends to be extremely low, if not non-existent, and agreements 
tend to be of legally open-ended nature and usually entail no more than a 90-day notice for 
cancellation  (Horsky,  2006).  We  believe  our  results  are  generalizable,  even  though 
reconfiguration  may  be  harder  to  achieve  in  other  contexts.  Yet,  an  extension  of  this 
research in a different setting may call for a focus on different aspects or dimensions of 
performance, such as return on assets, or product, process or lead time improvements. We 
would expect supplier portfolio reconfiguration to have a much stronger impact on the 
latter dimensions of performance than on the firm’s overall bottom line. We also believe 
that our study provides a useful basis for future research on the reconfiguration of alliance 
portfolios.  Yet,  research  on  changes  in  alliance  portfolios  will  have  to  overcome  a 
challenge that we did not face in our setting. More precisely, the context that we focused 
on allowed us to study complete portfolios of ties of a specific kind, without having to 
make  assumptions  about  the  duration  of  these  relationships.  Research  on  alliance 
portfolios, on the other hand, often has to make assumptions about the duration of the 
alliances to determine the composition of the portfolio in a given year as the data sources 
generally used do not specify the termination date of the collaborations (e.g., Lavie and 
Miller, 2008; Srivastava and Gnyawali, 2010).  













































While  much  research  on  IORs  has  examined  their  antecedents  and  performance 
implications, less is known about their evolution. In addition, with a few notable exceptions, 
previous  research  has  examined  IORs  in  isolation  from  each  other  and  from  other  strategic 
actions. I addressed these two issues in Chapters 2-4. In Chapter 2 I presented a review of the 
extant literature. The most striking gaps in the literature pertain to the interplay between different 
types  of  IORs  and  the  effect  of  strategic  and  environmental  factors  on  the  evolution  and 
dissolution of IORs. In the subsequent chapters I addressed some of these issues empirically. In 
Chapter 3, I showed that corporate development activity experience, particularly experience with 
alliances and equity  joint-ventures, influences the stability of supplier-buyer ties. The results 
provide interesting insights into the interplay between IORs. In short, gaining experience with 
some types of corporate development activities, particularly those that can be considered to be 
IORs, will result in greater supplier tie stability, but the effects are not uniform across IORs. The 
insights gained from this study illustrate the importance of distinguishing between different types 
of IORs and taking their differences and similarities into account for research on experiential 
learning in the context of IORs.  
I examined the effect of the occurrence of an M&A on supplier ties in more detail in 
Chapter 4. Even though the study in Chapter 3 did not find substantive spillovers from M&A 
experience to supplier tie stability, under certain circumstances buyer M&As should cause both 
buyers and suppliers to reconsider their ties. I focused on post-M&A changes in competitive 
overlap between the merged company and the other buyers in the focal supplier’s customer base. Chapter 6        
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I analyzed the implications of changes in competitive overlap, from both the buyer’s and the 
supplier’s perspective. From the buyer’s perspective, an increase in competitive overlap has a 
negative effect on the likelihood of tie continuation, but contrary to what I predicted, this effect 
is moderated by the importance of the service provided by the focal supplier to the buyer. From 
the  supplier’s  perspective,  the  negative  effect  of  an  increase  in  competitive  overlap  on  the 
likelihood of tie continuation is moderated by the importance of the buyer to the supplier. These 
results suggest that buyers are concerned about sharing a supplier with competitors, but these 
fears are mitigated when the buyers are in a better bargaining position and can use their power to 
force suppliers to put protective mechanisms in place. Suppliers seem to be driven by the fear of 
losing important incumbent clients as a result of competitive overlap.  
In  Chapter  5  I  showed  that  the  reconfiguration  of  supplier  portfolios  alters  firm 
performance. I draw on arguments from several theoretical perspectives that have recognized the 
importance of IORs for firm performance, and that have argued in favor of tie stability or change, 
including  the  relational  view,  the  resource  based  view,  the  dynamic  capabilities  view  and 
resource dependence theory. Based on the insights gained through these various perspectives, I 
argue that portfolio reconfiguration does not have a uniform effect on performance and instead, 
its effect depends on the characteristics of the portfolio and type of change that is pursued. It 
makes a difference whether a buyer adds or drops supplier ties; furthermore, the effects of these 
changes are contingent on the characteristics of both the portfolio and the set of ties within it. 
More precisely, my results show that the effect of adding or deleting ties will depend on the size 
of the portfolio prior to reconfiguration and the strength of the ties in the portfolio. The positive 
performance  implications  of  tie  addition,  and  the  negative  implications  of  tie  deletion  are General Conclusions 
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moderated by the size of the portfolio. Furthermore, the positive effect of the addition of ties is 
also tempered by the average strength of ties in the portfolio 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Taken together, the findings of my research offer several important contributions to the 
literature  on  IORs  in  general.  Firstly,  I  have  identified  hitherto  un-researched  or  under-
researched drivers of relationship evolution and dissolution. By examining the interplay between 
different types of IORs and between IORs and M&As, I have started to tackle one of the main 
shortcomings of extant research, i.e., the tendency to study IORs in isolation of each other and in 
isolation of other strategic actions. Consequently, I contribute to the co-evolutionary perspective 
on IORs - which suggests IORs cannot be seen in isolation from firms’ broader strategies - that 
has  emerged  over  the  last  decade.  Secondly,  the  explicit  recognition  of  differences  between 
different types of IORs in Chapters 2 and 3 makes a valuable contribution to the current literature, 
which  has  often  ignored  these  differences  thereby  leading  to  inaccurate  or  contradictory 
conclusions (Mayer and Teece, 2008).  
Thirdly,  in  Chapter  4,  I  have  emphasized  the  need  to  take  a  two-sided  view  when 
studying IORs. Traditionally, research has examined IORs from the perspective of one of the 
parties  involved.  Although  this  has  been  a  general  trend,  I  have  suggested  that  the  implicit 
assumptions that drive this trend are particularly prevalent in studies of supplier-buyer ties. Most 
previous research has assumed that the buyers call the shots and determine when a relationship 
will be terminated. Consequently, relatively little is known about the implications of changes at 
the  buyer  level  for  the  supplier’s  willingness  to  continue  the  relationship.  In  Chapter  4,  I 
discussed  both  the  buyer’s  and  the  supplier’s  incentives  to  keep  a  relationship  ongoing, Chapter 6        
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particularly when changes occur in one of the organizations involved. Although I focused on 
supplier-buyer ties, the implications of my arguments and findings are broader. Research on all 
types of IORs would benefit greatly from taking a more comprehensive view incorporating the 
priorities of all parties in a relationship.  
  Fourthly,  IOR  research,  and  supplier-buyer  tie  research  in  particular,  has  focused 
predominantly  on  manufacturing  settings.  Yet,  professional  services  are  a  major  corporate 
expenditure and contribute to the achievement of competitive advantage (Baker and Faulkner, 
1991). In addition, professional service settings offer an appropriate setting to test some of the 
determinants of tie stability, as these relationships do not entail as much physical asset specificity 
and it is often easier to move out of these relationships. This makes it easier to study the inter-
organization factors under investigation without confounding them with the effects of specialized 
investments in physical assets. 
  In addition, the results from Chapter 3 contribute to the literature on experiential learning. 
Previous  research  in  this  area  has  predominantly  examined  intra-activity  learning.  The  few 
studies  that  acknowledged  the  possibility  of  inter-activity  learning  focused  on  experience 
spillovers  between  corporate  development  activities  (e.g.,  Zollo  and  Reuer,  2009).  Hence,  I 
extend  this  literature  by  examining  in  more  detail  the  determinants  of  the  occurrence  and 
magnitude of experience spillovers between different types CDA and supplier-buyer ties.  
  Chapter  4  also  makes  several  contributions  to  the  M&A  literature.  Insofar  as  inter-
organizational relations are often deemed to be a critical resource for firms, I contribute to the 
literature on post-M&A resource reconfiguration by taking into account the unique challenges 
that the reconfiguration of such boundary spanning resources provide. Furthermore, I extend the 
M&A literature by improving our understanding of the implications of M&As for the merging General Conclusions 
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companies’  partners,  including  suppliers.  Research  in  the organization  and  strategy  field  has 
largely  ignored  the  implications  of  buyer-level  M&As  on  suppliers.  In  the  area  of  finance, 
however, some scholars have recognized that this is an important avenue for future research, as 
suppliers of merging companies will be affected in many ways, including changes in their client 
portfolios, performance, bargaining power, and even their future survival (Fee and Thomas, 2004; 
Shahrur,  2005).  My  findings  also  provide  additional  insights  into  the  competitive  dynamics 
following  M&A.  Previous  research  has  focused  on the  direct  implications  of  M&As  for the 
competitive dynamics in the industries of the merging companies. Yet, the indirect competitive 
dynamics that may be triggered by potential knowledge spillovers through shared suppliers have 
been left unexplored.  
Finally, the results of Chapter 5 contribute to the relational and resource based views, as 
well as to the IOR literature, by showing that it is well warranted to treat IORs as resources that 
contribute to firm performance. The benefits and performance implications of IORs have been 
well documented. However, with a  few  notable exceptions (e.g., Singh and Mitchell, 1996), 
empirical evidence on the implications of IOR change on firm performance or success is lacking. 
My results show that changes in ties need to be made cautiously as they may have a negative 
effect on performance, depending on the type of change as well as characteristics of the portfolio 
of ties. This is all the more relevant as not all changes in ties may be within the control of the 
firm, as I illustrated in the context of post-M&A tie continuation in Chapter 4.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The contributions and limitations of this dissertation indicate several additional avenues 
for  future  research.  While  I  identified  several  gaps  in  the  literature  on  the  evolution  and Chapter 6        
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dissolution  of  IORs  in  Chapter  2,  particularly  pertaining  to  the  effects  of  strategic  and 
environmental  influences,  I  only  empirically  examined  the  effect  of  different  corporate 
development activities. Hence, future research should examine how other strategic actions and 
environmental  changes  affect  the  evolution  and  dissolution  of  different  types  of  IORs.  In 
addition,  with  the  exception  of  Chapter  5,  I  have  focused  on  dyadic  relationships.  Yet,  as I 
argued  in  Chapter  2,  strategic  and  environmental  factors  may  also  alter  firms’  portfolios  or 
networks of IORs. Empirical research is particularly warranted in this area, as most work to date 
has been of a conceptual  nature or examined change  in  networks or IOR portfolios through 
sparse case studies.  
Despite the advances made in this thesis on the interplay between different types of IORs, 
particularly  in the area of experience  spillovers  between CDA and  supplier-buyer ties,  more 
work is needed on the underlying mechanisms that drive spillovers. Despite the richness of the 
data used in this dissertation, it is not sufficient to gain deep insights into the processes and 
decision mechanisms involved. The use of archival data throughout this dissertation has led to 
some additional limitations. While I take a two-sided view of the drivers of tie continuation in 
Chapter 4, I cannot determine empirically who ended the ties in the sample. Future research 
would benefits from a more in depth analysis of the actions of all collaborative partners under 
specific circumstances, provided it recognizes that both (or all) parties in an IOR may initiate 
these actions. 
Lastly,  although I  believe that the  findings  in the advertising  industry are reasonably 
generalizable to other professional services and even to manufacturing contexts, future research 
would benefit from studying the questions raised in this dissertation in different settings as well.  General Conclusions 
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  The goal of this dissertation was to provide insights into the drivers and performance 
implications of changes in inter-organizational relations, and supplier-buyer ties in particular. 
Answering  the  underlying  research  questions  lead  to  novel  insights  and  contributions  to the 
extant literature. Nevertheless, numerous questions for future research remain.  
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